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This thesis explores the ways in which miscarriages of England and Wales' criminal 
justice system (CJS) are currently defined, quantified, constructed and deployed. 
Presented in two parts, the first identifies and argues against the pervasive but 
problematical tendency to conceive miscarriages of justice as exceptional occurrences, 
that are small in number, and that result from post-appeal procedures once existing appeal 
opportunities have been exhausted. In fact, the evidence is that a successful appeal 
against criminal conviction forms a routine and mundane procedure of criminal justice in 
England and Wales. This indicates a need both to re-orientate definitions and 
understandings of miscarriages of justice and to re-calculate the likely scale of the 
phenomenon, an attempt at which is then offered. The second part of the thesis involves a 
broader plane of analysis, examining a range of discourses which articulate challenges to, 
or reforms of, the CJS, with respect to miscarriages. In so doing, a critique is developed 
to show that counter-discourses against miscarriages of justice are hindered by their 
problematic definition and the consequential calculation of miscarriages as a small-scale 
statistical phenomenon. They also labour under a misconception of the relations of power 
in the sphere of criminal justice. This severely diminishes the potential force of critical 
counter-discourse in the existing terrain. As a possible way out of this malaise, a 
Foucauldian-inspired understanding of the inter-relations of power, knowledge and 
`governmentality' is brought into dialogue with the emerging zemiological perspective, 
which seeks a more holistic appraisal of the harmful consequences of social and political 
decisions in the interests of social justice. The critical and reconstructive moves that I 
recommend enable miscarriages of justice to be thought about in new ways and to help 
assess what is to count as effective counter-discourse. The thesis, then, represents a 
determined effort to re-orientate our understanding of miscarriages of justice by moving 
away from `exceptional ism'. This encourages new ways of defining and quantifying 
miscarriages of justice and new ways of developing theoretical resources. The ultimate 
point of the thesis is to contribute towards the production of more effective counter- 
discourses that might achieve lasting practical change in this area of social regulation. 
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Context and aims 
In an historical analysis of miscarriages of England and Wales' criminal justice 
system (CJS) what might be termed a `tradition of criminal justice system reform' can 
be discerned. Within this tradition, corrective legislative reforms are introduced to the 
CJS in response to specific cases of successful appeal against criminal conviction that 
exemplified `failings' in the existing procedural framework. For example, the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure (1981) (RCCP) was established in response to the 
Confait Affair (see Fisher, 1977; Price and Caplan, 1976; Price, 1985) which 
exemplified the procedural ambiguity in the police's role as criminal investigators and 
prosecution decision-makers. Similarly, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 
(1993) (RCCJ) was primarily established in response to the cases of the Guildford 
Four (see May, 1994), the Maguire Seven (see Kee, 1986) and the Birmingham Six 
(see Mullin, 1986)1 which exemplified a procedural reluctance to return meritorious 
cases back to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (CACD). These reviews led to 
a plethora of legislative reforms of the CJS aimed chiefly at reducing the occurrence 
of miscarriages of justice, but also aimed at reducing the overt harm that was caused 
to these victims of wrongful criminal conviction. For example, the RCCP spawned the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) (PACE) which formalised police codes of 
I The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) was announced on the day that the Birmingham 
SLr had their convictions overturned by the CACD (see Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) 
Report (Cm. 2263), London HMSO p. 1). It was also established, in part, to a line of other less well- 
publicised miscarriage of justice cases. See, for example, Woffinden, B. (1987) Miscarriages of Justice 
London; Toronto; Sydney: Hodder & Stoughton. 
conduct when obtaining evidence and the Prosecution of Offences Act (1985) 
(POOA), which established the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). As for the RCCJ, it 
created the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act (1996) (CPIA), which 
introduced a system of advanced disclosure aimed at eliminating miscarriages of 
justice caused by prosecution non-disclosure. Perhaps even more significantly, the 
RCCJ also led to the Criminal Appeal Act (1995), which established the Criminal 
Cases Review Commission (CCRC) with the task of investigating alleged or 
suspected miscarriages of justice that have already been through the appeals system 
and have not succeeded. There are, then, two distinct aspects to the tradition of 
criminal justice reform: a legal concern to correct the procedural framework of the 
CJS to reduce the occurrence of miscarriages of justice; and, a moral concern about 
the harm caused to victims of wrongful criminal conviction as evidenced by 
successful appeals. 
Despite this, the existing literature (discourse) on miscarriages of justice, whether 
from campaign organisations, the media, academic sources, the CJS and/or the 
governmental sphere, has not generally addressed the question of the likely scale of 
the miscarriage of justice phenomenon in any systematic way. Rather, all eyes have 
generally been directed towards what this thesis discerns as specific exceptional cases 
of successful appeal against criminal conviction, brought about through the post- 
appeal procedures of the CCRC, which exemplify new `failings' in the procedural 
framework of the CJS. A profound limitation with this exceptionalism is that 
successful appeals that are achieved through the post-appeal procedures of the CCRC 
represent only a tiny fraction of the total annual number of successful appeals within 
England and Wales. 
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In this context, the overall aim of this thesis is to provide a more adequate 
sociological depiction of both the scale and consequences of wrongful criminal 
convictions in England and Wales, as indicated by the official statistics on successful 
appeals. In the absence of any properly established literature in this area, I want to 
begin to map a new terrain for miscarriages of justice as a field of empirical enquiry 
and as an activity of counter-discourse. I want to show that miscarriages of justice are 
not the exception to the rule but, rather, are a routine and mundane feature of the 
criminal justice process. To that end, the thesis firstly explores arguments about the 
meaning, scale and causes of wrongful criminal convictions and calls for a re- 
orientation of definitions of miscarriages of justice to include all successful appeals 
against criminal conviction. Simultaneously, this brings into focus a corresponding 
scale of victims of wrongful convictions that has not previously been sufficiently 
acknowledged or subjected to appropriate critical appraisal. 
The analysis then turns to the `voices' that have been constructed and deployed as 
counter-discourses aimed at the reform of the CJS for the reduction of the occurrence 
of miscarriages of justice. Following Collini (1991, p. 3) 1 use the metaphor of `voice' 
as opposed to the more usual terminology of `thought', `views' or `theories' of a 
particular author because it more adequately captures the `identity', in the broadest 
sense, which a particular participator in the dialogue and/or mediation of miscarriages 
of justice seeks to present. At the same time, a notion of voice draws attention to the 
characteristic patterns of forms of `discourse'/'counter-discourse' (in the Foucauldian 
sense) that reveal the relation between individual commentators in the various 
3 
domains and the `audiences' to which they are addressed and hope to activate. 
2 The 
attempt here is to show that, because they are rooted in an extremely limited 
definition of miscarriages as exceptional events, and a corresponding perception of 
the scale of the phenomenon as rare and small scale, all existing voices against 
miscarriages of justice have themselves been limited in their remit and impact. 
Consequently, not only do existing voices tend to concentrate on the legal plane at the 
expense of the moral consequences and social harm of wrongful convictions, the form 
and extent of the reforms of the CJS that have been achieved have also been 
extremely limited. For the exceptionalism displayed in the terrain of miscarriages of 
justice, which is often geared to the exposure of alarming and outrageous individual 
moral wrongs, paradoxically only serves to minimise the sense that there is something 
systematically and routinely alarming about the operation of the CJS. Exceptionalism, 
in fact, makes it relatively easy to restore an adequate `legal equilibrium' once the 
procedural `failings' that the exceptional cases exemplify have been adjusted for. 
However, my own more `mundane' approach actually leads to a fuller and deeper 
sense of the moral consequences which accompany the operations of the CJS. This 
contributes to the growing literature on the procedures by which utterances, generally 
written texts, but also visual presentations, are expressed and deployed in the 
disciplinary fields which constitute the human sciences and attempt to display how 
2 As will become apparent, this analysis, then, differs somewhat from Collini (1991) who did not 
invoke the abbreviations of `discourse'/'counter-discourse' due to the specific assumptions about 
`power' that they conjure up. Alternatively, this thesis grounds notions of voice within a Foucauldian 
inspired reading of the interplay of discourse and its counter-discursive opposition precisely in an 
attempt to show the processes of power within the terrain of miscarriages of justice and the reform of 
the CJS. 
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such texts are organised and ultimately how voices articulate their claims (Hand and 
Velody, 1997, p. 1). 3 
In this respect, there is a theoretical dimension to the thesis of considerable 
importance for the available critical voices or counter-discourses against miscarriages 
of justice, which have generally been over-concerned with what Foucault described as 
a `sovereign' view of power. Put another way, oppositional counter-discourses have 
tended to be caught up in `conspiracy' accounts of the causes of miscarriages of 
justice and their remedy. Consequently, the counter-strategies that have been devised 
and/or deployed have been rather moralistic and negative in nature; as if nothing can 
be achieved by discursive contestation other than a legitimisation of the system or 
form of power to which critics stand totally opposed. Ironically, this severely 
diminishes the potential force of critical counter-discourse against miscarriages of 
justice. For, as Foucault's researches demonstrated, forms of power are not just about 
the brutal domination of the weaker by the stronger, whether measured in physical or 
economic terms. They are also about the interplay of forms of knowledge (discourse) 
and their counter-discursive opposition that are productive and/or constitutive of 
forms of social reality and human conduct: 
`We should admit. . . that power produces 
knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it 
because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge 
directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative 
3 See also, for example, Lynch, M. (1997) `A so-called "fraud": moral modulations in a literary 
scandal' History of the Human Sciences Volume 10, Number 3, pp. 9-21; Smith, R. (1997) `History 
and the history of the human sciences: what voice? ' History of the Human Sciences Volume 10, 
Number 3, pp. 22-39; Burke, S. (1997) `Who speaks? Who writes? Dialogue and authorship in the 
Phaedrus' History of the Human Sciences Volume 10, Number 3, pp. 40-55; Osborne, T. & Rose, N. 
(1997) `In the name of society, or three theses on the history of social thought' History of the Human 
Sciences Volume 10, Number 3, pp. 87-104. 
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constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and 
constitute at the same time power relations' (Foucault, 1977, p. 27). 
Accordingly, the various existing counter-discursive voices do, of course, need to be 
heard and appreciated for the contribution to the depictions of miscarriages of justice 
that they make and the reforms of the CJS that they achieve. I am emphatically not 
saying that existing voices are in any way wrong or unwarranted. Rather, because 
existing voices against miscarriages of justice are grounded in exceptionalist 
understandings, they are simply very limited, both in terms of the scale of wrongful 
criminal convictions that can be conceived, and the accompanying scale of victims. 
Furthermore, in being entirely reform-orientated, existing voices against miscarriages 
of justice have also been insufficient in analyses of the wider harmful implications of 
the current scale of successful appeals against criminal conviction. Moreover, existing 
voices do not deliver an adequate understanding of power, of discourse and its 
counter-discursive opposition, or of the constitutive character of the exercise of CJS 
power and procedural reform of the CJS. To attend to this, the analyses of the thesis 
contribute to a new account of the forms of power and harm inhabiting the terrain of 
miscarriages of justice, and seeks to encourage an array of anti-discursive voices of 
wrongful criminal conviction that are not currently articulated. 
Theoretical orientation 
`The idea of theory, or the ability to interpret and understand the findings of research within 
a conceptual framework which makes "sense" of the data, is the mark of a discipline whose 
aim is the systematic study of particular phenomena... The issue for us as (social) 
6 
researchers is not simply what we produce, but how we produce it. An understanding of the 
relationship between theory and research is part of this reflexive project' (May, 1993, p. 20 
emphases in the original). 
The conceptual framework or theoretical point of reference through which this 
thesis attempts to make sense of the `data' is a Foucauldian-inspired reading of 
the inter-relations between power, knowledge and `governmentality'. For, as 
indicated, perhaps Foucault's (1979; 1980; 1991) most important contribution to 
sociological epistemology was to develop the insight that relations of power are 
not (only) economically derived and coercively enforced, but are, also, 
productive and constitutive of various forms of discourse and subjectivity. To be 
sure, power is a much more `material' force than the necessities required by 
economic priorities (Foucault, 1977, p. 221). In such a context, and for my 
purposes, power or force can be understood as the management or `government' 
of society through the negotiated interplay of discourse and its counter-discursive 
opposition. The form of this negotiated outcome then constitutes (produces) a 
new regime of truth, and even new forms of `social reality'. 
On the face of it, an attempt to analyse the moral consequences of wrongful criminal 
convictions as evidenced by official statistics on successful appeals against criminal 
conviction from a Foucauldian-inspired perspective might seem unpromising or even 
contradictory. For the conventional perception of Foucault's work within the social 
sciences is that it presents a `postmodern' (McNay, 1994, p. 159; Wolin, 1988, pp. 
179-180; Hoy, 1988; Hillyard and Watson, 1996), `relativistic' (Ramazanoglu, 1993, 
p. 8) account that is `normatively confused' (Fraser, 1989, pp. 32-33) in its 
`nominalistic' (Porter, 1996) and `nihilist' (Major-Poetzl, 1983, p. 60; Rose, 1994) 
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denunciation of the social scientific enterprise (see also Osborne, 1994). From such a 
perspective Foucault really would have very little to offer an essentially realist, 
morally grounded enquiry into the scale of the miscarriage of justice phenomenon and 
likely forms of harm to victims of wrongful criminal convictions. A thorough 
exploration of such charges is beyond the scope of this introduction, and is not the 
object of the thesis. However, I would like to attend to this possible 
(mis)interpretation at the outset by stating the reverse. For it can plausibly be argued 
that rather than being an out-and-out relativist who denied the possibility of objective 
truth, Foucault was a perspectivist concerned to examine the operation of the `truths' 
peculiar to `the societies within which we find ourselves', the `truths' of `what we 
are', the `truths' we live by (Gordon, 1986, p. 76). Foucault, in fact, described himself 
as a critic of `present-ness' of `Today' (Foucault, 1986, p. 90). This entails an entirely 
serious and critical commitment, if not an `absolutist' one, to the production of 
credible accounts which problematise accepted and presentist thinking. 
Furthermore, Foucault was not a nihilist, but a thinker whose conception of power 
presupposed the possibility of resistance, of a certain form of freedom (see, for 
example, Rose 1993; 1999), and of radical social and political change (see, for 
example, Patton, 1994). Indeed, for Foucault (1979, p. 95), resistance to power is not 
simply a reaction to a pre-existing power, for this would be to misunderstand the 
strictly relational character of power relations. Resistance, from a Foucauldian 
perspective is, in fact, part of the definition of power; resistance is never in a position 
of exteriority in relation to power. Rather, it is more likely the reverse: states of power 
are continually engendered or incited by virtue of the potential counter-powers which 
co-exist with them - `where there is power there is resistance' (Foucault, 1979, p. 95). 
8 
From such a frame of reference, is it entirely legitimate to draw from Foucault in a 
qualified form of realist investigation (see, for example, Cain, 1993, p. 74). As 
Osborne (1998, p. xii) noted, Foucault was a nominalist of sorts, yet this `oddly 
enough, leads to a kind of realism, because our only option becomes not to theorize 
about [the way things are] but attempt to picture it at work' (my emphasis). Moreover, 
as Ward (1999, p. 3) observed, for the purposes of analyses of `social construction' it 
may make good methodological sense to `bracket' the question of whether a criminal 
defendant `really was' guilty, or whether some natural phenomenon `really' exists. 
However, it certainly does not follow that one can set such questions aside once and 
for all when the aim of enquiry is, for instance, to correct a miscarriage of justice or 
quantify the harm that miscarriages of justice cause. If not obviously consonant with 
one another, therefore, it does not follow that constructionism/perspectivism and 
realism are engaged in some fatal metaphysical conflict. On the contrary: `the results 
of sociological enquiries into "case construction" can help us to understand why 
miscarriages of justice occur' (Ward, 1999, p. 3). Accordingly, social constructionist 
analyses, whilst to an extent operating outside of the conventional disciplinary 
parameters of empirically grounded social research and realist-style theorising, can 
add a significant dimension in terms of accounting for the formation of existing 
hierarchies of knowledge in a given field (cf. Ward, 1999, pp. 4-5). In any case, there 
is undoubtedly some hazard in trying to colonise Foucault for any one specific line of 
critical enquiry (see Gane, 1986, p. 111; Osborne, 1994, pp. 493-499). As Sheridan 
(1980, p. 225) has argued: 
`There is no "Foucault system". One cannot be a "Foucauldian" in the same way that one 
can be a Marxist or a Freudian: Marx and Freud left coherent bodies of doctrine (or 
"knowledge") and organizations which, whether one likes it or not (for some that is the 
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attraction), enjoy uninterrupted apostolic succession from their founders. If Foucault is to 
have any "influence" it will no doubt be as a slayer of dragons, a breaker of systems. ' 
Foucault can, thus, be taken to `offer a set of possible tools for the identification of the 
conditions of possibility which operate through the obviousness and enigmas of our 
present, tools perhaps also for the eventual modification of those conditions' (Gordon, 
1980, p. 258). It is within such a context that this thesis extends Foucauldian insights 
into the operations and exercise of prevailing forms of knowledge-power in the field 
of miscarriages of justice. 
Methodological issues 
This thesis draws from an archive of materials on miscarriages of England and Wales' 
CJS that was compiled during the `research moment' January 1997-January 2003, 
when the CCRC started handling casework. I use the term `archive' to indicate the 
diverse and incomplete range of materials that are germane to the research, in the 
absence of pre-packaged data and sources. But, I also use the term `archive' in a 
Foucauldian sense. For, in exploring a public issue from a certain kind of critical 
perspective, one has to create anew a sense of the relevant `facticity' of the situation 
or phenomenon being explored. The presentation of an archive of material is thus part 
of the argument and not just a means by which an argument might be `tested'. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that the relation between evidence and argument is 
under serious consideration in many dimensions of Social Science work. As 
McLennan (1995, p. 57) noted: 
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`In what is often characterized as our "post-positivist" methodological condition today, it is 
increasingly accepted both that a diversity of valid philosophies, paradigms, general 
theories, approaches to research, and value orientation exist, and that it is neither possible 
nor desirable to say definitively which amongst these are more objective, true, scientific, or 
essential. ' 
Despite this variety and diversity of approaches, however, and the obvious change in 
emphasis that such a `condition' represents in terms of the contemporary status of the 
knowledge produced by social research, there remains a united conviction among 
social researchers that `argument based on sound evidence is superior to argument 
based on false evidence, limited evidence, or no evidence' (McNeill, 1990, p. 1). 
What counts as sound evidence? Essentially, evidence that is the product of empirical 
researches that are `reliable', `valid' and `representative'. Such research is based on 
information that can be reliably repeated; information that gives a valid depiction of 
what is being studied; and, information that is representative of what is being studied 
(see McNeill, 1990, pp. 14-15). 
In this context, it is important to consider a number of specific methodological issues 
that affect the reliability, validity and representativeness of the researches in this 
thesis. In particular, there are the issues of defining and measuring miscarriages of 
justice. `Miscarriages' of England and Wales' CJS are entirely defined as successful 
appeals against criminal conviction and they are retrospectively quantified in terms of 
the CJS's appeal criteria. This determines the possible scale of the miscarriage of 
justice phenomenon that will be derived. It also determines the possible reliability, 
validity and representativeness with which miscarriages of justice can be measured 
(cf. Slattery, 1986, p. 10). For example, if new legislation is introduced that reforms 
or changes the appeals system in any way, then the way that miscarriages of justice 
are defined and quantified will also be reformed and/or changed. 
The sources I draw on are: web-based campaign organisations and/or groups; 
information from television and/or newspaper media sources; historical newspaper 
reportage of important cases of wrongful criminal conviction which was only 
available on microfiche; previous primary researches; official statistics; and, other 
public documents. 
Much substantive information on miscarriages of justice can be derived from web- 
based campaign organisations and/or groups. A potential methodological issue with 
such information is not so much that the `facts' might be incorrect, more that such 
information is produced and presented from a particular political standpoint, with the 
overt political motivations/desire to undermine confidence in the CJS. Information so 
derived normally needs careful social scientific consideration, as it is, undoubtedly, 
`tainted' by the political persuasions of its producers. 
Another potential methodological problem with information derived from web-based 
campaign organisation/group sources pertains to authorship. Many of the accounts of 
victims of miscarriages of justice that appear on web-based campaign group sites are 
biographical accounts provided by the miscarriage of justice victims themselves. 
Conventionally, such information would be classified as personal documents. A 
potential problem with such information is whether such evidence is authentic, 
whether it is complete, how representative it is of the experiences described, whether 
12 
it is distorted by the bias of the author, and why it was written. Often, such personal 
accounts are written in an assault on the CJS. Accordingly, they might exaggerate the 
victim's experiences and/or be self-justificatory (cf. McNeill, 1990, p. 109). The 
strategy employed by this thesis to account for such inherent biases is, wherever 
possible, to triangulate the information, that is, to check the reliability of the 
information against other sources, to cross-reference such information against other 
recorded information about the same case. For example, a personal biography of the 
experience(s) of a miscarriage of justice victim can be checked against news media 
reportage of the same case, reportage from the CACD and/or reportage from the 
CCRC. 
A further potential methodological issue of web-based research relates to `reliability', 
in two senses. Firstly, there is the issue of reliability in the sense that what the 
information purports to represents may be inaccurate in its reportage. During this 
research there have been numerous examples of web pages being altered without 
acknowledgement and, hence, such sources cannot be entirely trusted. A main 
problem here appears to relate to the quality control of such websites, which are 
normally run by volunteers. Under such conditions mistakes can be inadvertently 
made. In response, all information derived from web-based campaign sites was 
triangulated against other sources. 
A second `reliability' problem that emerged in the course of this research was that 
information from web-based sources might not be retrievable. Web-based campaign 
groups can be closed without notice, which means that information previously 
available is no longer available. In response, the strategy of this research has been to 
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produce a `hard' paper copy archive of any useful information, recorded by the date 
the information was accessed. 
As with information derived from web-based sources, information from television 
and/or newspaper media sources also contains a number of potential methodological 
issues that are, perhaps, better documented. For example, there are the issues of the 
particular editorial policy of the newspaper or television network (political bias) 
and/or unreliable reportage and/or omissions (see, for example, Mann, 1985, pp. 73- 
76; Glasgow University Media Group, 1976). Another aspect of information derived 
from media sources relates to `audience context' As Gilbert (1993, pp. 191-192) has 
noted, the production of any medium of communication is consciously undertaken 
with an audience in mind. From a methodological standpoint, unless the researcher 
knows how that audience `reads' the content, it is possible that the cultural message 
might be misinterpreted. As with the information derived from web-based sources, the 
same methodological strategies were employed. Information derived from television 
and newspaper media were checked for reliability against other sources to eliminate 
possible errors. 
This thesis also draws from historical newspaper reportage of important miscarriage 
of justice cases during the period 1889-1907, which was only available on microfiche. 
In the course of that research various errors were encountered that had a direct 
methodological impact upon this thesis. For example, much of the reportage of the 
researched cases that was listed on the microfiche index on `Palmer's Times Full Text 
Online' (Palmer's) that was accessed via the University of Bristol's information 
services website did not appear on the correct page and/or in the correct column. In 
14 
response, microfiche's were trawled in the hope that I happened to `come across' 
what I was looking for. This proved to be very frustrating and time consuming, but 
was sometimes `rewarded' when the reportage was found in a different edition, page 
and/or column than the one on the index. Even more frustrating, many articles that 
were listed on Palmer's microfiche index about potentially important aspects of the 
cases that were being researched could not be found at all. This resulted in 16 
untraceable documents and abandoned searches. Thus, many potentially significant 
reports of important miscarriage of justice cases were not found which might have 
contributed to this thesis in unknown ways. At the very least, they could have 
contributed to the triangulation of the sources that were retrieved. The problems of the 
reliability of working with microfiche have been attributed to the fact that it is not the 
original document that is being researched, but some form of copy. As Gilbert (1993, 
p. 192) noted, such materials depend on a copyist, under which omissions and 
transpositions are not unknown. 
This thesis draws from previous primary researches into miscarriages of justice both 
applicable to England and Wales and the United States of America (US). Wherever 
possible, the methodological issues of previous academic researches are critically 
appraised. For example, I take issue in Chapter 2 with Brandon and Davies's (1973) 
acceptance of Home Office (HO) pardons as evidence of a criminal appellant's 
innocence. At other times, however, primary researches can reasonably be taken at 
`face value', without specific reference to methodology, such as McConville et al's 
(1991) finding that prosecution cases are driven largely in the interests of obtaining a 
prosecution victory. This presents no major methodological difficulties for me, 
because such politically charged research findings are not cited to premise this thesis. 
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On the contrary, they are applied to counter other politically charged research findings 
to illustrate differences of position. For example, McConville et al (1991) are set 
against Brandon and Davies' assertion that: `The main duty of the prosecution in this 
country is not to get a conviction at all costs, but to make sure that justice is done' 
(1973, p. 70 emphases added). 
This thesis draws from a range of official statistics - statistics collected by the state 
and its agencies. These include statistics on successful appeals against criminal 
conviction collected by the Lord Chancellor's Department (LCD); HO statistics on 
the penal costs per prisoner per annum; statistics from the CCRC; as well a range of 
documents derived from the HO's Research Development and Statistics Directorate 
(RDS). Conventional analyses of the use(s) of official statistics in social research 
discern the following methodological issues. On the positive side, official statistics 
are conceived as a ready-made source of information for social research. They are 
cheap, readily available, cover a long time-span and, hence, lend themselves well to 
longitudinal analyses, and are comprehensive in their coverage of the aspect of social 
reality to which they are directed. On the other hand, official statistics are generally 
collected for administrative as opposed to sociological purposes, as such they may 
contain profound definitional and/or methodological limitations. In particular, there is 
no real way to check the accuracy of the figures (McNeill, 1990, pp. 103-104). 
In addition to noting these methodological issues, this thesis analyses official statistics 
from a methodological perspective informed by Foucauldian-inspired writings on the 
po»'er of statistics in present exercises of power. That is, this thesis is critical of the 
construction processes of official statistics in the sense that they are not regarded as a 
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real, true or objective representation of the particular reality that they purport to 
represent. But, rather, they are constructed for particular purposes, with particular 
interests. Despite this, however, this thesis draws from Foucault, and others such as 
Hacking, Rose, Osborne and Latour, and notes that as official statistics are discursive, 
they are about the production of `truth' and the exercise of power. Accordingly, they 
shape how people perceive and conduct their lives. From such a perspective, official 
statistics are not written off in the way that they might be from a conventional critical 
social theorist as inherently biased and, therefore, intrinsically untrue. But, rather, 
they are taken seriously and engaged with for the `truths' that they engender, as well 
as the consequential human actions that those `truths' invoke. 
The thesis also draws on other public documents on miscarriages of justice, such as 
official reports of extra judicial inquiries, court records, official publications on the 
aims of the CJS, the annual and press reports of the CCRC and an extensive range of 
other HO RDS researches. None of these, nor any of the previous range of sources 
was specifically produced for their applied purpose to this thesis. Consequently, I am 
aware of the possibility that my use of such `data', whether separately or together, 
could be called into question in terms of satisfactory reliability, validity and/or 
representativeness. In response, I can only make three, rather different points. The 
first is to insist that the other modes for computing the miscarriage of justice 
phenomena, including `official' modes, are at least as vulnerable to the same charge. 
Secondly, as previously noted, a post-positivistic and Foucauldian outlook requires us 
to see ideas, values and data not in some easy relationship of hypothesis-and-test, but 
rather as forming some kind of co-production of informed argumentation and as 
constitutive of forms of social reality. Thirdly, I try to be rigorous when it comes to 
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`triangulating' methodological approaches and quasi-quantitative information. The 
centrality and good sense of triangulation - of sources, methods, theories and 
calculations almost amounts to an ethical imperative, and stands above other types of 
- equally crucial - philosophical and political disputes. Finally, I would note that in 
such an emotive and controversial area of investigation, I have not had to rely on the 
co-operation on any particular participants involved in the miscarriage of justice 
processes, and that this is, arguably, a methodological advantage (see, Webb et al, 
1981; 2000). Overall, then, I take my methodological cue from Webb et al (1977, p. 
120). For although there is, undoubtedly, substantial errors in the material: 
`... it is not usual to find masking or sensitivity because the producer of the data knows he 
(sic) is being (or will be) studied by some social scientist. This gain by itself makes the use 
of archives attractive if one wants to compensate for the reactivity which riddles the 
interview and the questionnaire. The risks of error implicit in archival sources are not trivial, 
but... if they are recognised and accounted for by multiple measurement techniques, the 
errors need not preclude the use of the data. ' 
As the foregoing sections have indicated, this thesis has attempted to `recognise' as 
many potential methodological issues as possible, and then `account' for them 
through a broad form of triangulation. However, it also needs to be emphasised that 
drawing from secondary sources should not be regarded as somehow inferior to 
investigations that utilise primary sources. Indeed, errors and biases contained in 
primary sources, may be more difficult to recognise, and more difficult to account for. 
A final methodological issue that needs to be acknowledged relates to the crucial 
matter of the limits of the available official statistical information from which the 
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thesis draws. Prior to 1987, the statistics concerning CACD appeals were represented 
in the LCD's annual judicial statistics as `appeals heard' and `appeals terminated'. 
Since 1987, however, much more useful information has been provided including the 
results of appeals heard by the full court. This information was vital to the thesis as it 
formed the basis for the re-orientation of miscarriages of justice. With this in mind, 
and in an attempt to provide a more longditudinal base, I contacted IMAGE 
(Information Management and Analysis) at the Court Service Headquarters (on 
several occasions by telephone and fax) and requested more information for 
successful appeals that pre-dated the 1987 shift of emphasis. Despite the fact that the 
requested extra information was available, and that I was promised that it would be 
forwarded to me, the information never materialised. This is significant because what 
is left out of an enquiry is often as important as what is included. In this instance, the 
thesis was restricted to evidence of successful appeals against criminal conviction 
since 1987. 
Thesis presentation 
As indicated, the thesis is presented in two parts: Part One deals with the matters of 
the definition and calculation of the scale of the miscarriages of justice phenomenon; 
Part Two with the different existing constructions or counter-discursive voices against 
miscarriages of justice that attempt to effect reforms for their remedy and/or 
reduction. 
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In three chapters, Part One argues that by focussing upon exceptional cases of 
successful appeal against criminal conviction in the interests of the reform of the CJS, 
those cases of criminal conviction that are routinely quashed by the CACD, or more 
mundanely quashed by the Crown Court from the magistrates' courts have received 
no attention at all. As a result, the likely scale of England and Wales' miscarriage of 
justice phenomenon that can be inferred from the official statistics, the size of the 
official `iceberg', has been overlooked. Accordingly, the corresponding number of 
victims of wrongful conviction and the harmful consequences that they experience 
have also been overlooked. Part One also notes that there are a number of legitimate 
procedures that can cause wrongful convictions and act as deterrents against 
successful appeals that might never be acknowledged in the official statistics on 
successful appeals. When these are also considered, the true number of wrongful 
convictions is likely to be even higher than portrayed in the official statistics. 
Chapter 1 argues that in order to arrive at a more appropriate definition of 
miscarriages of justice it is the issue of the routine `carriage of justice', not the issue 
of a `miscarriage', which needs further consideration to determine the ways in which 
it may be denied. For the evidence or test of a miscarriage of justice -a successful 
appeal against criminal conviction - is not a rare or exceptional judicial event within 
England and Wales. In such a context, the roots of existing definitions of miscarriages 
of justice are traced to a pragmatic decision taken by the legal reform organisation 
JUSTICE in 1957. Then, citing recent developments in human rights provision an 
attempt is made to shift notions of miscarriages of justice onto new and more 
productive ground that sees all successful appeals as miscarriages of justice. Finally, 
Chapter 1 draws from Foucault's thoughts on `genealogy' and argues that a re- 
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orientation of miscarriages of justice to include all successful appeals can serve to 
unlock a vast array of anti-discursive voices about the experience of routine and/or 
mundane wrongful criminal conviction that are currently marginalised and/or 
unspoken. 
Chapter 2 builds on Chapter 1 through a closer consideration of the official indices on 
successful appeals against criminal conviction within England and Wales. It proposes 
three categories of miscarriages of justice that can be inferred from the official 
statistics - the exceptional, the routine and the mundane. Furthermore, drawing from 
Foucault and others on the centrality of statistics in existing operations of power, a 
critical pragmatist approach is forwarded that engages with official statistics in the 
interests of the production of a more forceful form of counter-discourse against 
miscarriages of justice than currently exists. 
Chapter 3 considers the question of causality of miscarriages of justice. It updates 
existing attempts to determine the most likely causes of miscarriages of justice in 
England and Wales. It also provides a supplementary analysis that highlights the 
likely procedural causes of miscarriages of justice and deterrents to a successful 
appeal which are currently minimised in the literature. This chapter, then, indexes a 
range of possible contemporary causes of wrongful criminal convictions, all of which 
should be represented in the calculation of the miscarriage of justice `iceberg'. In so 
doing, it is shown that whilst it is not possible to know for certain the total scale of 
England and Wales' miscarriage of justice `iceberg', what is clear enough, however, 
is that the total figure of wrongful criminal convictions is, undoubtedly, much greater 
21 
than is generally acknowledged, and even much greater than the total number of 
successful appeals against criminal conviction as recorded in the official statistics. 
Part Two considers the production and promise of existing counter-discourses against 
miscarriages of justice, and the different voices and audiences that are activated by 
these means. It covers the principal voices in the debate about miscarriages of justice 
- campaign, socio-legal academic, governmental and human rights - and firmly 
locates each of these within the limitations of the narrow scope of prevalent 
definitions of miscarriages as the products of the post-appeal procedures of the CCRC 
and the aforementioned tradition of criminal justice system reform. To attend to this, 
Part Two also considers the promise of the zemiological approach and the potential 
contribution that it might make to understandings of the wider harmful consequences 
of wrongful criminal convictions. 
Chapter 4 considers the governmental voice on miscarriages of justice and presents an 
historical overview of legislative responses to miscarriages within England and 
Wales. This is important because it sets the question of the possibilities of the reform 
of the CJS within a broader historical perspective that can take better account of the 
trends in CJS reform. In particular, through an historical analysis of the legislative 
responses to miscarriages of justice, a better understanding of the nature of 
miscarriages in the present is provided. In so doing, Chapter 4 distinguishes what 
makes an exceptional miscarriage of justice case. It also explicates further the 
tradition of CJS reform and argues that the focus of the existing governmental voice 
on exceptional successful appeals that exemplify procedural `failings' indicates what 
is termed `bad' government. Alternatively, `good' government would more vigilantly 
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respond to the scale of wrongful criminal convictions that can be inferred from the 
official statistics on successful appeals. For they signal not only an excessive scale of 
judicial `error' but, also, an excessive scale of harm to victims of wrongful criminal 
convictions whose wellbeing the government is mandated to enhance. 
Chapter 5 considers the part that campaign organisations play within the tradition of 
CJS reform. In particular, the notion that there is any crucial difference between 
exceptional successful appeals and mundane and/or routine successful appeals is 
dispelled. For when exceptional cases exemplify previously unacknowledged failings 
in the CJS's legislative framework, which become translated into corrective reform of 
the CJS, they create the legislative foundations upon which mundane and/or routine 
appeals will be successful in the future. Despite this, campaign voices have not made 
the connection between exceptional cases of successful appeal and the constitution of 
the routine and/or mundane procedural framework of the CJS. Hence, the forcefulness 
of campaign counter-discursive utterances has been unnecessarily weakened. 
Chapter 6 conducts an analysis of the forms of academic counter-discourse that were 
produced and deployed in reply to the most recent major governmental review of the 
CJS in response to the problem of miscarriages of justice - the RCCJ. In an attempt to 
re-orientate the more critical expressions of the academic voice, this chapter draws 
from Foucault and argues that the collective tendency of the critical academic 
counter-discourses that replied to the RCCJ to treat it as a `failed' `damage limitation 
exercise' was profoundly problematic. On the contrary, the RCCJ is shown to be an 
outgrowth of counter-discourse that exemplified a specific problematic in the 
legislative framework of the CJS that was able to induce a public crisis of confidence 
23 
in the CJS, thus prompting the governmental introduction of corrective legislative 
reform. From such a frame of reference, it is concluded that public `crises' that are 
induced by successful appeals that reveal previously unacknowledged `errors' in the 
procedural framework of the CJS, and attain a high profile status, need not be 
conceived in entirely `negative' terms. The more such counter-discourse is produced, 
then, potentially, the more `crises' of public confidence in the CJS will be induced, 
and the more problematic aspects of the procedures of the CJS will have to be 
subjected to governmental intervention to correct the CJS. 
Chapter 7 considers existing articulations of the `human rights voice' since the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act (1998) (HRA). It argues that whilst this voice 
does contribute to existing depictions of the harmful consequences of wrongful 
criminal convictions in important ways, it does so in an incomplete way. In particular, 
an inherent limitation of the human rights approach is the conception of harm to 
individual subjects solely in terms of the contravention of legal rights and freedoms. 
This omits other associated forms of harm that also accompany wrongful criminal 
convictions more widely conceived, such as impacts upon the families of victims of 
wrongful criminal convictions, and the economic costs of justice in `error' that impact 
upon other areas of public spending. This chapter consequently tries to re-orientate 
the human rights voice into more provocative territory to capitalise on the full 
promise contained within the HRA. 
In an attempt to move still further beyond the limitations of existing counter- 
discourses against miscarriages of justice, with the primary focus on the procedural 
reform of the CJS and/or the individual victims, the final chapter of the thesis engages 
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with the zemiological standpoint. This perspective offers the promise of moving 
beyond the boundaries of existing counter-discourses against miscarriages of justice, 
and helps consolidate Part One of the thesis, by reinforcing the call for the re- 
orientation of definitions of miscarriages of justice to include mundane and/or routine 
successful appeals. However, the zemiological paradigm is itself problematical if 
taken to extremes, particularly in terms of the long-term call to replace categories of 
`crime' altogether by those entirely of `harm'. In the context of recent developments 
in human rights provision this, I feel, would weaken the discursive potential of 
zemiology to effect significant reforms of the CJS, because it `elevates' critique to the 
level of a rather detached sociological moralism. 
The thesis concludes by reiterating that what is required is a move away from 
exceptionalist understandings through the construction of a voice that can combine 
the various strengths of the existing voices, but which can also take account of their 
various limitations. For it is not that the procedural reform of the CJS is wrong in its 
own terms. Rather, the narrow concentration on procedural reform requires turning a 
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1 
The miscarriage of justice phenomenon: an inclusive 
approach 
Introduction 
This chapter confronts a question that has hitherto received almost no attention: What 
precisely constitutes a `miscarriage' of England and Wales' CJS? (Greer, 1994, p. 58). 
In so doing, it argues that, contrary to common sense and prevalent discourses in all 
relevant spheres - academic, 
4 campaign, media, CJS and governmental - it is very 
problematical to define miscarriages almost solely in terms of the factual innocence of 
appellants in cases of successful appeal against criminal conviction that are the 
product of post-appeal procedures. For the evidence upon which such a definition 
relies -a successful appeal - cannot simply be read off as an indicator of factual 
innocence. Nor is a successful appeal a unique outcome or product of a referral back 
to the CACD by the CCRC. On the contrary, successful appeals against criminal 
conviction are not the product of a judicial determination of the possible `innocence' 
or `not innocence' of criminal appellants. Rather, they are the products of a judicial 
adjudication process that attempts to assess the `safety' of previous criminal 
convictions. Moreover, successful appeals do not only derive from a referral back to 
the CACD by the CCRC. They can also derive from routine appeals in the CACD 
4 The term 'academic discourse' is applied in a broad sense to include any university-based research 
and/or analysis from socio-legalists, critical legalists and/or criminologists. 
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against criminal convictions given in the Crown Court. They can also derive from 
more mundane appeals heard in the Crown Court against criminal convictions given 
in the magistrates' courts. 
This chapter is structured into four parts. First, an historical analysis of the roots of 
the organisation JUSTICE and the rationale behind the `birth' of the tendency to 
define miscarriages of justice in terms of factual innocence and the product of post- 
appeal procedures is conducted. Included in this section are examples from academic, 
campaign, media, CCRC and official governmental literature to demonstrate the 
correspondence of existing definitions and/or approaches to miscarriages of justice 
with JUSTICE's initial formulation. Second, an alternative perspective of 
miscarriages of justice from the human rights approach is explored. This supports the 
notion that miscarriages of justice should be re-orientated to include all successful 
appeals against criminal conviction from whichever court they derive and whatever 
their cause. Third, the increased appropriateness and added force of the human rights 
approach following the introduction of the HRA is discussed. Finally, a theoretical 
note on Foucault's `genealogical' approach to unearthing `subjugated discourse' is 
presented. This demonstrates the utility of producing discourse on successful appeals 
against criminal convictions to bring into focus a more appropriate and adequate 
depiction of England and Wales' wrongful criminal conviction phenomenon and to 
give `voice' to a plethora of anti-discourses on wrongful convictions that are currently 
marginalised and/or disqualified. 
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The root of the problem 
In 1957, the organisation JUSTICE was established through `a common endeavour of 
lawyers representing the three main political parties [Labour, Conservative and 
Liberal] to uphold the principles of justice and the right to a fair trial' (JUSTICE, 
1989). Since its inception, JUSTICE began receiving requests for help by, and on 
behalf of, hundreds of prisoners alleging miscarriages of justice in their cases. 
Initially, because of the voluntary nature of the organisation, and the lack of staff and 
resources, it was decided that JUSTICE would operate a policy of not investigating 
individual cases. However, the sheer volume of allegations soon persuaded Tom 
Sargant, the organisation's secretary for its first 25 years, that there was a real need to 
investigate where he could and assist with appeals and petitions to the Secretary of 
State (JUSTICE, 1989, p. 1). Since that time, JUSTICE has assisted alleged victims of 
miscarriages of justice and sought reform of the CJS in order to protect the human 
rights of individuals and uphold the rule of law (JUSTICE, 1994). Indeed, prior to the 
establishment of the CCRC in January 1997, JUSTICE was the primary organisation 
to undertake investigations into alleged miscarriages of justice in England and Wales 
(JUSTICE, 1989, p. 2). 
The dilemma that confronted JUSTICE, however, was that without support staff and 
resources it was not possible for Tom Sargant to single-handedly investigate every 
alleged miscarriage of justice case that JUSTICE received. In response, it was decided 
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" lengthy terms of imprisonment of four years or more are being served; 
" no other legal help is available to the prisoner; 
9 the allegation is of actual, rather than technical, innocence; 
9 an investigation might achieve something, given the existing operation of the 
appellate courts; and, a complaint about sentence involves an important point of 
principle. Assistance is not given where the sole complaint is that the sentence is 
too long (JUSTICE, 1989, pp. 1-10). 
The pragmatism behind the criteria applied by JUSTICE appears entirely reasonable 
and perfectly understandable. For it seems to concentrate on what many would see as 
the most serious consequences of wrongful criminal conviction, i. e. significant loss of 
liberty through wrongful imprisonment. Therefore it seemed to focus on those 
individuals who have suffered the most harm. A more holistic approach to wrongful 
criminal convictions, however, shows that there are many forms of social, 
psychological, physical and/or financial harm engendered, and that loss of liberty 
cannot simply be taken as an obvious indicator of the most harm. For example, a 
wrongful conviction for a paedophile offence that may or may not incur a custodial 
sentence can have a catastrophic effect upon an individual within his/her community 
and upon his/her family relations (see, for example, Action Against False Allegations 
of Abuse, 2000). 
Another problem with JUSTICE's definition is that it inadvertently determined an 
agenda for miscarriages of justice that exists to the present day, an agenda that 
excludes from its frame of reference or critical gaze far more than it takes into 
consideration. Analyses that work within such a framework, for example, overtly 
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exclude all criminal cases in magistrates' courts, where currently 98% of criminal 
cases are dealt with (Bright and Nicklin, 2002). They exclude all those cases of 
criminal conviction that did not incur a custodial sentence. They exclude all those 
criminal convictions that incur a custodial sentence of less than four years. Moreover, 
they exclude all those cases of wrongful conviction in England and Wales where the 
factually innocent are able to mount a successful appeal. Such analyses, then, would 
currently concern a maximum of 2% of all criminal cases. This meant in the year 
2000, for example, critical analyses of miscarriages of justice grounded in JUSTICE's 
formulation considered less than half of one per cent of all criminal convictions in 
England and Wales. For only 24.9% of all those who were convicted of an indictable 
offence in the Crown Court in 2000 received a custodial sentence, of which the 
average length of sentence was approximately two years (24.2 months) (Home Office, 
2001, pp. 20-21; p. 157). 
Since JUSTICE devised its working formulation, miscarriages of justice have 
henceforth, generally, been defined by all the relevant discourses as those cases of 
criminal conviction that followed a trial by jury which received a significant custodial 
sentence where there remained allegations of factual innocence after existing appeal 
procedures had been exhausted. As this relates to the academic sphere, the following 
quotation represents important and significant research into miscarriages of justice in 
England and Wales that was conducted by Brandon and Davies (1973, p. 19) and 
which exemplifies the academic approach: 
Wrongful imprisonment we will define as follows: the man (sic) who has been wrongly 
imprisoned is the man who has been convicted of a crime he did not in fact commit and has 
been sent to prison on the basis of this conviction... Even when one has succeeded in 
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defining "wrongful conviction" there is still the difficult problem of demonstrating that it 
exists and measuring it. How could one possibly prove that someone has been wrongly 
imprisoned? For the purposes of this [research] we have considered as proved those cases 
where a free pardon has been granted, or where the case has been specifically referred to the 
Court of Appeal by the Home Secretary [since April 1997 the CCRC] and the conviction has 
been subsequently quashed. We have deliberately excluded those cases where the basis of 
the pardon or referral was simply a legal technicality' (my emphasis). 
Brandon and Davies's (1973) academic research was important because it was, in the 
authors' words, the first English book of any kind to deal systematically with the 
problem of wrongful imprisonment (Brandon and Davies, 1973, p. 23; see also 
Baldwin and McConville, 1978, p. 68). Brandon and Davies's research had added 
significance because of its close association with JUSTICE, and the authority 
bestowed upon it by Tom Sargant in the Foreword. For Sargant (1973, p. 9), the 
importance of Brandon and Davies's research was that `they... isolated and identified 
the.. . 
hazards which may confront an innocent man (sic) once he (sic) falls under 
suspicion of having committed a criminal offence... [In so doing, they produced 
research] which is greatly needed and which I would have liked to write if I had been 
able to do so. ' 
Since Brandon and Davies's research, academic researches into miscarriages of 
justice have not generally problematised definitions of miscarriages of justice. Rather, 
academic researches have been reform-orientated in response to specific cases of 
successful appeal in the CACD following a post-appeal referral by the CCRC that 
exemplified a previously unacknowledged `failing' in the legislative framework of the 
CJS (see Nobles and Schiff, 1995, p. 299; explicated in chapter 6). However, the 
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academic discourse that has specifically commented on miscarriages has also, 
generally, emphasised the factual innocence of miscarriage victims, whatever the 
particular theoretical, methodological or political persuasion of the researcher (see, for 
example, Baldwin and McConville, 1978, pp. 68-71; Green, 1995, p. 8; Sanders and 
Young, 2000, p. 9). 
As definitions of miscarriages of justice relate to campaign and media discourses, 
they have been (are) even more overt than academic discourses in asserting that 
successful appeals that are brought about following a referral back to the CACD by 
the CCRC are somehow prima facie proof of the factual innocence of the successful 
criminal appellant. To be sure, it is common practice in the campaign sphere to refer 
to individuals who are convicted of criminal offences and given a custodial sentence 
who allege to be miscarriage of justice victims are, in fact, innocent (see, for example, 
INNOCENT, 2002; The Portia Campaign, 2002; Action Against False Allegations of 
Abuse, 2002a; Merseyside Against Injustice, 2002), that whilst they are imprisoned 
they are `hostages of the state' (see, for example, Miscarriages of Justice UK, 2002a; 
Taylor, 2002; Burke, 2002; McKay, 2002). 
Similarly, the media, fuelled by the research of investigative journalists, also routinely 
declare the factual innocence of alleged victims of miscarriages of justice long before 
a successful appeal and the final decision of the CACD (see, for example, Gillian, 
2001; Goodman, 1999; Foot, 2002; Woffinden, 1998a; Nobles and Schiff, 1995, p. 
299). Critical approaches are succinctly summed-up by The Citizen's Commission on 
Scandals in Justice (CCSJ) (2002, p. 1) that regards a `miscarriage of justice [as] 
com[ing] into being when a Single Judge and/or the Full Court of Appeal rejects an 
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appeal on grounds that continue to raise doubts about the appellants guilt' (my 
emphasis). The problem with such a conception is that a miscarriage officially comes 
into being - is recorded in the official statistics on successful appeals as such - when a 
Single Judge and/or a Full Court of Appeal allows an appeal against a criminal 
conviction. 
As for how miscarriages of justice are treated in the spheres of the CJS and the 
government, a similar very narrow definition prevails. Successful appeals that 
routinely flow from the CACD from criminal convictions given in the Crown Court 
are not regarded as miscarriages of justice. Neither are those successful appeals that 
flow so mundanely from the Crown Court against criminal convictions in the 
magistrates' court. Rather, only successful appeals against criminal conviction that are 
the product of a referral back to the CACD through post-appeal procedures are 
thought to be miscarriages of justice. As this relates to current post-appeal provision, 
before April 1997, convicted persons in England and Wales, who alleged to be 
wrongly convicted, but who had exhausted their appeal rights looked to the Home 
Secretary and the Criminal Cases Unit (CCU) (formally C3 Division) of the Home 
Office. If it was thought that there might be some merit in the allegation, 
investigations would be arranged either within the HO, with the assistance of new 
police enquiries, or by setting up a judicial inquiry. The outcome of this process was 
that cases thought to be meritorious were referred back to the CACD (Nobles and 
Schiff, 2001, p. 282). There were a number of problems with these arrangements. In 
particular, the RCCJ was established in 1991 because of the apparent `constitutional 
reluctance' of successive Home Secretary's to return meritorious cases back to the 
CACD when their existing appeal rights had been exhausted for fear of undermining 
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the independence of the judiciary (Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 1993, 
p. 1; Nobles and Schiff, 2001, p. 283). In response, the main recommendation of the 
RCCJ (1993) was the creation of an independent body to assume the duties and 
responsibilities of the Home Secretary and CCU. In January 1997, CCU was replaced 
by the CCRC under the Criminal Appeal Act (1995) (CAA) with the same narrow 
agenda. 5 The CCRC would also be `a last resort' for cases that had already exhausted 
the appeal system (Criminal Cases Review Commission, 2002c; see also Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993, chapter 11). 
In all spheres, then, successful appeals against criminal conviction (analysed in the 
next chapter) tend to be perceived as a positive indicator that wrongful convictions 
are being remedied, and that what might be termed the routine `carriage of justice' in 
England and Wales is working; they are a manifestation of the safeguards that are 
contained within the CJS, functioning in the interests of the protection of the wrongful 
conviction population (see, for example, Pattenden, 1996, pp. 57-58). Of course, in a 
sense the criminal convictions that are routinely quashed by the CACD and 
mundanely quashed by the Crown Court are a sign of the carriage of justice and that 
people who are wrongly convicted in England and Wales do have rights of legal 
redress. But, by the same token, routine carriage of justice safeguards are supposed to 
exist only for use in extreme circumstances and only then are they supposed to be 
used in the last resort, as in the rationale behind the CCRC. By concentrating the 
miscarriage of justice agenda only upon post-appeal successful appeals, the safeguard 
argument is sustained. For it reinforces the perception that miscarriages of justice are 
5 The CCRC started handling casework from the 31 March 1997 when all C3's files had been 
transferred. 
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rare occurrences that are small in number. But, by widening the critical gaze to 
incorporate all of the thousands of successful appeals against criminal conviction that 
annually occur in England and Wales, which themselves are a part and parcel of the 
routine and mundane carriage of justice, any notion of the right to appeal as a last 
resort appellate safeguard is undermined. From such a perspective, the entire judiciary 
can be called into question for the number of wrongful criminal convictions that are 
occurring. 
This is not to suggest that JUSTICE's working definition was entirely unbeneficial. It 
is acknowledged that JUSTICE did achieve a systematic agenda for miscarriages of 
justice to which all the major political parties subscribed. Nor is it to suggest that 
researches and/or forms of action that have been premised upon successful appeals 
that derive from post-appeal procedures have done no good whatever. As will be 
shown in Chapter 4, analyses that have focused upon post-appeal successful appeals 
have been successful in effecting a number of important reforms of the legislative 
framework of the CJS. For example, PACE (1984), which formalised a range of 
safeguards for criminal suspects against even more wrongful criminal convictions, 
was a corrective legislative outgrowth of the forms of critique that focused on the 
post-appeal successful appeals in the Confait Affair (see Price and Caplan, 1976; 
Kettle, 1979; Price, 1985) So, too, the critique of the failure of existing post-appeal 
remedies to quash the cases of the Guildford Four (see May, 1994), the Birmingham 
Six (see Mullin, 1986) and the Maguires (see Kee, 1986) which led to the 
establishment of the CCRC did represent a step forward in the post-appeal remedy of 
wrongful convictions. Thus, the problem with prevalent definitions and/or approaches 
to miscarriages of justice is not so much that they are somehow wrong or misguided. 
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Rather, the problem with analyses that focus only upon successful appeals that derive 
from post-appeal procedures is that they are so narrowly conceived that they only 
look at a tiny aspect of all the possible wrongful criminal convictions that occur in 
England and Wales. They, therefore, only depict the tiniest part of the miscarriage of 
justice phenomenon. 
Another major challenge to prevalent definitions and/or approaches to miscarriages of 
justice is that they are premised upon what might be termed a judicial fallacy. For 
neither criminal trials nor appeals against criminal convictions in England and Wales 
seek to establish or pronounce upon the factual innocence of criminal defendants or 
appellants. Rather, criminal trials are a judicial adjudication that attempts to determine 
the `guilt' or `not guilt' of criminal defendants. And, criminal appeals are a judicial 
attempt to determine whether the previous criminal conviction that was given in the 
Crown Court is `safe' or `unsafe' (Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, s2). As such, there is 
no reliable method for separating successful appeals against criminal conviction into 
cases of factual innocence and technical or non-factual `innocence'. Therefore, the 
judgements of the CACD or the Crown Court do not provide the kind of factual 
objective knowledge required to prove the factual innocence of the wrongly convicted 
that is both, generally, assumed and claimed by all the existing discourses on 
miscarriages of justice. It is in this context that any attempt to determine factual 
innocence in a system where the `guilt' or `not guilt' of a criminal suspect can be 
conceptualised as a legal technicality can be conceived as an entirely erroneous 
pursuit. For criminal convictions and quashed criminal convictions alike are 
intrinsically technical, in the sense that they are both the product of the discursive 
rules, practices and procedures of the system. Accordingly, Brandon and Davies 
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(1973) (in the above quotation) were correct to raise the question of the possibility of 
proving that someone has, in fact, been wrongly imprisoned. They applied the judicial 
fallacy, however, in their uncritical acceptance of the granting of a free pardon and/or 
the quashing of a previous criminal conviction by the CACD upon appeal as prima 
facie evidence of such proof. This fallacy has generally been unproblematically 
followed ever since. 
Two wrongs don't make a right 
Against the prevalent trend to define miscarriages of justice in terms of the wrongful 
conviction of the factually innocent, an alternative account from the human rights 
approach lends support for a more properly inclusive understanding of miscarriages of 
justice. For theorists such as Walker (1993, p. 2) and Greer (1994, p. 59) the `obvious' 
point to be made (the main point being made by this chapter) is that what counts as a 
`miscarriage' will depend critically upon what `criminal justice' is said to mean. From 
such a standpoint, Walker (1993) and Greer (1994) offered complementary analyses 
wherein it is the issue of `justice', not the issue of a `miscarriage', which needs further 
consideration to determine the ways in which it may be denied. 
The starting point for Walker's (1993) analysis was that `justice', at least in stated 
principle, is about distributions - according persons fair shares and treatment. As far 
as this relates to the impacts of the CJS, Walker (1993, p. 3) asserted that `just' 
treatment in a liberal, democratic society is stated as the treatment of individuals with 
equal respect for their rights and the rights of others: 
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`... it is... the responsibility of the [agencies of the] state to treat citizens.. . justly. . . and that 
if 
their treatment is disproportionate to the need to protect the rights of others or is wholly 
unwarranted, then serious damage will be inflicted not only on the individual but on society 
as a whole. ' 
In such a context, a major cause of miscarriages of justice can be conceived to occur 
`whenever individuals are treated by the State [or the agencies of the State] in breach 
of their rights' (Walker, 1993, p. 5). The criminal conviction of persons believed to be 
innocent, or who are in fact innocent, fall into this category of breach of rights, and 
indeed might be said to be a core case. However, as Walker (1993, p. 4) argued, the 
conviction of anyone, even someone who has committed a crime, on the basis of 
inadequate legal proof could equally be said to be a breach of rights: 
`Some observers attempt to distinguish between those who are really "innocent" and those 
who are acquitted "on a technicality". However, a conviction arising from deceit or 
illegalities is corrosive of the State's claims to legitimacy on the basis of due process and 
respect for rights, and there may be practical deleterious effects in terms of diminished 
confidence in the forces of law and order, leading to fewer active citizens aiding the police 
and fewer jurors willing to convict even the blatantly guilty. Accordingly, even a person 
who has in fact and with intent committed a crime could be said to have suffered a 
miscarriage if convicted on evidence which is legally inadmissible or which is not proven 
beyond reasonable doubt' (my emphasis). 
This points to an added problem with prevalent definitions of miscarriages of justice 
in that they are asl', nmetrical - they look at the issue in one direction only. 
Miscarriages of justice have never only been about the wrongful conviction of the 
factually innocent (see, for example, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1994, p. 
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1). They have also always been about the acquittal of the factually guilty. The crux of 
the issue being the difficult question of balance. As Walker (1993, p. 5) noted, 
because no human system can ever be perfect the CJS has historically been 
`weighted' in favour of the accused, with `the burden of proof upon the prosecution'. 
Accordingly, in order to minimise the potential harm that might be caused by the 
agencies of the state in their task of `crime control' the ever-present dangers of 
mistakes are accounted for by the procedural safeguards such as the `burden of proof 
and the `right to silence'. The reasoning being that `it is better that 10 guilty offenders 
are acquitted than one innocent person wrongly convicted. ' Theoretically, then, one 
thousand factually guilty acquittals or successful appeals against criminal conviction 
would be tolerable to safeguard against the wrongful conviction of one hundred 
factually innocent victims. In this context, and in the context that all successful 
appeals are technical because there is no reliable way to separate them into `factual 
innocence' and `technical innocence', there really are no justifiable grounds for not 
considering all successful appeals as miscarriages of justice. 
Moreover, there is support in judicial reality for the notion that the conviction of the 
factually guilty would constitute a miscarriage of justice. For example, in quashing 
the convictions of the Cardiff Three (BBC, 2000c) Lord Taylor asserted that whether 
Steven Miller'S admission to the murder of Lynette White were true or not was 
`irrelevant'. For the oppressive nature of his questioning (he was asked the same 
question 300 times) required the interview to be rejected as evidence (cited Green, 
1995, p. 77). Similar examples include the CACD's pronouncement in quashing the 
convictions of the M25 Three that `this does not mean that they are innocent' (cited 
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Norman, 2001b). 6 Another example is the judgement in the quashing of the 
Bridgewater case that declared that the CACD was not concerned with the question of 
the possible innocence of the appellants, but, rather, with the integrity of the trial in 
which the appellants had been found guilty: 
`This Court is not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the appellants; but only with the 
safety of their convictions. This may, at first sight, appear an unsatisfactory state of affairs, 
until it is remembered that the integrity of the criminal process is the most important 
consideration for courts which have to hear appeals against conviction. Both the innocent 
and the guilty are entitled to fair trials. If the trial process is not fair; if it is distorted by 
deceit or by material breaches of the rules of evidence or procedure, then the liberties of all 
are threatened' (England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions, 1997). 
In his analysis, Greer (1994) also attempted to unravel the meaning of the notion of a 
miscarriage of justice within a human rights framework. In so doing, he applied a 
distinction between `unjustified convictions' and `unjustified avoidance of 
conviction'. This point of departure was preferred by Greer to the more readily 
apparent distinction between `unjust acquittals' and `unjust convictions' which has 
tended to underpin miscarriage of justice debates. This was because `unjust acquittals' 
do not include injustices that arise from decisions not to charge or prosecute. In a 
similar vein to Walker (1993), Greer (1994, p. 63) made a further distinction between 
`structure' and `agency' and noted that miscarriages do not only result from human 
error, malpractice or corruption. It is also possible that they are caused by existing 
procedures of the CJS: `Some features of the current... procedures of the criminal 
justice system may themselves create miscarriages of justice irrespective of the 
6 Norman (2001b) raises the interesting question that if the appeal judges really thought that the M25 
were robbers and murderers would they quash their convictions or would they order a re-trial? 
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manner in which they are applied, while other types of miscarriage stem more directly 
from the decisions or behaviour of given agencies or officials. ' This is important, for 
it extends existing analyses of the causes of miscarriages of justice into the area of the 
procedures of the CJS that has not previously been acknowledged (explicated in 
Chapter 3). From such a perspective, Greer (1994, p. 74) concluded that much more 
research in this area is badly needed as there are many types of miscarriages of justice 
of which the conviction of the factually innocent is only one: 
`... the conviction of the factually innocent is only one amongst several types of miscarriage 
of criminal justice. Others include four kinds of unjustified avoidance of conviction (those 
due to defects in substantive criminal law and procedure, indefensible decisions not to 
charge or prosecute and unjustified acquittal) and six types of unjustified conviction (those 
deriving from defects in substantive criminal law and procedure, plea bargaining, anti- 
terrorist criminal justice processes, impropriety by tribunals of fact and other agencies, and 
mistakes) not to mention the numerous subcategories ... for example, misidentifications and 
reliance by the police upon the evidence of informers. ' 
Both Walker's and Greer's attempts to extend definitions of miscarriages of justice 
can be conceived under a general rubric of `two wrongs don't make a right'. For they 
conceive that miscarriages can be institutionalised within the procedures of law as 
well as failures in the application of laws. Moreover, `a miscarriage of justice must 
involve a shortcoming by some form of State agency and therefore a degree of State 
responsibility' (Walker, 1993, p. 6). Accordingly, even `noble cause corruption' (see 
Green, 2000c), whereby the agents of the CJS `fit-up' criminal suspects that they 
genuinely believe to be (or even actually are) factually guilty, cannot be justified and 
can be conceived as a miscarriage of justice. This is supported in the examples of the 
judicial declarations in the quashed convictions just cited. It is also supported by the 
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HO Compensation Unit that decides upon the compensation paid to victims of 
miscarriages of justice. For it makes no distinction between `technical' and `factual' 
miscarriages as all successful appeals against criminal conviction receive the same 
entitlement if the test of `judicial error' has been met (see, for example, Criminal 
Justice Act, 1988; Dyer, 2001; Walsh, 2001). 
The ascendancy of the human rights approach 
The recent introduction of the Human Rights Act (1998) (HRA) that came into force 
in England and Wales? on 2nd October 2000 increases the significance, as well as the 
potential discursive force of the human rights based definition. For when Walker 
(1993) and Greer (1994) produced their analyses, appeals against criminal conviction 
that hoped to be successful on the grounds of violations of signed-up-for human rights 
legislation would have needed to have been brought before the European Court of 
Human Rights at Strasbourg. To do so, they would have had to have exhausted all 
domestic remedies and also satisfied a range of other obstacles in the form of other 
rules and procedures (see European Court of Human Rights, 2002). Now, however, 
the opportunities for domestic challenges have been enhanced. For the HRA takes the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which was ratified by Britain in 
1951, and introduces most of it into England and Wales' domestic law. 8 It is expected, 
then, that the potential of the HRA is not only that it will save time and money, but, 
7 Since devolution, the devolved legislatures and executives of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
have also been required to act in a manner compatible with the ECHR rights and freedoms (for 
example, see Hope, L. (2000) `Rights of passage' The Guardian October 9. 
8 Protocol 12 of the ECHR, prohibiting all forms of discrimination, will not be part of the HRA (1998). 
For a discussion see Palmer, S. (2000) `Rights the UK won't give' The Guardian November 22. 
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also, that more complainants will decide to pursue their cases and, hence, it could 
result in a more fair and just society (see, for example, Taylor, 2000). Indeed, for the 
Home Secretary that oversaw its introduction, the HRA is intended to be a 
`cornerstone of British democracy', `a vision of a human rights culture', part of an 
`inclusive' `fair and decent society' (Straw, 2000). 
An important aspect of the HRA (1998, s3) relates to its compatibility with existing 
primary and subordinate legislation which, so far as it is possible to do so, must be 
read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. 
Accordingly, the HRA has profound implications for successful appeals against 
criminal conviction, both in terms of the accountability of CJS agents and the thorny 
issue of liability. Although victims in successful appeal cases do receive 
compensation from the state if their wrongful conviction can be shown to have 
derived from `judicial error', the state does not accept liability for the injustice or the 
harm caused. 9 As for the issue of accountability, this has tended to operate at the level 
of the individual with victims of successful appeals attempting to bring to account 
those individual police officers, prosecutors, or in some cases their own defence 
lawyers, that they allege are responsible for or caused their wrongful criminal 
conviction (see, for example, Whelan, 1998). These attempts have, however, 
generally been unsuccessful. So, for many victims and their supporters, there remains 
the issue of a lack of closure on their injustice as, more often than not, no one is 
brought to account. In such a context, many victims feel a general sense of 
dissatisfaction that justice has not been done. 
9 See House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 22 July 1999 website: 
http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/p... 89/cmhansard/vo990722/text/90722w 14. htm retrieved 18 
September 2001. 
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The HRA, however, provides the potential resolution of such a problem, as a 
significant feature of the HRA (1998, s6) is that it makes the actions of a `public 
authority' or `any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature' 
`unlawful' if they `act in a way which is incompatible' with the incorporated ECHR 
rights and freedoms. A public authority or public authority employee would also be 
deemed `unlawful' under s6(6) of the HRA by an act of `omission' or a `failure to act' 
in a way that was compatible with the incorporated ECHR rights and freedoms. This 
could have far-reaching consequences for successful appeals as public sector 
organisations such as the courts, the CPS, the police, prisons, and so on, and those 
persons employed by such organisations could potentially be liable for breeches of the 
HRA. It could also have implications for many private sector organisations that carry 
out public sector duties such as private prisons, and so on, as well as those individuals 
employed by such public-private partnership companies. 
Under the HRA (1998, s6), then, employers can, arguably, be conceived as 
vicariously liable and equally accountable for any possible transgressions of their 
employees. This was officially acknowledged in the recent test-case decision on Lister 
and Other v Hesley Hall Ltd by the HL, which held that the Respondent company was 
vicariously liable for the sexual abuse of the Appellants by its employee. 
Significantly, this was the first decision against a company where the heinousness of 
the act did not absolve the company of liability by taking the acts of the employee 
outside the scope of employment. Avoiding this debate, the Law Lords focused 
instead on what they termed the `closeness of the connection' between the acts 
committed by the employee and the duties that the employee was employed to 
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perform (see Saxon, 2002). This new `closeness of connection' test could mean that 
whatever the reason a person who is acting on behalf of the various public authorities 
- police, CPS, prison service - that together comprise the CJS causes a successful 
appeal - overzealousness, corruption, error - the CJS can be conceived as vicariously 
liable and unlawful in accordance with the HRA. In such a context, there is a possible 
corresponding shift of emphasis in attempts to determine accountability. No longer 
are the individual victims and their supporters on the `outside' of the system and alone 
in attempting to obtain judicial accountability of the person on the `inside' alleged to 
have caused the miscarriage of justice. Now, as the particular public authority of the 
CJS that employs the person alleged to have caused the miscarriage of justice can be 
held to be vicariously liable for their employees' actions, it is also very much in their 
interests to assist in the attempt to find the person responsible, as well as the precise 
reason for the miscarriage in an attempt to ensure that such causes do not happen in 
the future. Moreover, it could be argued that in the interests of restricting or 
minimising the bad publicity or scandal that accompanies the public knowledge of 
miscarriages of justice, it is in the interests of the various public authorities that 
together comprise England and Wales' CJS to more closely monitor the 
actions/activities of their employees. This might, in turn, contribute to the overall 
reduction of miscarriages. It is within this context that miscarriages of justice must be 
defined and within which the exclusion of any successful appeal against criminal 
conviction, deliberate or not, seems not only an impossible distinction to make, but 
also a wholly ill-considered omission. 
46 
Giving `voice' to `subjugated discourses' 
Foucault (1980, pp. 80-81) noted that in recent times there has been an `insurrection' 
of what he termed `subjugated knowledges' or forms of `anti-discourse' that have 
interrupted established regimes of thought; forms of particular, localised and/or 
discontinuous criticism that have been so efficacious that they have undermined, for 
example, psychoanalysis, the asylum, the legal system or the prison. There are two 
ways in which such forms of knowledge can be understood. On the one hand, they are 
`those blocs of historical knowledge which were present but disguised [or buried] 
within the body of... systemising theory and which [meticulous erudite, exact 
historical knowledge]... has been able to reveal' (Foucault, 1980, p. 82). On the other 
hand, however, Foucault (1980, p. 82) argued that by `subjugated knowledges one 
should understand something else, something which in a sense is altogether different, 
namely, a whole set of [local, specific and popular] knowledges that have been 
disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, 
located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or 
scientificity. ' For Foucault (1980, p. 83), what tied these two types of subjugated 
knowledge together - those buried discourses of academic erudition and those popular 
disqualified discourses of popular experience - is that both are essentially concerned 
with a `historical knowledge of struggles' (original emphasis). As he (1980, p. 83) 
said: `In the specialised areas of erudition as in the disqualified, popular knowledge 
there lay the memory of hostile encounters which. . . 
have been confined to the margins 
of knowledge. ' What emerged out of this `union' between erudite academic 
knowledge and local experiential knowledge are `genealogical, or rather a multiplicity 
of genealogical researches, a painstaking rediscovery of struggles together with the 
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memory of their conflicts' (Foucault, 1980, p. 83). As Foucault (1980, pp. 82-87) 
pointed out, the utility of genealogical research that produces subjugated forms of 
knowledge is that it can be tactically deployed in struggles that oppose the effects of 
the forms of power that predominate in societies like ours. 
Foucault's (1980) genealogical approach has an important relevance to this analysis 
of prevalent definitions of miscarriages of justice. For in the same way that counter- 
discourse or `anti-discourse' was necessary in undermining prevalent perceptions of 
the realities of the asylum and/or the prison, there is a corresponding necessity for the 
elevation of disqualified discourses of routine and/or mundane wrongful criminal 
convictions. This can serve to undermine the predominant perception that 
miscarriages of justice are an exceptional occurrence and small in number, and 
provide a more comprehensive depiction of the wrongful criminal conviction 
phenomenon. As the next chapter will show, successful appeals are not only an 
exceptional occurrence in England and Wales, they are also routine and mundane 
features of the criminal justice process that occur every day of every week of every 
year. Accordingly, analyses that attempt to depict the extent of miscarriages of justice 
that consider only those cases and forms of knowledge that derived from post-appeal 
procedures will, inevitably, be partial and, hence, inadequate. Alternatively, a more 
comprehensive depiction of the miscarriage of justice phenomenon needs also to 
include all successful appeals to provide access to a whole variety of currently 
disqualified and maginalised forms of discourse about the forms of miscarriages of 
justice and their consequences, both to the individual victims and to society as a 
whole. This is the purpose of the next chapter. 
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2 
How big is the miscarriage of justice `iceberg'? 
Introduction 
Largely due to definitional limitations, then, existing analyses and researches into 
miscarriages of justice in England and Wales have not generally addressed the 
question of the likely scale of the phenomenon in any systematic way. On the 
contrary, they have generally been directed towards individual cases of successful 
appeal against criminal conviction brought about through post-appeal procedures. 
Despite this, many analyses have routinely speculated upon the possible scale of 
England and Wales' miscarriage phenomenon by asserting that the exceptional case 
being `exposed' is the `tip' of some much greater `iceberg' (see, for example, Nobles 
and Schiff, 2001, p. 281; Baldwin and McConville, 1978, p. 68; Brandon and Davies, 
1973, p. 4). But just how big the `iceberg' might be has hardly received any critical 
attention at all. 
In redressing this, I draw from the CCRC's published case statistics and the LCD's 
published statistics on successful appeals against criminal conviction in both the 
CACD and the Crown Court to demonstrate a scale of wrongful criminal convictions 
in England and Wales that far exceeds all previous estimations of the problem. It 
follows that the customary wholesale rejection of official statistics of successful 
appeals by the critical discourses against miscarriages of justice is misplaced. Despite 
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their inherent limitations, official statistics on successful appeals are a vital element in 
depictions of miscarriages of justice and a core component in the exercise of existing 
forms of power. In other words, a more pragmatic approach towards official statistics 
on successful appeals needs to be adopted for critical purposes. 
With that in mind, I briefly outline the appellate structure in England and Wales and 
the appellate opportunities that are provided to rectify miscarriages of justice. 
Secondly, the official statistics of successful appeals against criminal conviction are 
analysed and three categories of miscarriage of justice discerned - the exceptional, the 
routine and the mundane. Thirdly, I point up some inherent methodological 
difficulties that are involved in quantifying miscarriages of justice in terms of 
successful appeals, before more generally considering the issue of official statistics 
usage within an account of the production and exercise of existing forms of power. 
Three categories 
Within England and Wales, there are a number of appellate opportunities available to 
those who receive criminal convictions. In order of ascending judicial superiority: 
" the Crown Court deals mainly with appeals by persons convicted in magistrates' 
courts against their conviction or sentence or both whereupon the case is re-heard 
(Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, s26); 
" the CACD hears appeals in criminal matters from the Crown Court (for a 
discussion of the criteria and procedures see Pattenden, 1996, pp. 83-128); 
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9 an appeal can be made to the HL where it has been certified by the CACD that a 
point of law of general public importance was involved in a decision; 
9 the Attorney General has the power to refer what are thought to be unduly lenient 
sentences for offences triable on indictment to the Court of Appeal; 
" the CCRC can re-investigate and refer cases that have already been through the 
appeals system and have not succeeded for any reason back to the appropriate 
appeal court' (Chapman and Niven, 2000, pp. 42-43); and, 
" when all domestic appellate attempts have been exhausted, criminal appeal cases 
can also be taken to the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg (for 
details see European Court of Human Rights, 2002a). 
In terms of official statistics on successful appeals against criminal conviction, the 
LCD collects statistics from each of these appeal courts in terms of applications for 
leave to appeal and their success. Taken together, these statistics would provide a 
depiction of the scale of England and Wales' miscarriage of justice `iceberg' that can 
be inferred from the official statistics. Despite this, as the last Chapter showed, public 
perceptions and all forms of discourse on miscarriages of justice have been almost 
entirely focussed upon what might be termed exceptional cases of successful appeal 
that were referred back to the CACD by the CCRC having previously failed through 
routine appeal procedures. For example, the following cases have dominated the 
recent discourse on miscarriages: Stephen Downing (see Vasagar, 2000; Vasagar, 
2000b; Vasagar and Ward, 2001); Derek Bentley (see Campbell, 1998; Birnberg, 
1998; Oliver, 2002); Mahmood Mattan (see Lee, 1998; Wilson, 2001), John Kamara 
(see Quinn, 1999; Carter and Bowers, 2000; Gillan, 2001), the M25 Three (see Hardy, 
2000; Bird, 2000; Times Law Report, 2000), the Cardiff Newsagent Three (see 
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Carroll, 1998; Lewis, 1999). The problem with this is not that these cases were not 
miscarriages but, rather, that they are all cases that were successful in appeal 
following a post-appeal referral back to the CACD by the CCRC. The problem with 
this is that they, therefore, constitute only a tiny aspect of all wrongful convictions, as 
evidenced by successful appeals, in England and Wales. Table 1, for example, 
represents the number of criminal convictions that were quashed by the CACD as a 
result of being referred back to the CACD by the CCRC since it started handling 
casework in April 1997. In the year 1998, for example, there were 7 cases that were 
successfully quashed in the CACD after referral by the CCRC. This compares with a 
total of 341,000 criminal convictions from the Crown Court and magistrates' courts in 
the same year, 1998 (Home Office, 2000). Thus, in the context of the iceberg analogy, 
depicting what might be termed only the tiniest of icecubes. 
Table 1: Criminal Cases Review Commission: Successful quashed convictions after 
referral back to CACD* 
Year 1997** 1998 1999 2000 2001 *** Total Average 
per year 
Number of 0 7 10 10 9 36 7 
quashed 
convictions 
Source: Criminal Cases Review Commission, 2002a. * The methodology upon which this analysis is 
based differs from the CCRC's own analysis in that it only includes those criminal convictions that 
were successfully quashed after referral back to the CACD that involved no further action. That is, this 
analysis does not include those `quashed' convictions that were included by the CCRC that resulted in 
an altered charge or sentence. Nor does it include those `quashed' convictions that the CACD referred 
for retrial. ** Figures for the year 1997 are from 31 March when the CCRC started handling casework. 
*** Figures for the year 2001 are up to and including to October. 
A major limitation of concentrating on exceptional cases of successful appeal that are 
brought to light via the post-appeal procedures of the CCRC, is that all manner of 
routine successful appeals have been neglected. For in addition to the exceptional 
successful appeals there are also all those routine successful appeals in the CACD 
against criminal convictions given in the Crown Court. Indeed, if definitions of 
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miscarriages of justice are re-orientated to also include all those successful appeals 
that are routinely quashed upon appeal by the CACD, then miscarriages can, perhaps, 
be said to be far more widespread than is commonly first thought. Table 2 shows that 
in the decade 1988-1998, for example, the CACD abated a yearly average of 267 
criminal convictions - over 2,670 in total. 
Table 2: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Successful appeals against criminal 
conviction 1988-1998 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total Annual 
-89 -90 -91 -92 -93 -94 -95 -96 -97 -98 
Average 
269 299 402 351 253 250 236 290 171 150 2671 267 
Source: Source: Lord Chancellor's Department (1999) Judicial Statistics Annual Report London: 
HMSO CM 4786; Lord Chancellor's Department (1998) Judicial Statistics Annual Report London: 
HMSO CM 4371. 
To put the figures presented in Table 2 into context, as well as to give some indication 
of the split between the routine and exceptional successful appeals that can be 
discerned from the LCD's official statistics, it is worth comparing the CCRC's 
reported case statistics in a little more detail. For if definitions of miscarriages of 
justice are re-orientated to incorporate routine successful appeals the official scale of 
England and Wales' miscarriage of justice phenomenon increases from an annual 
average of 7 cases to an annual average of around 267 cases. Thus, exponentially 
increasing the miscarriage of justice `iceberg' as it is conventionally perceived and 
understood. 
In addition, Table 3 and Table 4 show that if a broader definition is applied that also 
includes successful appeals made against length of sentence, then the number of 
miscarriages (the number of times that the CJS itself indicates that it previously got 
either the conviction or the sentence wrong), increases still further to an annual 
average of 2,852 appellants or 28,523 for the period. 
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Total 2837 3105 2842 2590 2906 2597 2485 2923 3269 3498 25783 
Source: Lord Chancellor's Department (1999) Judicial Statistics Annual Report London: HMSO CM 
4786; Lord Chancellor's Department (1998) Judicial Statistics Annual Report London: HMSO CM 
4371. 
Table 4: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Successful appeals against conviction 
and sentence 1988-98 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total 
-89 -90 -91 -92 -93 -94 -95 -96 -97 -98 
Average 
Total 3106 3404 3244 2941 3159 2847 2721 3213 3440 3648 28523 2852 
Source: Tables 2 and 3. 
This broader definition is also important to analyses that attempt a qualitative 
depiction of the wrongful criminal conviction phenomenon or the harmful 
consequences of justice in `error'. For a prison sentence of 10 years, for example, 
could, arguably, be conceived as more harmful that one that is reduced to 5 years on 
appeal (see, for example, Herbert, 2002). Of course, prison sentences can also be 
increased. This could also be significant. For if persistent perpetrators of serious 
offences (murder, rape, paedophilia, for example) are given sentences that are too 
lenient then there is the potential that they will inflict further harm upon their early 
release. Undoubtedly, more research needs to be conducted on the statistics of appeal 
against sentence and the precise number of sentences being reduced and/or increased. 
The point to be made here, however, is that a significant number of sentences are 
altered (approximately 3,000 each year). This would indicate a scale of wrongful 
criminal sentences that is also at odds with popular perceptions of criminal justice. 
The CJS not only sometimes makes `mistakes' in sentencing. It routinely and 
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mundanely gets the categories of sentence wrong, too, which also contains significant 
consequences that have not previously been acknowledged and/or analysed. 
In addition to successful appeals in the CACD from the CCRC and the Crown Court, 
criminal convictions given in magistrates' courts can be appealed in the Crown Court 
whereupon the case is re-heard. When the criminal convictions from magistrates' 
courts that are quashed upon appeal to the Crown Court are also taken into account 
the extent of England and Wales' miscarriage of justice phenomenon that can be 
inferred from the official statistics on successful appeals is even further extended. For 
example, Table 5 shows an annual average of 3,546 quashed convictions at the Crown 
Court for criminal convictions that were given by magistrates' courts between 1998- 
2000 (inclusive). If this average is added to the CACD annual average then an official 
picture of England and Wales' miscarriage of justice phenomenon, the official 
miscarriage of justice `iceberg', is multiplied to an annual average of 3,813 cases. 
Table 5: Crown Court: Successful appeals against criminal conviction in the 
magistrates' court 1998-2000 (inclusive) 
Year 1998 1999 2000 Total Average 
3,980 3,575 3,090 10,645 3,546 
Source: Lord Chancellor's Department (2000) Judicial Statistics Annual Report London: HMSO Cm 
5223; Lord Chancellor's Department (1999) Judicial Statistics Annual Report London: HMSO Cm 
4786; Lord Chancellor's Department (1998) Judicial Statistics Annual Report London: HMSO Cm 
4371. 
In calling for the re-orientation of notions of miscarriages of justice to include all the 
official statistics of successful appeals there is the crucial question of the distinction 
between exceptional, routine and mundane cases. Conventionally, it has been 
perceived that the denial of individual liberty is the most severe punishment and, 
therefore, constitutes the most harm. This, probably, contributes to the concentration 
on exceptional cases. Against this, I am seeking to show that although the available 
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evidence of routine and mundane successful appeals is not as extensive or detailed as 
the evidence on exceptional successful appeals, there is enough available evidence to 
show that loss of liberty cannot be simply read-off as an indicator of the most harm 
that an individual can experience. For there are also a range of social, psychological, 
physical and/or financial aspects of wrongful criminal convictions that also need to be 
considered. For example, in June 1998,58 motorists won a joint action against 
Greater Manchester Police (GMP) against wrongful conviction for drink-driving 
offences. It transpired that the kit that was being used to determine blood alcohol 
levels contained a fault that actually introduced alcohol into the suspect's sample and 
gave a positive reading even if the suspect had not been drinking. The harmful 
consequences attached to this case were as substantial as in many exceptional cases. 
For some of those concerned served prison sentences, some lost their businesses, 
several suffered mental breakdowns, and some even tried to take their own lives (see 
Ford, 1998). The main point to be made here is that such mundane counter-discourses 
against miscarriages of justice are themselves exceptional (exceptions to the rule). 
Hence, the trend of existing critical discourses against miscarriages to focus on 
exceptional successful appeals produced through post-appeal procedures does not take 
adequate account or properly utilise the potential `anti-discourses' of the victims of 
routine and/or mundane cases. On the contrary, the experiences and/or harmful 
consequences of routine and/or mundane wrongful convictions are either marginalised 
or disqualified altogether in the hierarchical regime of miscarriage of justice 
discourse. As such, depictions of the full extent of the harmful consequences of 
wrongful conviction have been severely limited in their scope. 
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A further potential problem in advocating the reorientation of definitions of 
miscarriages of justice to include all successful appeals relates to a range of 
theoretical and methodological issues and the reliability of the official statistics. There 
is also the crucial matter of the nature and operation of power in the sphere of the 
CJS, which informs my rationale that official statistics of successful appeals must be 
embraced for the counter-discursive force that they can provide. To these matters the 
chapter now turns: How reliable are official statistics on successful appeals against 
criminal conviction as a way of quantifying England and Wales' miscarriage of 
justice phenomenon? Furthermore: Why is it necessary to re-orientate definitions of 
miscarriages of justice to include the official statistics of all successful appeals against 
criminal conviction? 
Reliability 
In a pragmatic critical mode, there is a strong case for defining miscarriages of justice 
as embracing all the official statistics on successful appeals against criminal 
conviction. The very nature of the enterprise means that legal definitions and 
categorisations cannot be transcended. Thus, at best it seems inappropriate to consider 
only part of the picture - exceptional post-appeal cases - at the expense of broader 
statistical appraisals of mundane and/or routine successful appeals that derive from 
the same existing appeal procedures. At worst, the wholesale exclusion of official 
statistics of successful appeals by those who seek to be critical about miscarriages 
(campaign groups, investigative media, critical academics) seems entirely misplaced. 
For whether successful appeals be mundane, routine or exceptional in character, they 
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each encompass a wide range of extensive social, psychological, physical as well as 
financial forms of harm within which length of time spent in prison cannot simply be 
read as an indicator of more harm. For example, a person could spend five years in 
prison wrongly convicted of an aggravated burglary and experience a relatively 
peaceful time in prison. In contrast, a person could spend only a few months in prison 
as a result of being wrongly convicted of a sexual or paedophile offence, or not go to 
prison at all, and experience more damaging and longer-lasting harmful consequences 
in terms of harm to reputation, and so on (see, for example, Falsely Accused Carers 
and Teachers, 2002; 2002b). As such, official statistics that represent mundane and/or 
routine successful appeals are just as important for critical analyses as those analyses 
that focus only upon exceptional cases that cannot in any meaningful sense be proven, 
nor legalistically differentiated. This opens-up a scale of miscarriages of justice for 
further critical substantive analyses, that was formally inaccessible due to definitional 
restriction, that can provide a more adequate depiction of wrongful criminal 
convictions in England and Wales. 
Inextricably related to the problem of definitional reliability is the matter of the 
potential political dimension of the official statistics on successful appeals. To be 
sure, official statistics on successful appeals are inherently political in the sense that 
they are the products of legal judgements grounded in politically derived legislative 
reforms. If the law on appeals changes, so too do the criteria for defining successful 
appeals as well as official measurements of successful appeals (cf. Hindess, 1973, p. 
12). 
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A further potential political dimension with official statistics of successful appeals 
against criminal conviction according to Woffinden (1987) is the problem of political 
obstruction. Drawing support from Koestler (1956), Woffinden (1987, p. 341) 
asserted that it is `impossible to tell' how many miscarriages of justice occur, but `it is 
not unreasonable to assume that the number of undetected errors may be greater than 
we believe' (Woffinden, 1987, p. 341): 
`The major problem. . . (with) miscarriage of justice (cases) is that to acknowledge the case as 
such would inevitably involve admitting to a catalogue of serious errors in the detection of 
crime and the administration of justice. The authorities are loath to countenance this.. . with 
the result that... even allowing murderers to go free and commit further crimes becomes a 
small price to pay for the maintenance of the facade of judicial infallibility (Woffinden, 
1987, p. 342). 
Woffinden is correct that a finite calculation of miscarriages of justice is, probably, 
impossible. He is also right to raise the issue of the political dimension of the problem 
of miscarriage of justice research, as well as the associated harmful consequences of 
such governmental inaction. However, the impossibility of a finite calculation of 
miscarriages is not merely due to the reasons that he supposes. Firstly, miscarriages 
are not only about the wrongful conviction of the factually innocent, but are also 
about the acquittal of the factually guilty. Secondly, as this discussion is attempting to 
show, it is not only about political interference, but also about the reliability and/or 
validity of the available statistical information and the accompanying problem of an 
appropriate definition. 
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Moreover, as the above statistics on successful appeals show, even in a strictly 
legalistic sense, the appellate courts indicate wrongful criminal convictions and/or 
wrongful criminal sentences are not only widespread, they are commonplace. Thus, it 
is not the case that the agencies that comprise England and Wales' CJS are `loath' to 
acknowledge the quashing of criminal convictions as Woffinden (1987) asserts. 
Successful appeal statistics are collected and produced from all manner of appellate 
court that indicate that quite the reverse is true. Rather, the `political problem' seems 
to reside more with those critics who have accepted definitions of miscarriages of 
justice as very rare and exceptional occurrences of judicial error. Alternatively, if 
miscarriages of justice are taken as systemic mistakes, then they are not only an 
intermittent socio-legal phenomenon, they are a mundane and routine, as well as an 
exceptional feature of England and Wales' system of criminal justice. This needs 
wider dissemination in the interests of a more realistic and sustained critical debate, 
both about the procedures of the `law in books' and the `law in action'. Official 
statistics of successful appeals against criminal conviction, then, need to be taken 
seriously to provide a more adequate depiction of the wrongful criminal conviction 
phenomenon. For, although they may not be an objectively accurate index of all 
wrongful criminal convictions in England and Wales, they can be viewed as an index 
of the institutional or organisational processes and forms of behaviour that produce 
wrongful criminal convictions about which very little is known (cf. Kituse and 
Cicourel, 1963, p. 137). 
Another interrelated challenge to such empirically grounded research into 
miscarriages of England and Wales' CJS is the validity of the available statistical 
information and what it purports to cover. Since the 1960s there has been an ongoing 
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debate within the Social Sciences on the reliability of statistical `data' and its 
usefulness (or uselessness) as a tool of sociological analysis - the very idea of 
statistical sociology being anathema to some. This debate has, to a large extent, been 
centred upon Durkheim's Suicide (1952) to the effect that it is commonplace for `A' 
level and undergraduate Sociology students to cut their critical and methodological 
teeth on that text. 
In the area of research into miscarriages of justice, the problem is just as profound. If 
Durkheim's Suicide (1897) can (rightly) be criticised on the grounds that `suicide' as 
an official category of social reality is the product of the interpretations of official 
coroners (see Douglas, 1967), then the idea of research on miscarriages of justice is 
open to the same criticism. Official statistics of successful appeals against criminal 
conviction are not an exhaustive indicator of England and Wales' miscarriage of 
justice or wrongful criminal conviction phenomenon. On the contrary, they are 
entirely legalistic and retrospective socio-legal constructions (cf. Box, 1971, pp. 208- 
210). They are the product of the official pronouncements and categorisation of the 
different appellate courts comprised within the CJS. As Miles and Irvine (1979) 
noted: `Official statistics are not objective reflections of social reality, neutral pictures 
emerging from purely technical decisions. Their production involves a host of 
decisions about the objects, techniques and methods involved' (Miles and Irvine, 
1979, p. 115). The official figure of successful appeals that appears in the LCD's 
publications relates only to the records of the various appellate courts that comprise 
England and Wales' CJS as prescribed by the Criminal Appeal Act (1995). These 
records are also subject to an acute technical problem in their compilation, as the 
decisions of judges are very much subject to their own interpretations of the law. As 
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is possible for different judges, in different places, at different times to interpret the 
same law differentially, official statistics can be conceived as inherently incorporating 
an inevitable degree of inconsistency in their construction which can never be 
overcome (cf. Reiner, 1996, pp. 191-192). 
Furthermore, if the official statistics on successful appeals are to be included in a re- 
orientated definition of miscarriages of justice, it needs also to be acknowledged that 
they take no account of those appeals against criminal conviction that are in the 
process of being quashed. Nor do they take account of allegations and suspicions of 
miscarriages of justice, including the factually innocent, that might never be officially 
adjudicated as such. As the following chapter will show, there are a whole host of 
procedural barriers, obstacles and/or disincentives that will also have a profound 
impact upon the reliability and/or validity of the official statistics on successful 
appeals to comprehensively represent England and Wales' miscarriage of justice 
phenomenon, however conceived. Thus, even if all of the officially collected statistics 
on successful appeals were considered as miscarriages they would not represent the 
total scale of England and Wales' wrongful criminal conviction phenomenon. But, 
rather, the official statistics are themselves only a partial indicator, and an official 
index of the total extent of England and Wales' miscarriage of justice phenomenon. 
Their inclusion in critical analyses together with the knowledge of their partiality, 
however, represents a scale of wrongful criminal conviction that has the potential to 




In general, critical social scientific conceptions of official statistics were derived in 
response to `positivist' and/or `empiricist' approaches. The positivist simply observes 
phenomena, establishes the links between them, and uncovers the fundamental laws 
of human behaviour (see, for example, Aron, 1965, pp. 62-66). Similarly, the 
empiricist tends to see the open-minded collection of data, and the unbiased discovery 
of findings, as the key to knowledge of the social world (Miles and Irvine, 1979, p. 
115 original emphasis). Against such conceptions, critical theorists generally tend to 
regard official statistics as politically biased forms of information that are 
systematically manipulated both by, and in the interests of, power structures in society 
(see for example, Nichols, 1996; Doyal, 1979; Hird and Irvine, 1979; Hyman and 
Price, 1979; Kincaid, 1979; Oakley and Oakley, 1979). From such a standpoint, 
official statistics have historically been regarded with great suspicion by critical social 
scientists and are generally engaged with only in the interests of theoretical and/or 
methodological criticism in an attempt to weaken or undermine their governmental 
authority; critical social scientists are generally unwilling to work `within' the 
discursive agendas that have been predetermined by their adversaries; and the 
application of official statistics is either generally avoided, or undertaken with 
extreme caution, which inevitably results in the production of diffident, if not 
extremely weak counter-discourse. 10 
10 An alternative critical view of official statistics which recognises their critical utility has been 
offered by a group of `critical realists' who regarded them as problematic and in need of careful 
interpretation, but better than nothing, see Levitas, R. & Guy, W. (1996) (editors) Interpreting Official 
Statistics London; New York: Routledge. 
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As this situation relates to the specific area of critical discourse against miscarriages 
of justice, the situation is even more profound. Miscarriage of justice researchers have 
seemingly rejected official statistics of successful appeals against criminal conviction 
altogether in favour of critical analyses of particular exceptional post-appeal cases of 
successful appeal that are achieved through a process that might, retrospectively, be 
termed the `campaign spiral' -a process whereby alleged or suspected innocent 
victims of wrongful convictions that have previously exhausted existing appeal 
procedures are the central focus of a power struggle between the campaign group or 
organisation and the State. It is almost as if the struggle for the `victory' of a publicly 
acknowledged quashed criminal conviction of an alleged innocent victim of wrongful 
conviction somehow makes those cases that attain a high profile status in the process 
somehow more noble and/or worthy than those successful appeals that result from the 
mundane and/or routine pronouncements of the CACD. It is as if the media attention 
that accompanies high profile cases of wrongful conviction in some way embarrasses 
the government and, consequently, weakens its power. 
The problem with this is that analyses that focus only upon exceptional cases of 
successful appeal that are produced through post-appeal procedures, result only in 
small-scale critiques, which in the context of all successful appeals represent only the 
minutest of `error'. Accordingly, such critical analyses cause little disruption to the 
everyday affairs of the CJS. To be sure, in the years 1997-99 (inclusive) roughly 
200,000 criminal convictions were given in the Crown Court (Lord Chancellors 
Department, 1999). Compared to this, the total number of exceptional successful 
appeal cases that were referred back to the CACD during the extended period 1 
January 1997 to 31 July 2001 through the post-appeal procedures of the CCRC 
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amounted to only 73 cases, of these cases only 55 were quashed (Criminal Cases 
Review Commission, 2002a; 2002b). In such a context, the routine defence of the 
CJS, that no human system is perfect, that a certain number of miscarriages of justice 
is, therefore, inevitable, and that that is why such appellate safeguards as the CACD 
exist and extra judicial appellate safeguards were introduced, appears extremely 
convincing (see, for example, Report Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993, 
pp. 6-7). The problem with this is that England and Wales' wrongful conviction 
phenomenon is not only a small-scale intermittent media driven phenomenon that 
relates only to the post-appeal cases that are quashed as a result of being referred back 
to the CACD by the CCRC. On the contrary, wrongful convictions in England and 
Wales' CJS are a mundane, routine, and everyday, feature of the England and Wales' 
CJS. And, there is a world of difference between an annual average of 12 exceptional, 
post-appeal, high profile cases being quashed by the CACD and the annual average of 
267 criminal convictions that are routinely quashed by the CACD, and the 3,500 or so 
cases that are mundanely quashed by the Crown Court. Not to mention the thousands 
of sentences that are altered upon appeal each year. 
This wholesale rejection of the official statistics on miscarriages of justice can be 
conceived to have its roots in a general critical social scientific tradition: Critical 
social science is, generally speaking, wedded to the pursuit of truth (see, for example, 
Feyerabend, 1981). This is manifested in critical criminological and socio-legal 
discourses against miscarriages in terms of the pursuit of factually innocent victims. 
From such a frame of reference it is little wonder that critical discourses have rejected 
even the consideration of official statistics of successful appeals. The general critiques 
produced by social science are enough for any self-respecting critic to leave them well 
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alone. As was shown, the official statistics on successful appeals are entirely 
legalistically determined and retrospectively directed. They contain inherent and acute 
theoretical and methodological problems that can never be resolved, no matter how 
`technical' their encoding. Accordingly, there has been no critical criminological or 
socio-legal assessment at all of the official statistics on successful appeals and their 
potential discursive utility if they were to form a re-oriented definition of miscarriages 
of justice. 
The main problem with such a rejection is that whether manipulated or not, truthful or 
not, official statistics are probably the most forceful constituent element in the 
interplay of competing discourses and the exercise of modern forms of power. As 
Levitas (1996, pp. 45-63), for example, observed, official statistics on the 
unemployment figures generally determine the meanings that are attributed to 
`unemployment', both in terms of public perceptions and the governmental 
departments that deal with unemployment. As Miller and Rose (1990) noted, official 
statistics are inseparable from the forms of calculation and expertise of the objects of 
government. Indeed, official statistics are intrinsically and intimately connected to the 
exercise of governmental power within the various domains that comprise society. 
They shape public perceptions on the various governmental problematics within 
society on such issues as social class, gender, ethnicity and so on. Furthermore, they 
determine the policies that are designed and implemented in response to those 
problematics (see, for example, Government Statistician's Collective, 1979). In this 
context, the apparent unwillingness of those engaged in the production of critical 
counter-discourse against miscarriages to engage with official statistics of successful 
appeals can be conceived as ensuring the discursive dominance of its adversaries, 
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both in terms of the definition of miscarriages of justice and the consequential neglect 
of the harm caused to the victims of mundane and routine wrongful convictions. 
Moreover, the general critique of official statistics from the critical social scientific 
community tends to presuppose that if statistics were not `manipulated' or `abused' 
they would be truthful. It serves to reinforce the scientific notion that statistics are, on 
the whole, or, at least, would be through the proper technical correction, about truth, 
and that only those statistics that are interfered with are false and, therefore, 
illegitimate. But, as we have seen, official statistics generally, as well as official 
statistics on successful appeals specifically, are intrinsically politico-legal 
technicalities. To be sure, official statistics are not about truth in any objective or 
absolute sense. But, they do produce the discursive `truths' that shape, guide, channel, 
and control modern western societies, in a Foucauldian sense, the `truths' we live by 
(see Foucault, 1986). As Rose and Miller (1992, p. 174) noted, existing forms of 
power are not so much a matter of `imposing' constraints or limitations upon citizens, 
upon a population, but more a matter of statistically `making-up' citizens capable of 
bearing `a kind of regulated freedom'. Thus, official statistics are not simply ways of 
collecting information about a state, but are in fact about `normalisation'; about 
normalising the population. In defining those outside the `norm' such as the 
unemployed, the poor, criminals, the mentally ill, and so on, official statistics 
determine the norm. And, because `few of us fancy being pathological "most of us" 
try to make ourselves normal, which in turn affects what is normal', indeed we desire 
to be normal (Hacking, 1990, p. 2). In such a context: `Even our personalities, 
subjectivities, and "relationships" are not private matters. . 
On the contrary, they are 
intensively governed... Thoughts, feelings and actions may appear as the very fabric 
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and constitution of the intimate self, but they are socially organised and managed in 
minute particulars' (Rose, 1990, p. 1). This is because `in modern societies "freedom" 
is "imposed", not through force but through the "shaping", "channelling" and 
"enhancement" of "subjectivity" in all of the operations of modern government; and 
the "government of subjectivity" which characterises modern political power is 
"explicitly connected" with social scientific statistical knowledge, a technique of the 
management of a population... modern government is to "know", to "proscribe", and 
to "monitor" the lives of those for whom one is responsible' (Rose, 1990, pp. 221- 
223). Moreover, a history of the practical applications of official statistics shows that 
in practice they have always been about the governmental maintenance of societal 
domains and populations (cf. Giddens, 1985, pp. 179-180). 
Against this, the critical social sciences are intrinsically about social justice; they are 
in a discursive programmatic struggle to improve the material conditions of those 
most unfairly and unjustly treated in our inherently biased political societies. The 
critical social sciences are (or should be) about the recognition of diversity in society. 
They are about an awareness of the inequality of treatment of differential groups and 
individuals within society. They are about illuminating the `other' in contemporary 
societies, about highlighting the unequal, unjust, and discriminatory experiences that 
exclude certain groups and individuals from participating fully within our societies 
and from sharing the benefits that our societies produce. They are an attempt to bring 
about a more just, fair, and well-ordered society (see, for example, Hillyard and 
Watson, 1996). The critical social sciences are certainly not about a single objective 
universal truth, within which all are expected to `fit'. 
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Alternatively, then, perhaps a more fruitful way of conceiving official statistics should 
be as utilities, tools to aid understanding and discursive weapons in political struggle. 
As Latour (1987) has shown, because statistics are highly rhetorical they are used 
strategically to convince people. From such a frame of analysis official statistics on 
successful appeals do not simply passively depict social reality, they are part of the 
discourse of governing. They discursively create forms of reality. They enable 
centralisation by fabricating a `clearing' within which thought and action can occur. 
They set up a homogeneous domain inhabited only by other numbers. They establish 
a single `plane of reality', with a single concern reducible to numbers. Thus, they 
enable a machinery of government to operate from centres that calculate (see Latour, 
1987; also 1986). Moreover, as Rose (1991, p. 674) has shown, official statistics are a 
very persuasive form of power because they promise a `de-politicization' of politics, 
`redrawing the boundaries between politics and objectivity by purporting to act as 
automatic technical mechanisms for making judgements, prioritizing problems and 
allocating scarce resources'. 
It is in this kind of framework that a critical pragmatist application of the official 
statistics on successful appeals as miscarriages of justice is advocated. A pragmatic 
approach that recognises that critical notions of `truth' must not be disconnected from 
the practices of belief, assertion and inquiry (cf. Misak, 1999, p. 2); that, critical 
discourse needs also to concern itself with the truth of the consequences of the official 
statistics on successful appeals, with `the `truths' we live by. As James contended: 
`The pragmatic method is primarily a method for settling metaphysical disputes that might 
otherwise be interminable.. .A pragmatist turns 
his back resolutely and once for all.. . 
from 
abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed 
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principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards 
concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and power' (James, 1992, pp. 39- 
41 original italics; Festenstein, 1997; Murphy, 1990). 
In such a context, despite the inherent limits and technical difficulties of official 
statistics in terms of reliability and validity, they are probably the most powerful force 
in discursive struggles and disputes. Indeed, the centrality of official statistics in 
governmental policy design and implementation suggests that existing societies can 
almost entirely be conceived as societies of discursive statistical argumentation. In 
the governmental processes of the negotiated reform of the CJS, statistical forms of 
knowledge are vital. They both inform and enhance the force of counter-discursive 
productions, wherein the most convincing statistical discourse will succeed. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to further substantiate the re-orientation of prevalent 
definitions of miscarriages of justice to include all successful appeals against criminal 
conviction. This will provide a more adequate depiction of wrongful convictions and 
generate a greater scale of miscarriages for further critical substantive analyses that 
might carry greater counter-discursive weight. In so doing, a critical pragmatist 
approach towards official statistics on successful appeals was adopted to re-orientate 
conventional definitions of miscarriages of justice. This exposes a scale of 
miscarriages that far exceeds all previous calculations, which has previously been 
neglected and, hence, has not been critically explored. This is not to suggest that the 
official statistics are somehow a reliable or even valid representation of the total 
70 
extent of England and Wales' miscarriage of justice phenomenon. This they are not. 
But, they do provide a more adequate depiction of wrongful convictions in England 
and Wales and expose a scale of officially generated statistics of miscarriages of 
justice that might more effectively engage with official discourse and dominant 
exercises of power in the struggle over criminal justice. 
Finally, it must be noted that this chapter has only considered the likely scale of 
England and Wales' miscarriage of justice phenomenon in the entirely legalistic and 
retrospective confines of the official statistics of successful appeals in the CACD and 
the Crown Court. That is, a miscarriage has only been considered to occur when an 
appeal against criminal conviction has been successfully achieved in one of these two 
appellate courts. This does not include all of the successful appeals that might occur 
each year in the remaining appellate courts both domestically in England and Wales 
and internationally in the European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, as the next 
chapter on the causes of wrongful convictions will show, there are a whole host of 
procedural causes of wrongful convictions and procedural deterrents to successful 
appeals. This also needs to be taken into critical consideration in attempts to depict 
the wrongful conviction phenomenon in England and Wales. For it indicates that the 
3,813 successful appeals that make-up the annual average of official statistics (the 
official statistics of miscarriages of justice) can themselves be conceived as just the 
`tip' of some even greater miscarriage of justice `iceberg'. 
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3 
On the causes of wrongful convictions 
Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to further extend the depiction of the scale of 
miscarriages of justice by showing that certain procedures of the CJS can cause 
wrongful criminal convictions and then act as deterrents to a successful appeal. This 
builds on the last chapter, for if it can be shown that not all wrongful convictions are 
successfully overturned, then, the official statistics on successful appeals can be 
conceived to be statistically partial, as they do not comprehensively represent all of 
the wrongful convictions that occur in England and Wales. As a result, the 
miscarriage of justice phenomenon can be conceived to be even greater than that 
which can be inferred from the official statistics of successful appeals. This supports 
the notion that the official statistics on successful appeals are themselves just the `tip' 
of a much larger wrongful conviction `iceberg', and that the harmful consequences 
that they engender effect even more victims than can be quantified from the official 
statistics. 
This chapter is structured into four parts. First, existing theoretical attempts to explain 
the causes of miscarriages of justice are outlined to illustrate a distinction between 
theories that focus upon individual blame and those that apportion blame on a more 
structural plane of analysis. Second, the most recent systematic account to map the 
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causes of miscarriages is applied to the recent literature on successful appeals to map 
the most likely current causes of wrongful convictions. This updates existing 
systematic accounts. And, it firmly locates the systematic account within a pragmatic 
tradition that works within the appellate procedures to overturn wrongful convictions 
by apportioning the causes of miscarriages either to the procedural error or intentional 
misconduct of agents of the CJS. Third, the various methodologies that underpin 
existing accounts are explored to highlight the competing approaches that currently 
prevail. In so doing, an integrated methodological approach is advanced in an attempt 
to marry the systematic account with more critical theories and methodologies to 
provide a more comprehensive depiction of wrongful criminal convictions and 
enhance the potential of counter-discourse. Finally, a range of significant procedures 
of the CJS are analysed to show that they indeed act as barriers, obstacles and/or 
disincentives against the remedy of many wrongful convictions through a successful 
appeal. Accordingly, the official statistics on successful appeals are also, indeed, only 
a partial indices of all wrongful criminal convictions within England and Wales - the 
`tip' of the miscarriage of justice `iceberg'. 
Existing theoretical perspectives 
An analysis of existing theoretical accounts of the causes of miscarriages of justice 
shows the terrain to be highly disorganised with various competing, limited, partial in 
scope and/or overlapping theoretical explanations being advanced. For example, 
whilst the case of the M25 Three (see Bird, 2000) was a successful appeal on the 
ground of a `material irregularity' in the prosecution evidence (Editorial, 2000a), it is 
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also widely speculated that their miscarriage of justice was due to racism. For 
although all three of the appellants in the case were black four of the six witnesses had 
referred to at least one of the offenders as being white (see Hardy, 2000). In an 
attempt to make some sense of the terrain, Green (1995, pp. 46-73) discerned five 
`ideal-type' theoretical formulations that can be discerned in existing explanations of 
the causes of miscarriages: a theory that generally posits the CJS as unproblematic 
and the causes of wrongful convictions in terms of individual procedural error or 
transgression; a theory based on an inherent imbalance of rights; a model based on 
systemic prejudice against ethnic minorities; a social structural theory of class bias 
and economic disadvantage; and, a model that conceptualises the police as inherently 
corrupt. 
Putting Green's analysis to work, the first, and most common explanation of the 
causes of miscarriages of justice is what might be term the error formulation which 
attempts to attribute miscarriages to individual `errors' or `defects' in the procedural 
framework of the CJS. In this category are problem-bearing individuals, either a 
criminal suspect who misleads the agents of the CJS or overzealous agents of the 
system who break the rules (for examples of this formulation see Fisher, 1977; May 
1994). In this formulation the CJS is conceived to be entirely concerned with dealing 
with problematic individuals. In such a context, the procedural framework of the CJS 
is in a continual state of on-going reform as errors emerge and show the existing 
procedures to be inadequate (explicated further in the next chapter as the predominant 
miscarriage of justice voice). 
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Secondly, Green discerned a rights-based system imbalance formulation. Rights and 
procedural safeguards are provided to suspects because they are powerless and the 
system is powerful, they, thus, provide a balance between the opposing parties. This 
second possible formulation discerned by Green seems to contradict the first 
formulation because it contends that the process of criminal justice routinely denies 
criminal suspects their rights because the system is unbalanced. There are two 
versions of this unbalance theory. According to one side of the argument, the view 
generally put forward by agents of the CJS itself is that there are too many procedural 
safeguards that hamper police investigations and the successful prosecution of the 
factually guilty (for a classic example of this formulation, see Mark, 1977; 1978; for a 
more recent example see Blair cited Travis and Hopkins, 2002). Against this, it is 
argued that the procedures of the criminal justice process are weighted against 
criminal suspects (for the classic socio-legal analysis of this position see McBarnet, 
1981). 
The third formulation discerned by Green flowed from the second and argued that 
criminal suspects who are denied rights or safeguards and wrongly convicted are more 
likely to be from minorities, especially ethnic minorities. This is because the system 
contains deeply rooted structural prejudices and values which are built into the 
system's procedures (see, for example, Scraton and Gordon, 1984; Hillyard, 1993) In 
particular, this formulation argues that the CJS is unable to exclude external 
prejudices or effectively prevent them from affecting the work of its agents which is 
expressed through the practices of `stereotyping' and `targeting' (see, for example, 
Box, 1983; Hillyard, 1996, pp. 13-15; Hillyard, 1998, pp. 36-46). 
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A fourth theoretical explanation discerned by Green was a social-structural 
explanation that asserts that the CJS cannot be balanced, because rights and 
safeguards cannot compensate for social structural inequality. In this formulation, 
victims of miscarriages of justice are most likely to be `poor' and, therefore, 
`powerless' (McConville et al, 1991, p. 206; Box, 1983). This formulation argues that 
the CJS comprises people whose social background and class affiliations make them 
unsympathetic or even hostile to the working class, on whom most of the police's 
attention is focused (for example, see Hall et al, 1977; 1980; Woffinden, 2001; 
Reiman, 1995, pp. 4-5; 114-117; Pantazis, 1998). 
Finally, Green discerned a fifth theoretical formulation of the causes of miscarriages 
that is opposed to the previous four formulations, and this he termed the corruption 
explanation. According to this formulation, rights and/or safeguards count for nothing 
if criminal suspects are `fitted up' by the agents of the CJS by `planting' evidence 
against them, fabricating witness statements, and not disclosing evidence that might 
support a defence case. These things can occur for reasons of ambition or other 
personal gain. This is perhaps the most straight-forward theoretical perspective on the 
cause of miscarriages of justice, and the one that appears most in media coverage: 
`Corrupt groups of police officers are not rotten apples, but are cancerous growth in 
an otherwise healthy criminal justice body, whose other organs are unaffected: the 
system is composed of discrete elements police and courts, and the first can mislead 
the second' (Green, 1995, p. 49; examples of this formulation include, Hillyard, 
1994a, pp. 75-78; McConville, 1989, pp. 5-6; Morton, 1994) 
76 
In assessing the existing theories of the causes of miscarriages of justice, it must be 
stressed that my point is not that critical theoretical accounts are wrong. For the 
composition of the prison population alone substantiates the claim that England and 
Wales' CJS tends to discriminate against the poor (for example, Hall, 1980) and 
ethnic minorities (for example, Hillyard, 1996; 1998), and that this translates into the 
routine imbalance of suspects' rights (McBarnet, 1981). Moreover, as will be 
illustrated below in the examples of the continuing problem of police misconduct, 
there is ample evidence of various forms of police corruption. Overall, then, whilst the 
existing critical theories of the causes of miscarriages of justice are not wrong as such, 
they tend to operate on a plane of critical analysis that is external to the procedures of 
the CJS through which successful appeals are produced and, so, do not attempt to 
produce statistical analyses to substantiate or support their claims. In such a context, a 
distinction can be made between the first formulation and the other four formulations. 
The `error' theory operates within the remit of the CJS and conceives the procedures 
of the CJS as generally unproblematical, with the causes of miscarriages set in terms 
of problematic individuals who transgress the procedures of the system either by 
intent or error. Against this, the remaining theories all conceive miscarriages of justice 
as caused by some form of structural discrimination, disadvantage or institutional 
source, within which the individuals who cause miscarriages of justice, either by error 
or intended misconduct, are of lesser importance. In terms of discursive force and 
reform success, the `error' formulation apportions the blame firmly upon the 
individual miscreant and attempts to contribute more directly with the reform of 
problematic procedures of the CJS, whereas the other theories apportion the blame 
elsewhere and are, therefore, less directly engaged with the reform of the procedures 
of the CJS identified as problematic. The strength of such critical theoretical 
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perspectives is that they do shed light upon the possible ways in which the procedures 
of the CJS may cause wrongful convictions. They, therefore, extend perceptions of 
the miscarriage of justice `iceberg' by emphasising the increased likelihood of 
wrongful convictions to criminal suspects from, for example, ethnic minorities or the 
economically disadvantaged. A main problem with critical theoretical accounts that 
work outside of the procedures of the CJS is that they do not engage at all with the 
procedures through which successful appeals are achieved. For instance, critical 
theoretical perspectives that cite class bias or ethnic minority prejudice can be 
conceived to practice an anti-pragmatist approach to law that renders their critiques 
largely ineffectual, both in terms of their statistical force and legal reform. For under 
England and Wales' case law system appeals against wrongful convictions are not 
achieved through speculative arguments that procedures of the CJS are inherently 
problematic or prejudicial against certain individuals and/or groups, no matter how 
accurate they might be. On the contrary, successful appeals are achieved through 
showing that the procedures of the CJS were in some way not correctly adhered to, 
either by error or some form of errant intent and that individuals were wrongly 
convicted. Accordingly, from the perspective advanced in the last chapter, to the 
effect that statistical forms of knowledge are the most powerful force in the interplay 
of forms of power, the forms of counter-discourse that are generated by critical 
theories that work outside of the procedural agenda of the CJS do not carry much 
decisive force. 
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Updating the systematic approach 
There have been two previous systematic attempts to map the causes of miscarriages 
in England and Wales. These accounts are systematic in the sense that they are 
broader forms of analysis that include more than a single case of successful appeal 
against criminal conviction and include a variety of different causes of miscarriages of 
justice. The object of such researches is the production of lists of the causes of 
miscarriages of justice that are discerned from the data sources. The first systematic 
account was presented by Brandon and Davies (1973) who conducted an analysis of 
Home Office pardons and referrals between 1950 and 1970, as well as material on 
individual cases of wrongful imprisonment provided by JUSTICE, and identified a 
seven-fold categorisation. More recently, JUSTICE (1989) updated Brandon and 
Davies' earlier research. In so doing, JUSTICE (1989, pp. 76-94) drew from their 
own case files and produced a sophisticated analysis of the four stages of the criminal 
justice process - pre-trial, trial, appeal and post-appeal - and discerned five common 
threads that cause miscarriages of justice: 
9 wrongful identification; 
" false confessions; 
" perjury by a co-accused and/or other witnesses; 
9 police misconduct; and, 
" bad trial tactics by the defence. 
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Putting JUSTICE's categories of causes to work, this section applies them to the 
recent literature on successful appeals. " l Because of space constraints this section will 
not provide an extended discussion of each of the causes that can be discerned from 
the recent literature. Rather, each of the causes listed by JUSTICE will be briefly 
considered in turn to determine if it continues as a cause of wrongful conviction, and 
to illustrate the apportioning of blame in systematic accounts upon individuals who 
transgress the procedures of the CJS or are erroneous in their procedural application. 
Wrongful identification as a cause of wrongful conviction in the current literature of 
successful appeals has generally been blamed on the errant behaviour of the agents of 
the CJS to obtain wrongful convictions by offering some form of inducements in 
return for false evidence. For example, one of the main problems has been identified 
as prison grasses' who provide false evidence (that causes a wrongful conviction) in 
exchange for some kind of sentence discount or other bargain as in the recent cases of 
Reg Dudley and Robert Maynard (for details, see Dudley, 2002; Dodd, 2002a; 
Campbell, 2002; Woffinden, 1998; Campbell and Hartley-Brewer, 2000; Woffinden, 
2001; 1987, p. 343). Another cause of wrongful convictions that stems from the 
intentions of the agents of the CJS is when they offer of a financial payment for false 
I1 This application of the systematic account, then, can be said to reverse the methodology of previous 
accounts. For existing systematic accounts analyse a data source of successful appeals and generate a 
range of categories by mapping the reasons for the successful appeal as the cause of the miscarriage of 
justice. Against this, this analysis works the other way around and starts with a list of categories and 
applies then to the recent literature of successful appeals to see if they still exist. A potential 
methodological problem with the conventional approach is that the range of categories that can be 
discerned are determined by the range of cases that are analysed. Accordingly, important causes might 
not be identified. Similarly, the potential methodological problem with this attempt is that in applying 
JUSTICE any categories that they failed to identify will also not be identified. The main point of this 
application of the systematic account, however, is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of ALL the 
current causes of wrongful convictions. Rather, the attempt here is to update JUSTICE's research to act 
as a literature review and to illustrate that successful appeals are the products of a pragmatic approach 
to the procedures of the CJS and the need to apportion some form of procedural blame so that 
successful appeals can be achieved. 
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identification evidence. An example of this in the recent literature on successful 
appeals is the case of Mahmood Mattan, who was executed at Cardiff prison in 
September 1952 for the murder of Lily Volpert. As the CACD quashed Mattan 's 
conviction in February 1998, it was revealed that at his trial the prosecution case 
relied almost entirely on the evidence of Harold Cover, who claimed that he had seen 
Mattan in the area where Volpert had been murdered on the night that she was 
murdered. But, what the jury were not told was that Cover, who was himself jailed for 
life in 1969 for the attempted murder of his own daughter, had been paid by the 
prosecution to give his evidence (for details see Wilson, 2001; Lee, 1998a). 
Identification evidence can also derive from false accusations that are induced by the 
hope of obtaining criminal compensation. An example is the case of David Jones, the 
former manager of Southampton Football Club, who was cleared of care home child 
abuse when his trial collapsed when an alleged victim refused to give evidence 
against him (for details see Chrisafis, 2000). The blame for this cause of wrongful 
conviction is generally attributed to the criminal intentions of individuals outside of 
the CJS (for a discussion of the phenomenon see Falsely Accused Carers and 
Teachers, 2002; Action Against False Accusations of Abuse, 2002; Action Against 
False Allegations of Abuse, 2002a; Woffinden, 2001a; Rose, 2002; Rose, 2002a; 
Dodd, 2000). 
JUSTICE (1989, pp. 15-16) discerned three categories of false confessions: 12 (1) the 
`voluntary group' who confess to notorious crimes because they want publicity or 
12 In their earlier systematic account Brandon and Davies (1973, pp. 49-65) also discerned three 
categories of false confession: (1) the `mentally retarded', (2) the `young', (3) `people with a 
psychological predisposition that makes them prone to make false confessions to crimes with which 
they have no connection'. These categories can also be illustrated by the examples cited. 
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have fantasies about committing crime; (2) the `guilt group' who want to be punished 
for a crime because they have general feelings of guilt about some aspect of their 
lives; and, (3) a range of `coerced groups' who are essentially suggestible in 
personality or in a situation which they find intolerable. In the literature of recent 
successful appeals all of JUSTICE's categories can be discerned, and are blamed 
upon the actions of individual police officers who transgress the rules of interrogation. 
For example, the case of Andrew Evans, who confessed to the police in October 1972 
that he had murdered Judith Roberts resonates with JUSTICE's first category of the 
`guilt group'. In December 1997, however, after he had served 25 years in prison, 
Evan 's conviction was quashed by the CACD when new psychiatric evidence showed 
him to be susceptible to `false memory' because of his extreme anxiety and hysterical 
state (see Duce, 1997; Randall, 1997; Vasagar, 2000a). 
An example of JUSTICE's third category of suspects who are `coerced' is the recent 
case of Stephen Downing. In one of the longest cases of wrongful imprisonment in the 
history of England and Wales' CJS, Downing's conviction for the murder of Wendy 
Sewell in February 1974 was quashed by the CACD in January 2002 on the grounds 
that: `police officers who questioned him before he confessed had committed 
"substantial and significant" breaches of the rules on the interrogating suspects' 
(Rozenberg, 2002). Downing was 17 years old with the mental age of an 11-year old 
when he was arrested after he had found Sewell unconscious in the Derbyshire 
cemetery where he worked (see Ward, 2002). At the police station, Downing was 
interrogated for seven hours without being informed that he was under arrest or that 
lie had a right to consult a solicitor before he finally made oral and written 
confessions to Sewell 's assault (see Rozenberg, 2001). Moreover during Downing's 
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interrogation, he had, at times, to be shaken awake and the officers took bets on 
whether he would confess (Vasagar and Ward, 2001). Sewell died two days later 
without recovering consciousness and, hence, without revealing the identity of her 
murderer (see, also, Vasagar, 2000; Weaver, 2000; Vasagar, 2002; James, 2002). A 
possible critique of the Downing case could be that it predated the introduction of 
PACE (1984). In this context, it has been argued that such miscarriages of justice can 
no longer occur (Steele, 1997). 13 However, a post-PACE (1984) example of 
JUSTICE's second category of the `voluntary group' has resonance with a 
phenomenon in the recent literature that revolves around the vulnerability of the 
young and the predisposition of certain criminal suspects to make false 
confessions/statements. An example is the case of Ashley King and Billy Waugh who 
were jointly convicted in 1986 of the murder of Margaret Greenwood. In December 
1999, however, the CACD quashed King's conviction, after he had spent 13 years in 
prison, on the ground of `new psychological evidence of King's vulnerability during 
police questioning' (Dyer, 1999d). Waugh, who was one of the youngest people ever 
to be convicted of murder within England and Wales, was released from custody in 
1987, after the CACD ruled that his conviction was `unsafe and unsatisfactory' 
There are numerous examples in the current literature of perjury by a co-accused 
and/or other witnesses or what might be termed malicious accusations in England and 
Wales, all of which are attributable to errant individuals who are external to the CJS. 
13 Against this perspective, Sanders and Young (1994) argued that PACE (1984) actually `made 
matters worse', see Sanders, A. & Young, R. (1994) `The Legal Wilderness of Police Interrogation' 
The Tom Sargant Memorial Lecture website: http: //website. lineone. net/-passy34/sander. htm retrieved 
25 August 2001. See also Coleman, C. Dixon, D. & Bottomley, K. (1983) `Police Investigative 
Procedures: Researching the Impact of PACE in Walker, C. & Starmer, K. (1993) (eds) Justice in 
Error London: Blackstone Press Limited; Sanders, A. & Bridges, L. (1983) `The Right to Legal 
Advice' in Walker, C. & Starmer, K. (1993) (eds) Justice in Error London: Blackstone Press Limited. 
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In particular, whilst the discussion above on the potential of financial inducement as a 
cause of wrongful convictions focused upon teachers and care workers, it must also be 
noted that teachers and care workers are also subjected to many false accusations for 
entirely malicious reasons (see Carvel, 1999; 2000). In addition, there have been a 
number of successful appeal cases involving false allegations of rape including Ashley 
Pittman (for details see Gibbs, 2000); Austen Donnellan (see Berlins, 2000) and 
Nicholas Buoy (see Merritt, 2000) who were both successful in appeal against 
criminal conviction against false allegations of `date rape'. 
In the current literature on successful appeals a range of subcategories of police 
misconduct as a cause of wrongful criminal conviction can be discerned, all of which 
are blamed upon the errant actions of individual police officers. These include police 
collaborations with major criminals and `losing' key evidence, both in the interests of 
obtaining convictions of the innocent and in the interests of securing the acquittal of 
the guilty (Sweeney et al, 2000); drug dealing (Hopkins, 2000c); the misuse of 
informants (Hopkins and Dodd, 1999); planting evidence (Hopkins, 2000b; 
Woffinden, 2000); and, fabricating evidence and sabotaging cases (Thompson, 2000; 
Pallister, 1999). In addition, wrongful convictions can also be caused by prosecution 
misconduct. For despite the introduction of the CPIA (1996) which introduced the 
system for advance disclosure aimed at reducing miscarriages (see Green, 2000), a 
main factor in `prosecution misbehaviour' remains a `culture of non-disclosure' (for 
details of the case see Gillard and Flynn, 2000). For example, in May 2000 the CACD 
quashed Kamara 's conviction on the ground that the prosecution failed to disclose 
over 200 witness statements taken by Merseyside police to the defence lawyers at the 
original trial (see Carter and Bowers, 2000; BBC News, 2000; Liverpool Echo, 2000). 
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There is evidence in the recent material on successful appeals that demonstrates the 
continuing relevance of bad trial tactics by the defence as a significant cause of 
wrongful convictions in England and Wales. For example, inadequate representation 
was blamed in the successful appeals of John Taylor (see Criminal Cases Review 
Commission, 2002) and Mark Day (see Criminal Cases Review Commission, 2002a; 
Woffinden, 2001b). Significantly, the associated problems of poor defence will have a 
profound impact upon the official statistics on successful appeals to fully represent all 
wrongful convictions. For an inadequate defence is almost certainly not grounds for 
appeal, whether the failure lies with lawyers or with expert witnesses (Brandon and 
Davies, 1973, pp. 101-102; JUSTICE, 1989, pp. 51-55). 
The foregoing analysis contributes to the existing terrain, then, by updating the most 
recent analyses of the causes of miscarriages of justice in England and Wales and by 
showing that all of the causes of wrongful convictions discerned by JUSTICE over a 
decade ago are still significant today. In addition, as the foregoing analysis was 
grounded in already achieved successful appeals, it illustrates the point that successful 
appeals are not achieved through general or speculative arguments to the effect that 
procedures of the CJS are inherently problematic or prejudicial against certain 
individuals and/or groups. On the contrary, successful appeals are pragmatically 
achieved by working within the appellate procedural framework and by showing that 
the procedures of the CJS were in some way not correctly adhered to, either by error 
or some form of errant intent, and that individual victims of wrongful convictions 
ii'ere wrongly convicted. In this sense, as the systematic attempt draws evidence for 
the causes of miscarriages from already achieved successful appeals, it can be 
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depicted as operating entirely within the procedures through which successful appeals 
are produced and within a general theoretical rubric of 'error'. From such a 
standpoint, existing systematic accounts do not problematise the procedures through 
which successful appeals are produced. Nor do they consider the possible ways in 
which certain procedures may cause wrongful criminal convictions and/or act as 
deterrents to their remedy. Rather, victims of wrongful convictions and their 
supporters attempt to determine some form of procedural irregularity to account for 
their wrongful conviction and achieve a successful appeal. Essentially, this is 
achieved by taking the procedures of the CJS seriously and apportioning blame to an 
agent of the CJS either through procedural error or transgressive misconduct from a 
procedure. A main limitation with such accounts is that they are grounded in prevalent 
definitions of miscarriages of justice that concentrate on successful appeals that are 
produced through the post-appeal procedures of the CCRC. As such, although 
systematic accounts map a range of causes of exceptional successful appeals they can 
be said to be not systematic enough. For they do not map the likely causes of routine 
and mundane successful appeals. Nor do they map the likely procedural causes of 
wrongful convictions and/or the possible deterrents to a successful appeal that 
procedures might present. 
In terms of discursive force, such accounts are not very persuasive as they only 
consider a tiny aspect of all successful appeals - post-appeal exceptional cases - 
which, as shown in the previous chapter, amount to around 7 cases per year. 
Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that because a particular exceptional 
successful appeal was successful on the ground of non-disclosure, for example, that 
this amounts to prima facie evidence of a non-disclosure `iceberg'. In part, this 
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accounts for the `tip of the iceberg' analogy that prevails. For victims of wrongful 
convictions, and critics of the system alike, know full well that when blame cannot be 
apportioned to an individual agent of the CJS, who either intentionally or erroneously 
failed to adhere to a procedure of the CJS, a successful appeal will, probably, not be 
achieved. Thus, it is widely held that there are likely to be more wrongful convictions 
than there are exceptional successful appeals. As the last chapter showed, however, 
the irony is that by working entirely within the agenda of the CJS in a pragmatic 
attempt to overturn a wrongful conviction through post-appeal procedures, the forms 
of counter-discourse against miscarriages of justice that can be levelled against the 
CJS are inevitably small scale. 
Methodological approaches 
In terms of the methodologies that have informed the existing theoretical perspectives 
and systematic attempts to map the causes of miscarriages of justice, there are two 
broad methodological approaches that have been advanced: the interactionist and the 
structuralist. On the one hand, the interactionist approach is a micro-sociological 
attempt to explain the effectiveness of the law and measuring the `gap' between the 
`black' letter of the law and the law in practice. This is the favoured methodology for 
systematic researches in their attempts to explain the interactionist ways in which 
individual CJS administrators such as police officers, prosecutors, judges, and so on, 
have been unintentionally erroneous or have intentionally subverted the law in their 
attempts to obtain wrongful convictions (for a discussion see Black, 1972; Feeley 
1976; McBarnet 1981). The structuralist account, on the other hand, is a less common 
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macro-sociological approach that focuses on the socio-economic structures and legal- 
bureaucratic rules of law. In so doing, it asserts the political function and permissive 
character of legal rules to legitimate forms of behaviour by the agents of the system 
that cause miscarriages (for examples of this approach see McBarnet, 1981; Jefferson 
and Grimshaw, 1987). This is the favoured approach of critical theorists who attempt 
to locate the causes of miscarriages of justice within the context of broader forms of 
discrimination that exist within society. In addition, and in between these two 
opposing approaches, McConville et al (1991, p. 11) followed Henry (1983, p. 62) 
and applied an integrated approach that attempted to unite the interactionist and 
structuralist approaches to explore `the interpenetration of the micro-structures with 
the macro and vice versa. ' 
Following, the kind of methodological approach adopted by McConville et al (1991), 
the remainder of this chapter considers a number of procedures and practices of 
England and Wales' CJS that might contribute to the miscarriage of justice 
phenomenon by causing wrongful convictions and/or presenting barriers, obstacles or 
disincentives to an eventual successful appeal: procedural barriers that cannot be 
overcome by victims of wrongful convictions; procedural obstacles that can be 
overcome by some victims of wrongful convictions but the difficulties mean that there 
will inevitably be some victims that will not achieve a successful appeal; procedural 
disincentives that serve to deter victims of wrongful criminal conviction from even 
making an appeal. This marries the systematic account that presently fails to 
problematise the procedures of the CJS that might cause wrongful convictions and/or 
act as deterrents to a successful appeal with more critical theoretical perspectives that 
do problematise the procedures of the CJS but do not presently engage with statistical 
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analyses of the likely extent of wrongful convictions. Such a union shifts existing 
expressions of the systematic account onto a new theoretical and methodological 
footing that can serve to strengthen the forcefulness of forms of counter-discourse 
against miscarriages of justice. For it demonstrates that there are likely to be many 
wrongful convictions that are caused by the procedures of the CJS that will never 
achieve a successful appeal and, hence, the official statistics do not present a 
comprehensive depiction of all wrongful convictions. This consideration, however, 
will not be exhaustive in the sense that every procedure and/or practice will be 
covered. Rather, some of the more significant procedural candidates that cause 
wrongful convictions and/or act against a successful appeal are analysed to show that 
there are indeed possible causes of wrongful convictions that might never feature in 
the official indices of successful appeals against criminal conviction. 
Procedural causes 
Plea bargaining is, perhaps, the most obvious and widespread cause of wrongful 
convictions and procedural barrier to a successful appeal that has a profound impact 
upon the official statistics to adequately depict the full extent of miscarriages of 
justice in England and Wales. Plea bargaining can be defined as a judicial practice 
whereby judges and barristers strike a secret deal in return for a guilty plea (Gibb, 
2000). Accordingly, plea-bargaining can be conceived as interactionist in the sense 
that it is determined though the negotiations of individual social actors. Plea- 
bargaining, however, is also a routine procedural practice of the CJS and, hence, it is 
also appropriate to conceive and analyse it within an integrated methodology. In their 
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discussion of plea-bargaining in the US, Huff et al (1996) started with the observation 
that perhaps the most puzzling of all wrongful conviction cases, as well as the least 
publicised, are those in which innocent people plead guilty. After all, asked Huff et al 
(1996), why would a perfectly innocent person plead guilty? In response, Huff et al 
(1996) drew from a social psychological experiment conducted by Gregory et al 
(1978) and discerned ample reasons why some innocent people might plead guilty. 
For example, criminal defendants might be more likely to accept plea-bargains when 
they are faced with a number of charges or when the probable severity of punishment, 
as they perceived and feared it, was deemed to be great (Huff et al, 1996, p. 73). 
Moreover, innocent criminal defendants in the US who face execution might be 
induced to make deals. Even though they might face long prison sentences, such 
defendants can live in the hope that eventually the truth of their innocence will be 
discovered and they will be freed (Huff et al, 1996, p. 73). As for the lack of publicity 
in plea-bargain cases in the US, Huff et al (1996, p. 73) noted that one of the reasons 
is probably that most plea-bargains result in immediate freedom, suspended sentence, 
or perhaps prohibition and hence in such cases there is no aftermath, no continued 
investigation, no exoneration. As Huff et al (1996, p. 73) pointed out, in the US, the 
revocation of a guilty plea is legally permitted only under limited conditions, for 
example, when a judge refuses to abide by a plea-bargain that has been made between 
the defendant, through defence counsel, and the prosecution. Ordinarily, a plea 
bargain closes the case. 
Although the practice of plea-bargaining is widely acknowledged in the US (see also, 
for example, Guidorizzi, 2001; Mather, 1979; Heumann, 1978), there is much 
controversy, indeed secrecy, about the use of such a practice in the judicial 
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pronouncements of England and Wales' judiciary. In line with a court ruling of 30 
years ago which stated that plea bargaining should not occur (Gibb, 2000), officially 
plea-bargaining does not take place in English courts (Dyer, 2000b). Despite this, the 
practice of plea-bargaining was exposed to be widespread in two criminal cases that 
were widely publicised in 2000 (see Gibb, 2000). 
One of those cases was that of Robin Peverett, the former headmaster of Dulwich 
College Preparatory School in Kent, who walked free from Maidstone Crown Court 
in July 2000 with an 18-month suspended prison sentence after pleading guilty to nine 
offences of sexual molestation between 1969 and 1977 (see, for example, Ahmed, 
2000), an offence which could have carried a maximum custodial sentence of ten 
years (see Weale, 2000). Peverett's lenient sentence, it transpired, was the result of a 
bargain that had been struck between the defence and prosecution lawyers with the 
co-operation of the trial judge in return for his guilty plea (see, for example, Dyer, 
2000a; Weale, 2000). 
In response to the public fury that accompanied the sentence in the Peverett case, the 
Attorney-General, promptly restated the earlier court ruling that plea-bargaining is a 
breach of a barrister's professional conduct and is banned (Gibb, 2000). In addition, 
the Attorney General also referred the case to the CACD on the grounds that the 
sentence was too lenient. The CACD ruled, however, that the sentence stand as the 
prosecution's involvement in the `lamentable' plea-bargain, in effect, barred the 
crown from going back on the deal (Times Law Report, 2000). More specifically, on 
the general practice of plea-bargaining, the CACD judgement issued by Lord Justice 
Rose stated that: 
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`There were, of course, wholly exceptional cases [of which the Peverett case was not one] 
where that [plea-bargaining] might properly be done, for example if a defendant were 
dying. 
. . Apart from such wholly exceptional cases, no good usually came of this kind of 
activity... [which] affronts the public' (Lord Justice Rose cited Times Law Report, 2000). 
This indicated that, contrary to the Attorney General's earlier statement, plea- 
bargaining is not an altogether breach of a barrister's professional conduct, nor is it 
entirely banned. On the contrary, then, it is truer to say that plea-bargaining is a 
legitimate procedure of England and Wales' CJS which should only come into play 
under rigid `exceptional' circumstances. This served to fuel the debate on plea- 
bargaining and the possible `exceptional' circumstances of its applicability. For 
example, retired Recorder, Geoffrey Davey, distinguished between plea-bargaining 
where the effect is to `pervert the course of justice', and the kind of plea-bargaining, 
which was commonplace during his judicial career, that might elucidate an early 
guilty plea, thus achieving the ends of justice and saving court time and expense 
(Davey, 2000). More recently, Lord Justice Auld's Report into the reform of the 
criminal courts recommended that there should be a `graduated scheme' of discounts 
so that the earlier a guilty plea is made the lighter the sentence. To aid in this process, 
the judge would also be able to indicate in advance the sentence for a guilty plea 
(Lord Justice Auld's recommendations cited Travis, 2001; Dyer, 2001a). 
Strictly speaking, whilst the events of, and the debate surrounding the Peverett case 
served to shed some light upon the socio-legal realities of plea-bargain practice, the 
Peverett case was not a miscarriage of justice. To be sure, Blackstone's principal: 
`better that ten guilty persons escape than one innocent suffer' is still a foundational 
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stated aim of England and Wales' CJS. Accordingly, the system is weighted to the 
extent that the non-conviction of the factually guilty is not normally conceptualised as 
a `miscarriage' of the CJS. But, having established the existence and widespread 
practice of plea-bargaining, it must be noted that it can work both ways. As Huff et al 
(1996) observed, it can also be about the inducement of innocent people to plead 
guilty to criminal offences that they did not commit, which would constitute a 
wrongful conviction, however defined. 
Such was the finding of Baldwin and McConville's (1977) classic research of the 
extent to which plea-bargaining occurred in the Birmingham Crown Court. In 
particular, Baldwin and McConville (1977) showed that plea-bargaining was not 
unusual in the Birmingham Crown Court, that the bargains that are negotiated are not 
always in the defendant's interests, and that the processes that are involved in the 
bargain being struck sometimes went beyond the publicly acknowledged guidelines 
on plea-bargaining as they existed within the law of England and Wales at the time. 
Perhaps, more disturbingly Baldwin and McConville's (1977) research also showed 
that from the defendant's perspective the process of plea-bargaining may be perceived 
as involving pressure to plead guilty to charges of which they regard themselves as 
innocent (see Campbell and Wiles, 1977, p. ix). In their analysis, Baldwin and 
McConville (1977) found that a fundamental source of judicial defect is the 
customary `sentence discount' that is awarded to defendants who indicate their 
apparent repentance by pleading guilty. The present rules on sentence discount are 
that judges and magistrates are required, when sentencing an offender who has 
pleaded guilty, to take into account the stage at which the guilty plea was entered, and 
the circumstances in which the plea was made. If a discounted sentence is passed, this 
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must be stated in court. The CACD has stated that a discount of one-third should 
normally be given for a timely guilty plea (Chapman and Niven, 2000, p. 37). As in 
Davey's (2000) recent assertions on plea-bargaining cited above, Baldwin and 
McConville (1977) saw the argument in favour of the sentence discount being centred 
around an attempt to discourage defendants from wasting the valuable time of the 
court by needlessly contesting lost causes. As Williams (1976) put it: 
`... offenders who have no defence must be persuaded not to waste the time of the court and 
public money; pleas of guilty often save the distress of witnesses in having to give evidence, 
as well as inconvenience and loss of time; and in present conditions such pleas are essential 
to prevent serious congestion in the courts' (Williams cited Baldwin and McConville, 1977, 
p. 106). 
Against this, Baldwin and McConville (1977) turned the concept of sentence discount 
on its head by asserting that it is customary within the law of England and Wales to 
boast of a persons fundamental right to require the prosecution to prove their case 
beyond reasonable doubt, yet person's are in effect penalised when the prosecution 
are able to do so (Baldwin and McConville, 1977, p. 108). Moreover, as Baldwin and 
McConville (1977) drawing from Trasler (1976) pointed out: 
`Counsel and judges... may... complain of the waste of their time. Yet their time (unlike that 
of the accused, should he (sic) be convicted) is sufficiently repaid. . . the cost 
falls not upon 
them, but upon the people at large, who may be content to pay a price for the assurance that 
others will not be convicted upon inadequate evidence.. . 
To impose so severe a penalty [an 
extra third to the sentence] for wasting the time of a group of notably well-paid men (sic) 
seems excessive (Trasler cited Baldwin and McConville, 1977, p. 109). 
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In the context of the official statistics on successful appeals, plea-bargaining has an 
undoubted effect on their accuracy. An effect that makes a precise calculation 
impossible, but which, nonetheless, illustrates that the official statistics on successful 
appeals do not fully represent England and Wales' miscarriage of justice `iceberg'. 
The parole deal is another major procedural barrier to a successful appeal that has an 
impact upon the accuracy of the official statistics. In his analysis, Hill (2001) defined 
the parole deal as very much akin to a plea bargain for it attempts to make innocent 
prisoners acknowledge guilt for crimes that they did not, in fact, commit. 
Significantly, for Hill (2001), both offer the same essential deal in an attempt to 
obtain judicial finality in cases: `We say you are guilty. Admit it and you get 
something in return'. The rationale behind the parole deal is connected to a range of 
`cognitive skills', `thinking skills', `reasoning and rehabilitation' and various other 
`offending behaviour' programmes and courses that have come to dominate regimes 
within prisons in England and Wales over the last decade. These courses are almost 
universally based on the work of psychologists in the correctional service of Canada 
and work from the premise that as offenders `think' differently to law abiding 
citizens, once their `cognitive distortions' are corrected then they could be released 
with a reduced risk of recidivism (Wilson, 2001 a). The effect is that whilst the prison 
service acknowledges that it is unlawful to refuse to recommend release solely on the 
ground that a prisoner continues to deny guilt, it tends to work under the simultaneous 
assumption that denial of offending is a good indicator of a prisoner's continuing risk. 
Accordingly, prisons proceed on the basis that convictions are safe, which, in 
principle, seems an entirely reasonable and practical policy. In practice, however, this 
serves to exacerbate the harmful consequences of the injustice already done to the 
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wrongly convicted prisoner (Woffinden, 2000b; 2001d; Hill, 2002; Hill, 2002a; 
Berlins, 2002). In consequence, prisoners who protest their innocence experience a 
range of discriminatory practises and inevitably serve longer sentences, as the basis 
for release under the parole system is that prisoners attend offending behaviour 
courses and acknowledge their offence that they have not in fact committed. For 
example, Stephen Downing whose conviction was quashed in January 2002 spent 27 
years incarcerated for an offence which he might normally have served 12 years had 
he not been classified `IDOM' - in denial of murder. His continued denial of a murder 
that he did not commit meant that he was also deprived of better jobs, training 
opportunities and parole consideration (see Editorial, 2002a). To emphasise the point, 
Hill (2002b) reported that: `All the prison officers knew Stephen [Downing] was 
innocent. They were begging him to say he had done it [murdered Wendy Sewell] so 
they could release him. ' 
In a similar vein, Wilson (2001 a) conceptualised the situation as one which political 
philosophers would describe as a throffer - the combination of an offer or promise of 
a reward if a course of action is pursued, with a threat or penalty if this course of 
action is refused. This plays out with the prisoner being offered an enormous range of 
incentives including more out-of-cell time, more visits and a speedy progress through 
the system, to follow the course of action desired by the prison regime - to go on an 
offending behaviour course to ensure that the prisons performance target is met. This 
is made to appear as an entirely rational and subjective choice, especially as it will be 
the basis for ensuring early release through parole. At the same time, if the prisoner 
does not go on a course, the threat of continued imprisonment remains, as the prisoner 
will be deemed too much of a `risk' for release at all. Accordingly, the practice to 
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treat prisoners more harshly who maintain their innocence, whilst at the same time 
rewarding prisoners to accept their `guilt' can be conceived as an additional cause of 
miscarriages of justice that may never come to light. For a likely consequence will be 
for many innocent prisoners to `acknowledge' their `guilt' in the interests of a more 
tolerable prison experience or existence and early release through parole. Once 
embarked upon this course of action, however, not only will it be virtually impossible 
for the wrongly imprisoned innocent to overturn their wrongful conviction, there will 
also be a profound impact upon the number of successful appeals that it is possible to 
quantify. 
The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act (1996) (CPIA) serves to facilitate 
wrongful convictions that will be almost impossible to overturn and, hence, impact 
upon the ability of the official statistics of successful appeals to depict all wrongful 
convictions. Under the CPIA (1996) a three-stage disclosure process between 
prosecution and defence was introduced whereby the prosecution must firstly: 
(a) disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been 
disclosed to the accused and which in the prosecutor's opinion might undermine 
the case for the prosecution against the accused; or 
(b) give to the accused a written statement that there is no material of a description 
mentioned in paragraph (a) (s. 3(l). 
Once such materials or such a statement has been disclosed to the defence, the 
defence must then provide some indication of the nature of the defence case. This 
takes the form of a `defence statement' with the following objective: 
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(a) setting out in general terms the nature of the accused's defence; 
(b) indicating the matters on which he (sic) takes issue with the prosecution; and, 
(c) setting out, in the case of each such matter, the reason why he (sic) takes issue 
with the prosecution (s. 5(6)). 
Once such a defence statement has been submitted, there follows a re-examination of 
the unused material by the prosecution who must: 
(a) disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been 
disclosed to the accused and which might be reasonably expected to assist the 
accused's defence as disclosed by the defence statement given under section 5 or 
6; or, 
(b) give to the accused a written statement that there is no material of a description 
mentioned in paragraph (a) (s, 7(2)). 
The introduction of the CPIA (1996), then, can be conceived as introducing a 
procedural regime for advance disclosure that is at odds with the operational practices 
of police officers, the CPS and defence solicitors (for a discussion see, for example, 
Davies, Croall and Tyrer, 1998, p. 12). For the Act introduced a new and in many 
ways more restrictive scheme for how material is handled. Whereas previously the 
defence could go and inspect all the material, now in most cases a police officer will 
decide the materials that undermine his or her own case and only then, in theory, pass 
it on to the accused. As Bennathon (2000) noted, the CPIA (1996) `is an awful and 
dangerous piece of legislation, but just how bad it is tends to get hidden by its 
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technical nature. ' As a consequence, `errors', whether inadvertent or otherwise, may 
not be recognised and the result is a system that presents real risks of future 
miscarriages of justice (see Taylor (2001). The CPIA (1996) also questions the 
possible limits of the notion contained in the official account of the prosecution and 
defence parties' ability to freely present their respective `opposing' or `adversarial' 
cases in court `as they see fit'. For under the CPIA (1996), the case must be 
substantially set out before it gets to court (see Green, 2000; Emmerson, 1999; 
Woffinden, 1999). In concrete terms, questionnaires by the Law Society (LS) and the 
British Academy of Forensic Sciences (BAFS) have produced a list of over 200 
examples of wrongful criminal conviction caused through non-disclosure (see 
Langdon-Down, 1999). Thus, although the CPIA (1996) was a legislative 
consequence of the cases of the Guildford Four and Judith Ward, in which key 
evidence pointing to the defendant's innocence was not disclosed to the defence by 
the prosecution, the CPIA (1996) is, probably, causing more miscarriages (Dyer, 
1999e; 2000c; Rowe, 2000). In this context, perhaps the most obvious consequence of 
the CPIA (1996) is that no one knows how many miscarriages of justice are being 
caused simply because no one knows how much material is being withheld 
(Woffinden, 1999). Accordingly, although the CPIA (1996) can be conceived to cause 
wrongful convictions and act as a barrier to a successful appeal it is impossible to 
know how many successful appeals are not achieved. 
The Criminal Cases Review Commission can be conceived as presenting some of the 
most significant potential procedural obstacles to a successful appeal. In particular, a 
major problem with the CCRC emerges in an analysis of the procedures when 
allegations of police misconduct or error are made. For at such time it is normal 
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CCRC practice to send such allegations to the original investigating force/officer(s) 
for comment. As Green (2000a) notes, none of this is in itself unreasonable. For 
anyone against whom allegations are made should have the opportunity to know of 
those allegations and to respond to them. The main problem, however, is that if police 
officers have indeed done what they are alleged to have done, this procedure allows 
them the opportunity to destroy any evidence that there might be in support of those 
allegations (Green, 2000a). Another procedural aspect of the CCRC that mitigates 
against successful appeals, and affects the reliability of the official statistics, can be 
derived from an analysis of the CCRC's delays in referring meritorious appeals back 
to the CACD. For, as James (2002a, p. 5) noted, when assessing an appeal 
mechanism, it is necessary to do so in the light of its ability to accord fast and fair 
resolutions to those cases where justice failed the first time around. In such a context, 
James et al's (2000, pp. 143-146) research showed the CCRC's ability to deal with a 
daily intake of around four applications against a best disposal rate of two has resulted 
in delays and backlogs in the post-appeal processes of the CCRC that indicates a 
profound injustice which can be conceived to be in contravention of Article 5 s(4) of 
the HRA (1998) and possibly Article 6 of the ECHR, as the CCRC is failing in its 
task of providing fast and fair resolution to miscarriage of justice victims. 
Finally, a major procedural disincentive to a successful appeal in cases of wrongful 
conviction is the time loss rule. In essence, the time loss rule refers to the information 
provided to applicants who intend to make appeals against their criminal convictions 
that if their appeal is ultimately unsuccessful it could result in substantial increases to 
their sentence. Under the time loss rule when the criminally convicted apply for an 
appeal they are advised that if their appeal is ultimately unsuccessful it could result in 
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substantial increases to their sentence. Very little research exists about the time loss 
rule. Research conducted by JUSTICE (1994, p. 7), however, found that `the effect is 
to transform a minor check on wholly groundless applications into a major barrier in 
some meritorious cases'. The time loss rule, then, discourages appeals against 
wrongful convictions, and further illustrates the inability of the official statistics to 
adequately depict all wrongful convictions that occur. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has synthesised the systematic approach to the causes of miscarriages of 
justice with critical theoretical and methodological approaches. In so doing, existing 
depictions of the wrongful criminal conviction `iceberg' were extended to include a 
range of significant procedures of the CJS that can cause wrongful convictions and/or 
act as deterrents to overturning those wrongful convictions through a successful 
appeal. What this chapter has not determined, however, is the precise number of 
wrongful convictions that are engendered by the routine operations of the procedures 
of the CJS that were discussed. On the contrary, it has demonstrated that a precise 
figure of wrongful convictions is impossible to arrive at. But, a precise depiction of all 
wrongful convictions was not the object of this chapter. Rather, the primary purpose 
was to emphasise that there are indeed procedures that cause wrongful convictions 
and/or act as deterrents to their remedy through a successful appeal. This analysis can 
then be used as a tool of analysis against the official indices of successful appeal to 
show that they can be conceived to be only a partial indicator of England and Wales's 
miscarriage of justice phenomenon. Hence, the official statistics on successful appeals 
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against criminal conviction are not an exhaustive or comprehensive indicator of 
England and Wales' miscarriage of justice `iceberg'. 
So far, I have been concerned to question the limits of prevailing definitions of 
miscarriages of justice, their scale, and understandings of their causality. But when 
JUSTICE inadvertently set in motion a certain kind of discursive orthodoxy about the 
nature and the extent of the miscarriage of justice phenomenon, it also shaped the 
character of the counter-discursive voices aiming at significant CJS reform. In Part 
Two of the thesis I examine some of these principal voices in the debates about the 
morality of CJS procedure and reform. I make a number of constructive criticisms of 
each of these voices, and in line with my more radically inclusive approach to the 
whole terrain of miscarriages of justice, I argue overall that the many voices which 
echo the harms associated with mundane and routine successful appeals against 







The governmental voice 
Introduction 
This chapter begins by noting that England and Wales' CJS is a case-law system 
within which procedural reform is not effected through speculative critique but, 
rather, through showing procedural error or irregularity in concrete cases, i. e. by 
showing that particular individuals are being harmed. In such a context, an historical 
analysis of governmental responses to miscarriages of justice is conducted and what 
was termed a `tradition of criminal justice system reform' in the introduction is 
further explicated as a kind of `governmental voice' which responds to forms of 
counter-discourse in a particular official way. Interestingly, however, the 
governmental voice shares with `counter-voices' the assumption that miscarriages of 
justice are exceptional cases of successful appeal that have failed to be overturned 
through existing appellate procedures. Given the arguments in Part One, this 
constitutes a crucial limitation if the terrain of wrongful criminal convictions is to be 
properly understood. 
There are four parts in the development of this analysis. First, an outline of Foucault's 
(1991) analysis of the `art' of government is presented and a useful ideal-type of 
`good' government is discerned that can assist in evaluating the governmental voice in 
question. Then, an historical analysis of governmental legislative responses to specific 
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successful appeal cases is conducted. In so doing, a broader analysis of the operations 
of the governmental voice is provided. Following this, Foucault's thesis on power, 
knowledge and resistance is outlined to show that procedural reforms can be seen as 
intrinsically bound up with forms of counter-discourse - counter-voices - that are 
grounded in successful appeals that illustrate new procedural problematics. Finally, 
the limits of the focus upon procedural reform of the CJS are discussed in the context 
of the thousands of victims of wrongful criminal convictions that the reforming gaze 
overlooks. 
The art of `good' government 
Foucault's (1979) research found that from about the 16th century a new form of 
political structure has been developing - the modern state. However, Foucault (1979) 
argued, the state is not to be regarded in the conventional way, as a kind of power 
which ignores individuals in the interests of the totality, nor in the Marxist sense, as 
being concerned only with the interests of a particular class group in society. Rather, 
state power is both an `individualizing and a totalizing form of power' (Foucault, 
1979; Rabinow, 1991, p. 14; Gordon, 1991, p. 3). Foucault conducted a history of 
government and argued from the middle of the 16th Century a series of treatises 
began to appear which not only concerned the traditional questions of the nature of 
the state, nor even with the problems of how the prince could best guard his power. 
Their scope, Foucault pointed out, was much wider concerning the `art of 
government', in almost every area of social life such as the `governing of a household, 
souls, children, a province, a convent, a religious order, or a family' (Rabinow, 1991, 
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p. 15). Political reflection is, thus, broadened to include `almost all forms of human 
activity, from the smallest stirrings of the soul to the largest military manoeuvres of 
the army' (Rabinow, 1984, p. 15). As Rabinow (1984, p. 16) has argued, the treatises 
on government are linked directly to the rise and growth of centralised state 
administrative apparatuses, which would evolve in the following century into all the 
detailed knowledge of the resources at the state's disposal. 
In his analysis, Foucault's history of government also emphasised the centrality of 
statistical forms of analysis in the modes of government that distinguish the modern 
world and the ways in which they are (should be) used to enhance the wellbeing of the 
population. In particular, Foucault (1979, pp. 14-16) argued that from about the 18th 
century on, the 'arts of government', which replaced Sovereign authority, emerged as a 
consequence to the problem of population and `consist(ed) essentially of the 
knowledge of the state, in all the different elements, dimensions and factors of its 
power, termed precisely "statistics", meaning the science of the state'. Statistics, 
argued Foucault, gradually revealed that the population had its own lawlike 
regularities such as its own rate of death, of suicide, of disease, its own cycles of 
scarcity, etc. He asserted that under the `art', `population' management became the 
ultimate interest of government, embracing the welfare of the population to improve 
its conditions, increase its wealth, longevity, health etc. Hence individual interest and 
that of the population as a whole becomes both the target and the instrument of 
government (Foucault, 1979, p. 18). For Foucault, (1979, p. 17) `statistics... make it 
possible to quantify the phenomena specific to population', such that `the art of 
government and empirical knowledge of the state's resources and condition - its 
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statistics - together formed the major components of a new political rationality' 
(Rabinow, 1984, p. 16). 
From such a perspective, governmental rationalities are intrinsically linked to 
developments in statistical forms of knowledge and to the powers of governmental 
expertise. Existing modes of power are thus not so much a matter of `imposing' 
constraints or limitations upon citizens, but become rather a matter of `making up' 
citizens capable of bearing `a kind of regulated freedom' (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 
174). Thus, personal autonomy `is not the antithesis of political power, but a key term 
in its exercise, the more so because most individuals are not merely the subjects of 
power but play a part in its operations' (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 174). To be sure, to 
regard the state as some kind of `monstre froid' `confronting and dominating' is to 
`over-value the problem of the State' (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 174. And, of primary 
importance `is not so much the State-domination of society, but the 
`governmentalization' of the State' (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 175). This highlights a 
certain paradox of `governmentality'. For whilst modern liberalism is usually defined 
as a political philosophy which limits the legitimate exercise of power by political 
authorities over society, it, at the same time, also obliges the government with regard 
to the organisation and wellbeing of society (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 179). 
`Good' government, then, need not be conceived as a conspiratorial, negative or 
coercive form of control or domination over a population or domain of government. 
On the contrary, legitimate government is obliged to take as its object the 
enhancement of the population or domain to which it is mandated to be responsible. 
As Foucault (cited Rose, 1996, p. 44) has pointed out: `legitimate government will not 
107 
be arbitrary government, but will be based upon intelligence concerning those whose 
wellbeing it is mandated to enhance' (also Foucault, 1991, p. 100). In this process, 
statistics on all aspects of the domain to be governed or managed are drawn from that 
inform government about the needs of the population to be managed. To be sure, 
`pastoral' government attains the `intelligence' to enhance the wellbeing of those 
individuals and domains for which it has responsibility through new forms of 
rationality that also emerged alongside the replacement of `sovereignty' by 
`government' that are intrinsically connected to the production and deployment of 
statistical forms of knowledge, calculation, categorisation and expertise (see, for 
example, Hunt & Wickham, 1994, p. 27; Foucault, 1991, p. 96). 
Accordingly, these developments - the emergence of governmental rationality and 
what might be termed statistical forms of reason - ushered in a new regime of power, 
namely `bio-power'. In order to manage a population well, governmental rationality 
requires detailed knowledge about the population or the domain to which it is 
directed. Bio-power made possible the fostering of life and the growth and care of 
populations by bringing `life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit statistical 
calculations and made knowledge-power an agent for the transformation of human 
life' (Foucault cited Rabinow, 1984, p. 17). This is provided through a whole array of 
governmental devices and techniques such as school, factory, health and/or prison 
inspectorates, royal commissions, departmental committees of inquiry, social surveys, 
journalistic reportage and so on (Osborne, 1996, p. 114) that are utilised to visualise 
and statistically represent populations and societal domains. The purpose of such 
knowledge being to inform government as to the norms proper to the particular 
domain, rather than to provide the direct rationale for government itself (Osborne, 
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1996, p. 101). It is from such a perspective that the next section conducts a historical 
analysis of governmental interventions into the legislative framework of the CJS to 
correct procedural errors that were exemplified by certain exceptional successful 
appeals against criminal conviction. The question is: does the tradition of criminal 
justice system reform represent a governmental concern with the wellbeing of the 
population? 
The tradition of criminal justice system reform 
`All law-abiding citizens have a common interest in a system of criminal justice in which the risks 
of the innocent being convicted and the guilty being acquitted are as low as human fallibility 
allows. For a person to be deprived of his or her liberty, perhaps for many years, on account of a 
crime which was in fact committed by someone else is both an individual tragedy and an affront to 
the standards of a civilised society... mistaken verdicts can and do sometimes occur and our task 
[when such occasions arise] is to recommend changes to our system of criminal justice which will 
make them less likely in the future' (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993, pp. 2-3). 
The above quotation derives from the most recent major governmental review of the 
CJS - the RCCJ. It underlines the fact that the loudest voice on miscarriages of justice 
has been directed towards exceptional cases of successful appeal exemplifying new 
procedural `errors', and the fact that procedural reform is case-driven, being a 
combination of common law - decisions of judges of the higher courts - and of 
statute law enacted or authorised by `Acts of Parliament' (see Criminal Justice 
System, 2001). It is, perhaps, not surprising, then, that an analysis of public/media 
concerns, social or legal debates, or, indeed, governmental legislative responses to the 
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perceived `problem' of miscarriages of justice shows that they have correspondingly 
tended to concern only a comparatively small number of high profile cases. For the 
consensual concern with the corrective reform of CJS procedural errors has dictated 
that it has been necessary to mobilise behind specific miscarriage of justice cases that 
exemplify the most significant problematic procedural aspect of the CJS at any 
particular time (see also Greer, 1994, p. 59). Thus, the RCCJ was not established in 
response to a crisis caused by an excessive number of successful appeals but, rather, 
in response to the specific cases of the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four, the 
Maguires and Judith Ward (see Emmerson, 1999), which exemplified a procedural 
problem with returning potentially meritorious cases back to the CACD when appeal 
rights had been exhausted (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993, pp. 1-6). 
Moreover, a history of the CJS shows that whichever era one chooses for analysis, the 
governmental voice on the perceived problem of miscarriages of justice has been 
articulated around exceptionality. In illustration, four of the most important legislative 
events that have defined the historical phasing of the CJS are: 
9 the establishment of a Court of Criminal Appeal under the Criminal Appeal Act 
(1907) (CAA (1907)); 
9 the first step towards the permanent abolition of capital punishment under its 
temporary abolition in the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act (1965) 
(MADPA (1965)); 
" the introduction of formalised police codes of practice and conduct under PACE 
(1984) (Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1985); and, 
" the establishment of the CCRC (Criminal Cases Review Commission Annual 
Report, 1998-2000) an `independent' body responsible for investigating suspected 
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miscarriages of criminal justice in England, Wales and Northern Ireland under the 
Criminal Appeal Act (1995) (CAA (1995)) (Criminal Appeal Act, 1995). 
Crucially, each of these legislative events was connected with an extra judicial 
inquiry previously set up by the government to address the problem of miscarriages of 
justice as perceived at the time. The CAA (1907) was connected with a Committee of 
Inquiry, which reported in 1904, set up in response to the Beck case (see Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into the Beck Case, 1904). The MADPA (1965) was connected 
to the parliamentary debate about the establishment, terms of reference and 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1953) (RCCP 
(1953)) (see Block & Hostettler, 1997; Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 
1953). PACE (1984) was an outgrowth of some of the recommendations of the RCCP 
(see Report, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 1981). And, the CAA (1995) 
was a consequence of some of the recommendations advised by the RCCJ (see 
Report, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993). 
Significantly, although each of these events and inquiries followed long legal and 
political campaigns, they were not initiated because of campaigning pressures alone. 
Nor were they a consequence of the overwhelming weight of the statistics on 
successful appeals. On the contrary, they were in direct response to the pressures of 
specific cases of successful appeals. Such cases being those that provided the 
exemplifying counter-discourse of the most problematic aspect of the procedural 
framework of the CJS as perceived at that particular time that was able to induce a 
public crisis of confidence in the CJS and activate governmental intervention. 
The establishment of the Court of Criminal Appeal 
Throughout the nineteenth century there was a longstanding Parliamentary campaign 
for the establishment of a court capable of hearing criminal appeals (see Colvin, 
1994). This was fuelled by the recurrence of miscarriage of justice cases that were 
evidenced by HO pardons (see Pattenden, 1996, pp. 5-33). Despite this, the eventual 
establishment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1907 was attributable to the 
combined counter-discursive public pressures exerted by the cases of Maybrick (see 
Editorial, 1889a - Editorial, 1889m; MacDougall, 1889; Moulton, 1889; F. G., 1889; 
Bourke, 1889; Blyth, 1889; Herbert, 1889; Times Parliamentary Proceedings, 1889; 
Barrister of Eight Years Standing, 1889), Edalji (Lihiri, 2000) and Beck (see Editorial, 
1904a - Editorial, 1904f; Editorial, 1907). These cases exemplified the urgent need 
for a court of criminal appeal as they provided the necessary counter-discourse to the 
legal sphere that people such as Edalji and Beck were being wrongly imprisoned and 
others, as exemplified by the Maybrick case, were given the death penalty for crimes 
that they probably did not commit. Taken together the Maybrick, Edalji and Beck 
cases served to diminish public confidence in the CJS to the extent that a committee 
of inquiry was established to investigate the Beck Affair. Subsequently, a court of 
criminal appeal had to be established to dispose of the public crisis and restore 
confidence in the government of the CJS (see Woffinden, 1987). Indeed, in 
announcing the establishment of the Criminal Court of Appeal under the CAA (1907) 
the then Home Secretary, Herbert Gladstone, told the House of Commons that `the 
only way to reverse the public belief that miscarriages of justice were an every-day 
occurrence... was the establishment of a court capable of hearing appeals of fact, law 
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and sentence' (Herbert Gladstone, Parl. Deb (HC) 31 May 1907, cc. 193-5 cited 
Pattenden, 1996, p. 31). 
The abolition of capital punishment 
Following the establishment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1907 the concern that 
people were being, or could be, convicted of criminal offences, and in some cases 
executed, without an appeal soon dissipated from the public consciousness and the 
`normal' assumption that the CJS was operating correctly was re-established. The 
belief that the CJS now contained the necessary legislative safeguards to correct 
wrongful criminal convictions created what in Elias's (1978) analysis could be termed 
a new `figuration' of criminal justice. This period of `normality', however, would be 
temporary, lasting only until the success of the Court of Criminal Appeal could be 
determined and the knowledge entered the public domain that even with a criminal 
appeal system people were still being given the death penalty in questionable 
circumstances. This intensified the long-standing campaign for the abolition of capital 
punishment but did not, in and of itself, result in abolition (see Capital Punishment 
UK, 2002). For abolition to be achieved cases that exemplified the problem, thus 
providing the necessary counter-discourse to the systemic practice of capital 
punishment, would have to be disseminated to the public to induce the prerequisite 
public crisis of confidence in the CJS needed to activate corrective governmental 
response. That necessary counter-discourse would revolve around the cases of 
Bentley, (see Campbell, 1998; Parris, 1991; Trow, 1990), Evans (see Kennedy, 1961) 
and Ellis (see Jones, 2001; Travis, 1999; Hancock, 1963) which together exemplified 
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to the public the question of the justness and/or appropriateness of the continuance of 
capital punishment (see, for example, Ryan, 1983, pp. 10-16; Christoph, 1962). In 
disposing of the public crisis surrounding the cases of Bentley, Evans and Ellis the 
MADPA (1965) temporarily abolished capital punishment for a five-year period (see 
Block and Hostettler, 1997). Upon its expiry in 1969, capital punishment was 
permanently abolished (see Callaghan, 1997). 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) 
With the abolition of capital punishment a space was provided wherein critical 
thoughts could turn to other potential CJS procedural problems. Despite longstanding 
allegations of police corruption and calls for police accountability (see, for example, 
Chibnall, 1979, pp. 138-142; Manning, 1979, p. 45; Miller, 1979, pp. 21-22; Jefferson 
and Grimshaw, 1984, pp. 71-72; Reiner, 1985; Punch, 1985), guidelines for the 
conduct of police conduct could not be formally introduced. Once again, what was 
required was a case or small cluster of cases that exemplified improper police 
conduct, thus providing the counter-discursive evidence to induce a public crisis and 
subsequently prompt government to introduce corrective CJS legislative reform. That 
case turned out to be the Confait Affair (see Price and Caplan, 1976; Kettle, 1979; 
Price, 1985) which exemplified the need for police accountability, both in the interests 
of greater reliability of evidence and the enhancement of suspect's rights (Report, 
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 1981, para, 10.1). In particular, the Fisher 
(1977) inquiry into the case had been especially critical of the police practices that led 
to the wrongful convictions of the three youths for the murder of Maxwell Confait. 
114 
The whole prosecution, argued Fisher, (1977) was geared simply to providing the case 
against the boys. As a result, the RCCP's main recommendation was governmentally 
translated into PACE (1984) (for a discussion see Leigh, 1985; Birch, 1985; Gibbons, 
1985; Mirfield, 1985; Munro, 1985) and the public crisis of confidence was duly 
disposed of. 
The establishment of the Criminal Cases Review Commission 
Following the introduction of police codes of conduct under PACE (1984), the next 
significant CJS procedural problematic to emerge was the need for an independent 
body for the investigation of suspected or alleged miscarriages of justice once existing 
domestic appeal processes had been exhausted. The limits of the appeal process in 
terms of the criteria of fresh evidence coupled with the apparent reluctance of the HO 
to refer cases back to the CACD raised further concerns about the safety of the high 
profile criminal convictions of the Guildford Four, the Birmingham Six, the Maguires, 
and so on. In response, the government set up the RCCJ and subsequently translated 
its main recommendation into the CCRC through the CAA (1995), and, once again, 
the public crisis of confidence in the law of appeals was dissolved. 
Power, knowledge and resistance 
In assessing the governmental voice in the tradition of criminal justice system reform, 
Foucault's (1977; 1979) thoughts on power and resistance are again useful. For it can 
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be conceived as expressing a form of what might be termed procedural reform 
resistance to existing forms of CJS power through the following discursive rules. At 
particular times, cases of successful appeals that exemplify problematic aspects in the 
legislative framework of the CJS attain a high profile media status. In consequence, 
the government, legal and public/media spheres are thrown into chaotic collision as 
the counter-discursive forces inform government of a crisis of public confidence in its 
management of the CJS. In response, extra judicial inquiries are launched whose 
recommendations are subsequently translated into corrective CJS legislation that 
restores public confidence and reaffirms governmental authority in the CJS, and 
harmony between the colliding spheres, is, temporarily, restored. This sequence of 
events is conceived as a `tradition' because the temporary resumption of CJS 
procedural `normality' will prevail only until the next occasion (event) that counter- 
discourse against miscarriages of justice produces a successful appeal that exemplifies 
a new problematic in the procedural framework of the CJS. At such time, a public 
crisis of confidence will, once again be induced, and the governmental sequence of 
events will, once again, be initiated. 14 
From this outline of the tradition of criminal justice system reform the following three 
significant features can be drawn: 
14 There is a potential question in terms of the appropriateness of the vocabulary of `tradition' to 
describe the sequential process by which the CJS is governmentally reformed. Usually, a `tradition' 
refers to the `conscious reference back to legitimating roots and precedents', something which is not 
present in this analysis. It should be noted, however, that the term `tradition' is applied here in the very 
specific context of the operation and exercise of CJS power from a perspective inspired by Foucault, 
which might not correspond with conventional or, even, common-sense understandings. From such a 
perspective the use of the term `tradition' is justified within which the operation and exercise of CJS 
power is shown to be `intentional yet nonsubjective'. In this context, although there is no power that is 
exercised without a series of aims and objectives, this does not mean that it results from the choice or 
decision of an individual subject or group (see Foucault, 1979, p. 95). 
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9 corrective legislative reforms of the CJS are intrinsically bound up with the 
production and dissemination of counter-discursive forms of knowledge of 
successful appeals that exemplified new problematic aspects of the procedural 
framework of the CJS. Such cases are the ones that attain a high profile media 
status; 
" the forms of counter-discourse that were successful were those that were able to 
induce a public crisis of confidence in an aspect of the CJS; and, 
" legislative reforms to the CJS that are able to dispose of public crises of 
confidence are connected to the recommendations of extra judicial inquiries 
governmentally employed in specific response to the discourse that was able to 
induce the public crises of confidence in the CJS. 
Each of these features raise critical questions pertaining to power and knowledge in 
the operations of CJS power, the possibilities of resistance and the role and rationality 
of government (in a Foucauldian 1979; 1991 sense) in the disposal of public crisis of 
confidence in the CJS. To be sure, perhaps the most significant contribution of 
Foucault's thesis on existing forms of power was his stress on the productive or 
constitutive nature of its exercise. His major achievement was to have turned a 
negative concept on its head and to attribute the production of concepts, ideas, and the 
structures of social institutions to the operations of power in its existing forms. As he 
argued: `We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative 
terms: it "excludes", it " represses", it "censors", it "abstracts", it "masks", it 
"conceals". In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of 
objects and rituals of truth' (Foucault, 1977, p. 194). In such a context, the procedural 
reforms of the CJS, that were introduced in governmental response to exceptional 
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successful appeals that exemplified forms of harm that could not be procedurally 
remedied, can be conceived to have produced or constituted new forms of CJS reality. 
To be sure, a CJS without a Court of Criminal Appeal and the possibility of 
overturning wrongful convictions, for example, is a fundamentally different `product' 
to a system that is constituted to contain such an appellate procedure. 
Foucault's conception of `modern' `power', then, is very different from traditional 
socio-political conceptions of it. Power is not `owned' by some privileged person or 
group and exercised `simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who "do not 
have it"' (Foucault, 1977, p. 27). On the contrary, `power', or `government' for 
Foucault, is not just the ruthless domination of the weaker by the stronger, in fact, it is 
not to be `had' at all: `Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything but 
because it comes from everywhere... there is no binary and all-encompassing 
opposition between ruler and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a 
general matrix - no such duality extending from the top down and reacting on more 
and more limited groups to the very depths of the social body. One must suppose, 
rather, that the manifold relations of force that take shape and come into play in the 
machinery of production, in families, limited groups and institutions, are the basis for 
wide-ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole' 
(Foucault, 1979, pp. 93-94). From such a standpoint, Foucault conceived that forms of 
resistance to power are not simply a reaction to a pre-existing power. `This', he 
argued, `would be to misunderstand the strictly relational character of power 
relations' (Foucault, 1979, p. 95). Forms of resistance, for Foucault, are, in fact, never 
in a position of exteriority in relation to power. Rather, it is more likely the reverse: 
states of power are continually engendered or incited by virtue of the potential 
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counter-powers which co-exist with them: `Where there is power there is resistance' 
(Foucault, 1979, p. 95). Power, then, presupposes resistance of some form. He 
asserted: `Relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other 
types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual 
relationships), but are immanent in the latter; they are the immediate effects of the 
divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and conversely 
they are internal conditions of these differentiations; relations of power are not in 
superstructural positions, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they 
have a directly productive role, wherever they come into effect' (Foucault, 1979, p. 
94). 
The key to understanding Foucault's conception of resistance lies in his meaning of a 
4 power relation'. In the context of the present discussion, `power' within the sphere of 
criminal justice can be conceived as nothing more than the multiplicity of force 
relations extant within the socio-legal body. Power's conditions of possibility actually 
consist of this moving substrate of force relations: the struggles, confrontations, 
contradictions, inequalities, transformations and integrations of these force relations. 
Thus individuals are `positioned' within any struggle only as a consequence of the 
existence of a struggle for power. He argued: `politics is war by other means'. 
Accordingly, both existing forms of power and resistance to them involve the 
invention of `tactics' and the co-ordination of these various tactics into coherent 
strategies. This is, perhaps, the most important political consequence of Foucault's 
thesis on power: a strategic manoeuvre must be countered by an opposing manoeuvre; 
a set of `tactics' must be consciously `invented' in opposition to the setting in place of 
another; a different procedural `art' of CJS, for example, is what will oppose the 
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existing one. `One is always "inside" power, there is no "escaping" it' (Foucault, 
1979, p. 95). Moreover, Foucault argued, resistance is more effective when it is 
directed at a technique of power rather than at `power' in general. It is techniques of 
power which allow for the exercise of power and the production of knowledge. 
Resistance consists of `refusing' these techniques. Most importantly, Foucault argued, 
oppressive forces of domination do not hold the monopoly in the capacity to `invent' 
`tactics'. If resistance is to be effective, it requires the acknowledgement that tactics 
are being employed in a struggle, and the active interrogation of those tactics. 
Foucault suggested that in the interrogation of `tactics', `power' is intelligible, and 
susceptible to analysis down to its most minute details, in terms of the historical 
strategies and sets of `tactics' designed to mobilise these techniques to political 
advantage (Foucault, 1979, pp. 95-96). 
From such a frame of reference, what might be termed the governmental `ear' is, 
perhaps, even more significant than the governmental voice. For legislative reform of 
problematic procedures of England and Wales' CJS is inevitable in a system where 
power and resistance are about the governmental management of competing 
discourses (also cf. Nobles and Schiff, 1995). In this process, governmental 
techniques, such as committees of inquiries and the royal commissions into 
problematic aspects of the CJS, represent an arena within which an enactment in the 
power struggle between dominant forms of CJS power and its counter-discursive 
resistance takes place (see, for example, Osborne, 1996, p. 114). And, the success of 
the governmental translation of their recommendations into corrective CJS legislation 
that disposes of public crises represents an episode in the ongoing negotiated 
management of the CJS. 
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From this it follows that exceptional successful appeals that exemplify new errors 
need not be conceived in entirely negative terms. As Coser (1956) noted: `Far from 
being only a "negative" factor which "tears apart", social conflict may fulfil a number 
of determinate functions in groups and other interpersonal relations' (Coser, 1956, p. 
8). Accordingly, the more critical counter-discourse that is produced around cases that 
exemplify procedural problems in the CJS, then, potentially, the more crises of public 
confidence in the CJS will be induced, and the more problematic aspects of the CJS 
will have to be subjected to governmental disposal and legislative domestication. 
Moreover, as Coser (1956), in a reformulation of Simmel's (1955) proposition, also 
noted: `Struggle may be an important way to avoid conditions of disequilibrium by 
modifying the basis for power relations' (Coser, 1956, p. 137). 
The limits of the existing governmental voice 
On the face of it, the tradition of criminal justice system reform would seem to 
indicate that the governmental voice has followed its remit and introduced a range of 
corrective legislative reforms to the CJS that have, indeed, served to enhance the 
wellbeing of the population for which it is mandated. For the reform of the CJS 
illustrates that some of the most significant procedural reforms of the CJS have been 
introduced in an attempt to either reduce wrongful convictions or remedy them when 
they occur. As shown, the debate about the case of Timothy Evans contributed to the 
abolition of capital punishment. And, the focus upon the Confait Affair resulted in the 
introduction of PACE (1984), through which many thousands of mundane and routine 
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appeals against criminal conviction are successful each year. To be sure, the 
procedural reforms that were outlined in the tradition of criminal justice system 
reform, such as the introduction of the Court of Criminal Appeal and the abolition of 
capital punishment, can be conceived as representing what Foucault (1979) might 
term tactical victories in the discursive interplay of existing forms of CJS discourse 
and its counter-discursive opposition. For prior to the Court of Criminal Appeal there 
was no official mechanism for overturning wrongful criminal convictions. And, 
although wrongful criminal convictions are extensive, the abolition of capital 
punishment was also a step in the right direction. For prior to its abolition many of the 
victims in exceptional cases of successful appeals would not have been alive to 
overturn their wrongful convictions, for example, the Birmingham Six, the Guildford 
Four, and so on. 
There is, however, a significant limitation with the focus of the existing articulation of 
the governmental voice. In particular, its complicity with prevalent notions that 
miscarriages of justice constitute only exceptional cases of successful appeals takes 
no account whatever of the thousands of mundane and routine successful appeals that 
occur each year. It, therefore, can be conceived to divert attention away from, even 
disqualify, the potential voices of the thousands of victims of mundane wrongful 
convictions that occur annually in the Crown Court. It also excludes from the dialogue 
about miscarriages of justice the potential voices of the many hundreds of victims of 
wrongful conviction each year in the CACD. Accordingly, it is not that the existing 
tendency of the governmental voice to focus upon exceptional cases of successful 
appeals that exemplify newly discovered procedural errors in the operation of the 
criminal justice process is wrong. Rather, there has been no governmental `eye' at all 
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upon the scale of wrongful criminal convictions as evidenced by successful appeals 
that are not exceptional, or do not exemplify new procedural errors. In this sense, the 
legitimacy of the governmental voice is called into question. If good and/or legitimate 
government is about enhancing the wellbeing of the population to which it is 
mandated, then, it can be argued that the responsive ear of the government should not 
be entirely fixed upon listening to forms of counter-discourse that emphasise 
exceptional successful appeals. On the contrary, there should also be a governmental 
eye upon its own collected statistics of successful appeals. As it stands, however, the 
governmental voice on miscarriages really says very little about the real extent and 
forms of injustice within the domain of criminal justice. This is contrary to its remit 
and indicates a governmental neglect of a severe judicial lack of wellbeing. As Rose, 
(1991) noted, all aspects of the social economy are evaluated through their 
numericization. For example, poverty is transformed into the numbers claiming social 
benefits; public order statistics define the crime rate; the divorce rate becomes 
synonymous with the nation's morality; the spread of AIDS (or the lack of it) is 
regarded as a sign of the success of the government of sexual conduct. In the same 
way, the current scale of successful appeals indicates far too many wrongful 
convictions and, therefore, serves to undermine the entire judiciary. To be sure, `if 
sceptical vigilance over politics has long been a feature of liberal political thought, it 
is today increasingly conducted in the language of numbers' (Rose, 1991, p. 674). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has considered four of the most significant legislative events in the 
history of the CJS. In so doing, what was termed a tradition of criminal justice reform 
was explicated that can be interpreted within a Foucauldian power/knowledge 
theoretical perspective. For forms of procedural reform resistance of the CJS are 
intrinsically connected to forms of knowledge (counter-discourse) that exemplify new 
errors in the procedural framework. The point to be made about this is not that the 
reform of problematic procedures of the CJS is wrong. But, rather, in the metaphor of 
voices, the governmental reform voice has ranted on about reforming apparent errors 
in the procedural framework of the CJS in attempts to appease counter-discursive 
voices of particular cases of successful appeal. This has been at the expense of more 
vigilant government that ensures the wellbeing of the population as a whole from the 





There is a notable absence of literature generally on campaigns against the CJS in 
England and Wales, and specifically on campaigns against miscarriages of justice. In 
the course of this research, the closest sources that I could find were two analyses by 
Mick Ryan (1978; 1983) on the performance of the penal lobby in England and 
Wales. In those analyses, Ryan (1978, p. 1; see also 1983, pp. 105-121) argued that 
`governments discriminate against radical pressure groups in favour of liberal or 
conservative groups whose views imply no fundamental critique of the existing 
economic and political order'. In addition, there have been other numerous critical 
researches into the general unjust `treatment of the confined' with a view to a radical 
restructuring or complete abolition of the existing penal regime (for example, Scraton 
et al, 1991, pp. 154-160; Ruggiero et al, 1995; Fitzgerald and Sim, 1982; Mathiesen, 
1974). Such researches routinely draw upon the testimony of victims of exceptional 
successful appeals to support or substantiate their theoretical claims, but do so only in 
the limited context of the general unjust treatment of prisoners or as a critique of the 
politics of incarceration. For example, Scraton et al (1991, pp. 152-153) presented an 
extensive quotation by Paul Hill of the Guildford Four as evidence of the general 
unjust treatment of Irish prisoners. 
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In an attempt to redress this neglect, this chapter presents the findings of a web-based 
analysis of the part that campaign voices play in the discursive dialogue about 
miscarriages of justice in England and Wales. 15 In so doing, an analysis is presented 
which opposes Ryan's (1978; 1983) findings of a governmental conspiracy to block 
radical forms of counter-discourse in favour of more friendly forms of reform 
discourse. On the contrary, it is shown that successful campaigns against miscarriages 
of justice produce the counter-discursive raw material for the radical and progressive 
reform of the system. 
In general terms, this Chapter offers an account of the specific logic of campaigning 
against miscarriages of justice through the following steps. Firstly, attention is drawn 
to organisational diversity, campaign aims and types of cases that are assisted. Despite 
their important differences, it is argued that all campaign organisations share the same 
primary and secondary aims. Moreover, the proclivity of campaign organisations to 
focus upon serious cases that involve lengthy sentences of imprisonment is explored 
to indicate the possible factors behind such an approach. Second, the processes 
through which campaigns transform previously unsuccessful appeal cases into forms 
of counter-discourse resulting in successful appeal are traced. Finally, an assessment 
of the acheivements and limitations of existing forms of campaigning against 
miscarriages is conducted. 
15 In addition, this chapter benefits greatly from Andrew Green's (Conviction, INNOCENT, United 
Against Injustice) generous insights on the organisational structure, history and logic of campaign 
groups and organisations against miscarriages of justice within England and Wales. These were 
provided during two informal interviews conducted on 21 July 2002 (Bristol) (Green, 
2002) and 7 
August 2002 (Manchester) (Green, 2002a). 
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Campaigns: organisational diversity and aims 
If further support were needed to confirm the extensive scale of England and Wales' 
miscarriage of justice phenomenon, this is indicated in the sheer number and diversity 
of groups and organisations that campaign against miscarriages. These include United 
Against Injustice (UAI), a supra-federal system of miscarriage of justice umbrella 
organisations which support small single case groups within their geographical 
location; United Campaign Against False Allegations of Abuse (UCAFAA), which is 
a further federal system of groups and organisations concerned with sexual abuse as a 
specific cause of miscarriages of justice; other national miscarriage of justice 
organisations; other cause specific miscarriage organisations; and, a host of other 
national campaign organisations with other specific concerns (such as human rights, 
civil liberties, feminism and `racism'), which also support and/or campaign for certain 
miscarriage of justice victims within their specific area of concern. In practice these 
groups and/or organisations are not separate. On the contrary, under the banner of 
UAI, any group or organisation that supports more than a single case can request to be 
affiliated to UAI with full meeting and voting rights. 
In terms of structure, at the foundation of UTA are the single case miscarriage of 
justice campaign groups, generally comprised of the alleged victims' family and 
friends. For example, the Justice for Colin James Campaign (see Scandals in Justice, 
2002); Justice for John Taft Campaign (see Justice for John Taft Campaign, 2002); 
and the Friends of Susan May Campaign (see Inside and Innocent, 2002). Above 
these, (in terms of organisational structure, but not importance), are umbrella 
organisations that support more than a singe miscarriage of justice campaign group 
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within their geographical area. The main geographical umbrella organisations of UAI 
are: 
9 INNOCENT: perhaps the largest miscarriage of justice organisation, INNOCENT, 
based in Manchester, founded in June 1993, was an outgrowth of sister 
organisation Conviction, the Sheffield-based miscarriage of justice organisation, 
which had been inundated by prisoners from the Manchester area alleging their 
innocence (see INNOCENT, 2002); 16 
" Merseyside Against Injustice (MAI): set up in early 1999, in line with the aims of 
UAI, MAI aims to promote and encourage co-operation and exchange of 
information including advice and assistance to other organisations and individual 
campaigns (Merseyside Against Injustice, 2002); 
" Kent Against Injustice (KAI): a sister organisation to MAI with the same aims; 
" Gloucester Against Injustice (GAI): another sister organisation to MAI and KAI 
with the same aims; 
" South Wales Liberty (SWL): based in Cardiff, Wales, SWL is a local group of the 
London based civil rights organisation LIBERTY. SWL's main area of work 
locally is concerned with actively campaigning on a number of cases that they 
believe to be miscarriages (see South Wales Liberty, 2002). 
At the top of the federal organisational structure is UAI, to which the main umbrella 
organisations are affiliated. In practical terms, in addition to being a banner under 
16 In many respects, although Conviction still maintains a website, and will support campaign groups 
in the Sheffield area, it has been merged with INNOCENT with Andrew Green (the originator and sole 
remaining member of Conviction) working as a case worker in the Manchester area for INNOCENT 
(Green, 2002). 
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which organisations can come together, UAI is very keen to assist in setting up new 
organisations to support single case groups. In terms of operation, UAI is hosted by 
one of the geographically located organisations on a rotational basis. 17 
The main groups and geographically located organisations associated with UCAFAA 
are: 
" Action Against False Accusations of Abuse (AAFAA): a group which campaigns 
to raise awareness of the large number of people who are falsely accused of sexual 
abuse and wrongly convicted (see Action Against False Accusations of Abuse, 
2002b); 
9 Bryn Estyn Staff Support Team (BESST): supports and campaigns on behalf of all 
those that might be falsely accused and wrongly convicted as a result of the 
concern surrounding carers and teachers who worked in the North Wales 
Children's Homes in the 1960s and 70s (see Bryn Estyn Staff Support Team, 
2002); 
" Falsely Accused Carers and Teachers (FACT): a group based in Merseyside and 
Yorkshire which campaigns against police trawls of former care home residents 
touting for allegations of sexual abuse using compensation as a lure (see Falsely 
Accused Cares and Teachers, 2002a); 
In addition to the federal miscarriage of justice organisations, there are a host of 
national miscarriage of justice organisations including: 
17 Although UAI has been in operational existence since 2001 it was formally launched in October 
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" Miscarriages of Justice UK (MOJUK): provides details of a large number of 
miscarriage of justice cases, works closely with prisoners and produces daily 
bulletins and monthly newsletters which disseminate and co-ordinate information 
to and between campaign groups/organisations (see Miscarriages of Justice UK, 
2002b); 
" The Portia Campaign: a particular specialism of the Portia Campaign is a focus 
upon cases in which mothers are accused or jailed for murder or manslaughter of 
their children in doubtful circumstances (see The Portia Campaign, 2002); 
9 Miscarriage of Justice Organisation UK (MOJO): founded in 1999 to support 
miscarriage of justice victims and their families, and to attempt to redress the lack 
of welfare and aftercare provision for the wrongly imprisoned (Miscarriage of 
Justice Organisation UK, 2000); 
" False Allegations Support Organisation (FASO): an organisation dedicated to 
providing support to anyone affected by a false allegation of abuse (False 
Allegations Support Organisation, 2002); 
9 The Five Percenters: a cause specific organisation that was established in January 
1998 to campaign on behalf of people wrongly accused and/or convicted of 
`shaken baby syndrome' (causing brain injury by shaking their baby) (The Five 
Percenters, 2002); 
" JUSTICE: the first all-party legal reform organisation against miscarriages of 
justice. 18 
2002. 
18 Prior to the establishment of the CCRC in 1997, JUSTICE was the main organisation for the 
investigation of alleged or suspected miscarriage of justice cases in England and Wales at the post- 
appeal stage. It could be argued, however, that JUSTICE was so `successful' that it has rendered itself 
unnecessary and obsolete. With the establishment of the CCRC, something that JUSTICE had been 
campaigning for, for many years, the investigative function that JUSTICE provided to alleged victims 
of miscarriages of justice who had exhausted their existing appeal rights was taken over and formalised 
by the CCRC. For, prior to the establishment of the CCRC, JUSTICE investigated an annual average of 
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In addition to the groups and organisations that specifically campaign against 
miscarriages of justice, whether on a general or cause related basis, there are a number 
of civil rights, anti-racist and feminist organisations that campaign against specific 
miscarriage of justice cases that occur in England and Wales. These include: 
9 Amnesty International: the world-wide human rights organisation, which 
campaigns against miscarriages of justice that derive from human rights abuses 
(see Amnesty International, 2002; 2002a; 2002b); 
" Statewatch: which extensively reports on miscarriages of justice (see, for example, 
Statewatch, 2000); 
9 Campaign Against Racism and Fascism (CARF): which supports miscarriage of 
justice campaigns where the possible cause is `racism' (Campaign Against Racism 
and Fascism, 2002); 
" The National Civil Rights Movement (NCRM): which supports cases of injustice 
that are caused by an infringement of civil liberties (National Civil Rights 
Movement, 2002); and, 
" Justice For Women (JFW): a feminist organisation that campaigns to reveal 
miscarriages of justice that are caused through what they term `the gendered 
limitations of existing legal defences to a charge of murder for women who have 
fought back against or killed violent male partners'. JFW was established in 1990 
in Leeds, there are now groups in London, Leeds, Norwich and Manchester (see 
Justice For Women, 2002); 
50 cases (JUSTICE, 1989, pp. 1-2). As things currently stand, 
however, JUSTICE supports two cases 
that pre-date the CCRC. Both of these cases are currently under review at the 
CCRC and JUSTICE is 
seeking new cases that they might investigate. 
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9 Southall Black Sisters (SBS): an Asian women's organisation based in Southall, 
London, SBS are concerned with miscarriages of justice that might affect black 
and Asian women in the areas of domestic violence and racism (see Benn, 2000; 
Dunne, 1997); and, 
The range and diversity of the campaign organisations against miscarriages renders 
any attempt to discern a universal underpinning identity profoundly problematic. 
Moreover, within and between the various, and sometimes competing and 
conflicting, 19 organisations that campaign against miscarriages there are ostensibly 
different affiliations and/or motivations. As such, any attempt to construct a single 
campaign identity would almost inevitably produce a `straw' construction that would 
not be representative of any particular group or organisation and with which none of 
the groups or organisations would be likely to identify. In this context, this section 
analyses the identities of the various organisations that campaign against 
miscarriages. This illustrates both their ostensible differences, and the way that such 
differences are ultimately, and pragmatically, resolved in the interests of 
concentrating on the most important aspect of the campaigns -a successful appeal for 
the alleged innocent exceptional victims of post-appeal wrongful convictions. 
The conventional perception of the affiliations of campaign organisations, generally, 
might be to perceive them on the `left' of politics and, perhaps, to be `subversive' 
critics of the state (see, for example, Hardy, 1998; Cowe, 2001). Against this, 
19 Confidentiality dictates that I cannot elaborate upon this point and give specific examples. In the 
course of researching this chapter, however, I discovered that it is not uncommon for campaign groups 
and/or organisations to quarrel over the course of action to take and how it should be taken, sometimes 
resulting in an inability to continue campaigning together. Moreover, there are sometimes `personality 
clashes' between members of the single case groups and members of the most appropriate or 
convenient geographically located organisation with the result that the single case group 
is supported 
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campaigns against miscarriages of justice can be said to cut through such 
conventional political rivalries and divides where the reduction of miscarriages is just 
as likely to be a concern of campaigners on the `right' of politics, albeit for different 
reasons. As Huff et al (1996, p. xxiii) stated: `a common but fallacious, assumption 
about this topic is that wrongful conviction is an issue that should inherently interest 
"liberals" more than "conservatives" (who are presumed to be more interested in "law 
and order" and "public safety")'. In refuting this notion, Huff et al (1996, p. xxiii) 
emphasised the fact that every time an innocent person is wrongly convicted in the 
US, the actual offender typically remains free to continue victimising the public (see 
also Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993, p. 2). Thus, as Huff et al noted, 
miscarriages of justice are not only about an individual's right to due process and a 
fair trial, they are also a serious public safety concern. 
Within the specific context and jurisdiction of England and Wales' CJS, the political 
consensus on the need to reduce miscarriages of justice was most recently apparent in 
the parliamentary debate about the government's White Paper `Justice for All' (Home 
Office, 2002). Essentially, the debate was couched in a discourse of protecting the 
innocent, to which the main political parties attempted to align themselves. For the 
Government that drafted the White Paper the emphasis on the protection of the 
innocent was expressed in the following terms: `We have an absolute determination to 
create a system that meets the needs of society and wins the trust of citizens, 
by.. 
. acquitting the 
innocent' (Home Office, 2002, p. 13 my emphasis). For the 
Government's Opposition, the need to protect the innocent victims of the CJS was 
expressed by the Shadow Home Secretary as follows: `Any proposal to adjust the 
by another organisation with which there is no quarrel (Green, 2002). 
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rules... of the criminal justice system... should carry safeguards to protect the innocent' 
(Letwin, 2002 my emphasis). This is not to suggest that the major political parties 
with a stake in England and Wales' CJS perceive the problem and the solution of 
miscarriages of justice in the same way. As indicated by Huff et al (1996), there are 
also different reasons on the `left' and `right' of politics in England and Wales for 
wanting to reduce miscarriages. But, what is agreed, at least on a stated level, is that 
the legislative framework of the CJS should be such that it does not victimise the 
innocent. 
As affiliations specifically relate to UAI, any overt affiliations, attachments or 
`identity politics', whether they be grounded in religion, racism, sexuality, disability 
or, indeed, party politics, are regarded as a potentially dangerous irrelevance. They 
can often be an unhelpful distraction in the representation of miscarriage of justice 
victims and to the primary goal obtaining a quashed conviction for the innocent 
victims of wrongful conviction (discussed further below). In addition, overt identity 
politics can also be destructive of the relations within and between the groups and/or 
organisations that campaign on behalf of alleged and/or suspected miscarriage of 
justice victims. Accordingly, overt political views and/or other strongly held opinions 
are discouraged in the interests of maintaining the focus on the release of the 
innocent. This is expressed in the following quotation from Merseyside Against 
Injustice (MAI), an organisation affiliated to UAI: 
`MAI is not dominated by any political organisation or other group or any particular 
campaign or individual. MAI operates an Equal Opportunities Policy, which means that all 
victim's, their families or supporters will receive equal advice, help and support regardless 
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of their gender, sexuality, race, religious belief or disability' (Merseyside Against Injustice, 
2002 my emphases). 
But, the avoidance of getting caught up in identity politics is not only a characteristic 
of UAI and the organisations that choose or are invited to be affiliated to UAI, it is 
also overtly expressed by every other major campaign organisation, whatever their 
particular focus of concern. For example, The Portia Campaign (2002), a national 
organisation ostensibly concerned with the miscarriages that derive from mistakes 
about `cot death'20, SIDS (Sudden Infant Death Syndrome)21 and MSbP 
(Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy) 22 states that they `aim to help anyone who is... in 
trouble with the law' (my emphasis). Similarly, False Allegations Support 
Organisation (FASO) (2002b), an organisation ostensibly concerned with 
miscarriages that derive from false allegations of sexual abuse, assert that `whenever 
anyone (is) falsely accused of such an iniquitous crime Faso offers clear information, 
practical advice and emotional support ... [to] anyone affected 
by a false allegation of 
abuse' (my emphases). Likewise, Campaign Against Racism and Fascism (CARF) 
(2002a), an organisation ostensibly concerned with the effect that racism might have 
as a cause of wrongful convictions, stress that they are `not aligned to any political 
party or tendency'. Each of the above quotations, then, would seem to expresses the 
inclusiveness of the organisations that campaign against miscarriages of justice. For 
they emphasise that anyone, irrespective of things such as ethnicity, sexual 
20 For a critical discussion of `cot death' see Norman, K. (2000) `The causes of cot death' website: 
http: //www portia orrg/chapter05/frame5. html retrieved 20 July 2002. 
21 For a critical discussion of SIDS see Coulter, H. L. (1996) `SIDS and Seizures' website: 
http: //www. geocities. com/HotSprings/1158/vaccine_sids. htm retrieved 20 July 2002. 
22 MSbP can be defined as creating illnesses or disorders in someone else to gain medical attention. For 
a critical discussion see Johnston, L. & Calvert, J. (2000) `Doctors' child abuse theory that 
is tearing 
families apart' The Daily Express July 20. 
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orientation, religious or other belief and/or political affiliation is assisted to overturn 
wrongful convictions within the specific area of the various campaign organisations. 
However, whilst the organisations that campaign against miscarriages of justice can, 
indeed, be collectively conceived to assist anyone irrespective of ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, disability and so on, a mere cursory reading of such a stated consensual 
commitment might give a false impression of the kind of people to which this might 
apply. The actual generic commitment of the campaign organisations is not to 
campaign in support of anyone who might be a victim of a wrongful criminal 
conviction. On the contrary, campaign organisations are not at all interested in victims 
who may have been wrongly convicted for `technical' reasons, such as poorly 
presented defence cases, if the alleged victim actually committed the criminal 
offences for which they were convicted (see, for example, Green, 2000b). Rather, the 
consensual primary aim that is collectively expressed among and between campaign 
organisations is to campaign only in support of the factually innocent. Thus, whilst it 
is correct to say that campaign organisations are concerned to help anyone in trouble 
with the law irrespective of gender, social class, ethnicity and so on, the proviso is 
that such persons must be innocent to qualify (see, for example, The Portia Campaign, 
2002; Action against False Allegations of Abuse, 2002a; Merseyside Against 
Injustice, 2002; INNOCENT, 2002; National Civil Rights Movement, 2002a). 
Following the success of the primary aim to achieve a successful appeal for the 
alleged innocent miscarriage of justice victim, the organisations that campaign against 
miscarriages each express a similarly consensual secondary aim to effect reform of 
the CJS. Taking another quotation from MAI to provide a textual feel for a specific 
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campaign voice, MAI state that it `is dedicated to bringing about change in the 
current criminal justice system by campaigning against improper practices by the 
judiciary and the police (Merseyside Against Injustice, 2002 my emphasis). 23 
The surface differences, then, between the various organisations that campaign 
against miscarriages do not determine the primary and/or the secondary campaign 
aims. Whether organisations are concerned with the general causes of miscarriages, 
are human rights orientated, are anti-racist or are concerned with the plight of mothers 
who might be wrongly convicted for the murder of their children, an analysis of their 
stated aims indicates a generic commonality. In generic terms, all campaign 
organisations against miscarriages of justice in England and Wales, whatever their 
specific and ostensible differences, can be conceived as having a primary aim to 
secure a quashed conviction/the release for the alleged or suspected innocent 
miscarriage of justice victim. Once this has been achieved, the secondary interrelated 
aim is to effect corrective reform of the CJS's procedural framework in the hope that 
the identifiable cause of the exceptional miscarriage of justice is not a cause of 
miscarriages in the future. Hence, an organisation ostensibly concerned with racism 
can be said to be concerned with racism only in a secondary sense, a secondary sense 
that can only come into play following the successful outcome of the primary aim of a 
successful appeal for an innocent victim of an exceptional wrongful conviction. In the 
same way, an organisation that is ostensibly concerned with sexual abuse as a cause 
of miscarriages of justice, can be conceived to be concerned with sexual abuse in a 
23 For other examples of this secondary concern to reform the CJS following a successful appeal that is 
displayed by all other groups/organisations see The Portia Campaign, 2002; Action Against False 
Allegations of Abuse, 2002c; Merseyside Against Injustice, 2002; United Campaign Against False 
Allegations of Abuse, 2000a; National Civil Rights Movement, 2002a; Campaign Against Racism and 
Fascism. 2002a; Falsely Accused Carers and Teachers, 2002a; Justice For Women, 2002). 
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secondary sense, the primary concern being the innocent victim of a false accusation 
of sexual abuse. This is because racism, false allegations of sexual abuse, sexism, 
denial of human rights and so on can only come into play once the truth (knowledge) 
of such causes of miscarriages of justice can be proven. For without a successful 
appeal in an exceptional miscarriage of justice case that alleges racism, for example, 
there is no proof (knowledge) that `racism' was indeed the cause of the wrongful 
conviction. Put simply, the system cannot be challenged and/or reformed for being 
`racist', producing false convictions of sexual abuse, or be said to be denying 
fundamental human rights, for example, unless and until there is evidence that such 
errors and/or failings are occurring and causing wrongful convictions (discussed 
further below). 
A major flaw with the emphasis on the support of the factually innocent is that such a 
condition can never be proven. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the quashing of a 
previous criminal conviction by the CACD cannot be uncritically accepted as prima 
facie evidence of factual innocence. For the judicial pronouncements of the appeal 
courts are framed entirely within the parameters of the rules, procedures and/or 
practices of the CJS, within which, the judgement of the Crown Court is whether a 
criminal defendant is `guilty' or `not guilty'. As this relates to the CACD, it, too, is 
not an attempt to determine the guilt or innocence of the appellant, but rather to 
determine whether the previously obtained criminal conviction is `safe' or 'unsafe'. 
This does not provide the kind of factual objective knowledge required to prove or 
state the factual innocence of the wrongfully criminally convicted that is both, 
generally, assumed and claimed by organisations that campaign against exceptional 
miscarriages of justice. Accordingly, any attempt to determine factual or truthful 
138 
innocence in a system where even the `guilt' of a criminal suspect can be 
conceptualised as a legal technicality can be conceived as an entirely erroneous 
pursuit. For the discursive rules and practices that together comprise England and 
Wales' current criminal justice arrangements can be conceived to technologise the 
innocence of criminal defendants beyond such reach. 
As indicated, the various organisations that campaign against miscarriages also 
display a diverse range of motivations. There are organisations that are concerned 
with the general problem of miscarriages whatever the specific cause, and provide a 
support network for the families and friends of victims (essentially the organisations 
affiliated to UAI - INNOCENT, MAI, Kent Against Injustice (KAI), Gloucester 
Against Injustice (GAI)). There are organisations that are concerned with false 
allegations of sexual abuse (FASO, Action Against False Allegations of Abuse 
(AAFAA). There are organisations specifically concerned with the vulnerability of 
teachers and/or care workers to be falsely accused and/or convicted of sexual abuse 
(for example, Falsely Accused Cares and Teachers (FACT)). There is an organisation 
that campaigns for the provision of welfare upon the release of the wrongfully 
imprisoned (Miscarriage of Justice Organisation (MOJO)). There is an organisation 
that is specifically concerned with the associated problems of infant mortality and its 
potential to be a mistaken cause of miscarriages (The Portia Campaign). There are 
organisations that are concerned with the effect that `racism' might have in causing 
miscarriages (for example, CARF). There are organisations concerned with human 
rights abuses and miscarriages (Amnesty International, South Wales Liberty (SWL)). 
There are organisations concerned with abuses of civil rights and miscarriages 
(National Civil Rights Movement (NCRM); Statewatch). There are organisations that 
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are concerned with the miscarriages that might derive from the sexual discrimination 
of women (Justice For Women (JFW); Southall Black Sisters (SBS)). And, there is an 
organisation concerned with miscarriages that accompany mistaken diagnoses of 
`Shaken Baby Syndrome' (The Five Percenters). 
Taken together, these groups and/or organisations that campaign against exceptional 
wrongful convictions can be conceived as representing the most problematic aspects 
of the existing CJS that are in need of corrective legislative reform. What I mean by 
this is that campaigns are the discoverers of the causes of wrongful convictions in the 
sense that already acknowledged causes of wrongful convictions are accounted for by 
the existing procedures that produce routine and mundane successful appeals. 
Alternatively, campaigns search for causes of wrongful convictions that are not 
acknowledged. To be sure, exceptional miscarriages of justice are precisely not about 
working within the legal agenda. Rather, they are about working outside of the 
general confines of the `letter of the law' in attempts to ascertain the causes and/or the 
reasons why innocent victims of wrongful criminal conviction are unsuccessful in 
their appellate attempts to prove their innocence. Following which, campaigns can 
then turn their attention towards the secondary aim of attempting to effect corrective 
legislative reform of the CJS in the hope that such identifiable causes are not (or are at 
least less of) a cause in the future (discussed further below). 
In such a context, an attempt to understand the motivations of the organisations that 
campaign against miscarriages should not merely view them from the perspective of 
their ostensible differences. Such differences are important in terms of the production 
of different images of miscarriages of justice and the different audiences that they 
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represent. However, for my purposes it is also appropriate to conceive the way that 
campaign organisations aggregately or collectively deal with miscarriages of justice 
as intrinsically related to forms of knowledge of the most likely causes of wrongful 
conviction that the system has not yet formally acknowledged. In response to which, 
campaign organisations engage in a power struggle to reform the CJS by mirroring 
the major identified causes of miscarriages of justice at any particular historical 
moment. Indeed, it was not a coincidence that there was not a campaign against 
`racism' or false allegations of sexual abuse as a cause of miscarriages of justice in 
the nineteenth century. At the time the state of knowledge of the most significant 
cause of miscarriages was centred around the absence of appeals in criminal cases, a 
facility that was available in civil cases since the mid-seventeenth century (Pattenden, 
1996, p. 6). Accordingly, the predominant campaign at the time was directed towards 
the establishment of a Court of Appeal in criminal cases. The belief being that once 
such a court was in place wrongful convictions would, at the very least, be greatly 
reduced. When a court capable of hearing criminal appeals was established, however, 
and routine and/or mundane successful appeals could be produced, the campaign was 
dissolved and campaigners against miscarriages turned their attention to the 
production of counter-discourse on other identified `errors' in the CJS's legislative 
framework, such as the campaign against capital punishment. In the same way, when 
the campaign against capital punishment successfully achieved its aim in the 1960s, 
that campaign, too, was dissolved and campaigners against injustice once again re- 
focused their attention and efforts (counter-discourse) towards other aspects of the 
CJS identified as causes of miscarriages of justice and, hence, in need of reform. 
What each of these campaigns required were alleged miscarriage of justice cases to be 
successful in appeal to confirm the reality of the campaign focus, e. g. that people 
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were being killed in error. Accordingly, campaign organisations can be conceived as 
inherently and intrinsically about the production of forms of knowledge of the most 
likely causes of wrongful convictions at any particular historical moment. Such 
knowledge being expressly produced as part of a struggle for power to effect reforms 
of the CJS to reduce and remedy miscarriages of justice in the future. As Foucault 
(1977, pp. 27-28) noted: `power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse 
it and of which it is made up ... 
determines the forms and possible domains of 
knowledge. ' 
In terms of the focus of campaign organisations, the tradition of criminal justice 
system reform highlighted the extent to which all debates on miscarriages of justice 
have hitherto been very firmly focused towards an historically specific, exceptional 
case or small group of exceptional cases of successful appeal. In accordance with this 
trend, an analysis of the focus of organisations that campaign against miscarriages in 
England and Wales shows that they, too, are also only overwhelmingly concerned 
with individual cases of alleged or suspected wrongful conviction (see, for example, 
Merseyside Against Injustice, 2002a; INNOCENT, 2002a; South Wales Liberty, 
2002a; Falsely Accused Carers and Teachers, 2002b). Such cases are generally for 
serious criminal offences - murder, rape, armed robbery, and so on. They have often 
already failed in their routine and/or mundane appeals. 24 And, they continue to present 
concerns that innocent people continue to suffer the injustice of wrongful 
imprisonment. To be sure, Green (2002a) confirmed that campaign organisations are 
generally in line with the following criteria applied by JUSTICE (1989, pp. 1-2): 
24 In saying this it must be noted that many alleged miscarriage of 
justice victims do not contact a 
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" lengthy terms of imprisonment of four years or more were being served; 
" no other legal help was available to the prisoner; 
9 the allegation is of actual, rather than technical, innocence; 
9 an investigation might achieve something, given the present operation of the 
appellate courts; and, 
"a complaint about sentence involves an important point of principle; assistance is 
not given where the sole complaint is that the sentence is too long. 
This is because the length of time needed to investigate cases along with the delays in 
getting potentially meritorious cases back to the CACD enforces the need to focus on 
serious criminal convictions with substantial prison sentences. There are a number of 
other interrelated reasons for this. 
First and foremost, as indicated above, under England and Wales' case-law system, 
the release of individuals that are wrongly imprisoned and/or corrective reform of the 
CJS is not effected though speculative generalisation. Rather, such aims are effected 
through real individual cases in which real individual people can be shown to have 
been denied their rights and/or be innocent victims of the existing judicial regime: 
`The law must be seen to be done'. Within such constraints, campaigns have found it 
necessary on procedural grounds to focus on individual cases and work within the 
given legal agenda. Moreover, because of such parameters, it is not so much that 
campaigns against miscarriages are not interested in routine or mundane successful 
appeals. Rather, campaign organisations can be said to be less concerned with, 
perhaps, less serious cases that can be remedied by existing appellate procedures in 
campaign organisation until after their mundane and/or routine appeal has been unsuccessful. 
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the pragmatic interests of directing their efforts and priorities into those cases in 
which innocent people have exhausted their appeal rights and remain wrongly 
imprisoned. 
Another factor in the campaign focus on exceptional cases of wrongful imprisonment 
for serious criminal offences relates to the moral commitment of campaign 
organisations (further discussed below). Victims of exceptional miscarriages of 
justice, who have previously failed in their routine or mundane appeals and who also 
experience wrongful imprisonment and denial of liberty, are of the greatest priority to 
campaign organisations as they are thought to have suffered the greatest wrong and/or 
the most harm. Accordingly, it is, perhaps, not surprising that campaigns do not look 
at the phenomenon of miscarriages of justice as a statistical whole and include routine 
and mundane successful appeals into their analyses. For such cases are routinely 
and/or mundanely taken care of and accounted for. Moreover, it might conceivably be 
thought that if campaigns paid attention to already achieved successful appeals then 
attention would be diverted away from the exceptional cases that they assist. Against 
this, a consideration of the scale of successful appeals could serve to enhance the 
counter-discursive force of attempts to produce exceptional successful appeals by 
grounding them within the broader context of a judiciary that produces thousands of 
wrongful convictions each year. 
There is also a temporal aspect whereby campaigns focus on serious cases of alleged 
wrongful convictions that involve substantial prison sentences. In the same way that 
JUSTICE decided which cases it could assist, the voluntary nature of campaign 
organisations, their lack of staff and resources has meant that the volume of requests 
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to investigate alleged miscarriages of justice has also had to be limited to those cases 
that carry substantial prison sentences. 
A further possible factor that might account for the campaign focus on exceptional 
cases probably relates to economic realities. Campaign organisations are run on a 
voluntary basis with meagre budgets. They rely upon the contributions of supporters 
and upon fundraising activities. In such a context, and in the context of the other 
procedural, pragmatic, moral and temporal reasons for the focus on exceptional cases, 
exceptional cases in which the innocent are wrongly imprisoned must remain the 
primary focus. 
There are, however, profound limitations with the focus on exceptional cases. Firstly, 
it is not always the case that the victims of exceptional cases suffer the most `serious' 
harm. As previously discussed, even some of the most seemingly mundane cases (e. g. 
wrongful conviction for drink-driving) can contain a significant and often comparable 
amount of harm for the individual victims concerned (attempted suicide, mental 
health problems, imprisonment). Secondly, the tendency for campaign organisations 
to focus on individual cases, whether successful or not, will tend to be less successful 
in the broader context of the exercise and functioning of power in the criminal justice 
sphere. For they exclude all cases in summary courts where currently over 98% of all 
criminal cases are dealt with. Thus, campaign organisations provide no real sense of 
the everyday nature of wrongful convictions; of their routine and/or mundane 
occurrence. Moreover, by focusing entirely upon exceptional cases, organisations 
against miscarriages actually reinforce the perception that miscarriages of justice are 
an intermittent, high profile phenomenon that affects only a small number of victims 
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which serves to conceal the harm experienced by the thousands of routine and/or 
mundane victims each year. 
The production of the raw material for the reform of the CJS 
In Chapter 2, routine miscarriages of justice were discerned as those appeals against 
criminal conviction that are routinely quashed by the CACD and mundane 
miscarriages as those appeals against criminal conviction given in magistrates' courts 
that are quashed upon appeal at the Crown Court. These routine and/or mundane 
miscarriages can be conceived as the successful products of the appeal courts; an 
aspect of the routine and/or mundane `carriage of justice' or process of the CJS; an 
official indicator of the scale of the miscarriage of justice problem; which may or may 
not be an indicator of the scale of the wrongful conviction of the innocent. Against 
this, contested cases of criminal conviction that are unsuccessful in their routine 
and/or mundane appeals are exceptional cases of alleged or suspected miscarriages of 
justice, which can be conceived in an altogether different way. This is because those 
who allege to be victims of miscarriages have already been found guilty in a court of 
law, and they are likely to have also been unsuccessful in their routine and/or 
mundane appeal. Accordingly, the production of exceptional miscarriages of justice 
can be conceived as entirely extra judicial. They are not produced by the internal 
mechanisms of the system, but, rather, by the external (outside) endeavours of those 
that campaign on behalf of individual victims that continue to allege their innocence. 
In an attempt to understand the logic behind the production of exceptional 
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miscarriages of justice, this section analyses the construction and deployment of the 
counter-discourse that is successful in producing an exceptional successful appeal. 
There is a tradition for critical legalists and/or critical socio-legalists to construct a 
scenario-based counter-discourse of the potential problems that particular criminal 
legislation and proposed criminal legislation may contain and/or the potential harmful 
consequences that it may engender. For example, when the HRA was announced 
Liberty (1998) produced a briefing detailing a range of existing judicial procedures 
and/or police investigative practices that might be conceived to contravene the HRA 
and the possible challenges that could be made under the various Articles of the Act. 
At this stage, despite the intellectual validity of the various critiques, Liberty's (1998) 
analysis, as are all such counter-discursive productions, was regarded by the legal 
system as entirely speculative or fictitious. What were needed were real cases with 
real people who could demonstrate that they as individuals had really been denied 
their ascribed rights and/or freedoms. CJS discourse is not concerned with speculation 
of potential (or even inevitable) future causes of wrongful convictions and/or harm. 
Indeed, the CJS requires that this fictitious speculation to be proven by campaign 
organisations, whereupon what was formally considered as fictitious from a CJS 
perspective is transformed into CJS fact. 
For example, throughout the 150-year campaign to abolish capital punishment25 there 
were many allegations and/or suspicions that lives had been taken in judicial error. 
Despite the fact that any human system can make mistakes, and that miscarriages do 
25 The campaign to abolish capital punishment can 
be traced to the early 1800s. For a discussion see 
Capital Punishment UK (2002) `The Abolition of hanging in Britain' website: 
h!! p: //wwNN,. ricliard. cIark32. btintemet. co. uk/contents. 
htniI retrieved February 12. 
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occur, and that, therefore some victims will have inevitably suffered capital 
punishment in error, this was treated by the CJS as fictitious speculation. What was 
required to abolish the death penalty was a case in which it was indisputable that such 
a judicial `error' had occurred and that a real person had really lost his/her life. That 
case turned out to be that of Timothy Evans which transformed the fiction that some 
people could have been killed in error into the CJS fact that people really were being 
killed because of CJS `error'. This provided the necessary force required to induce a 
counter-discursive public crisis of confidence in the continued validity of the law of 
capital punishment. It effected the abolition of capital punishment. And, it brought a 
conclusion to the campaign against capital punishment. 
Similarly, prior to the introduction of PACE (1984) there were many criticisms of 
police practice and investigations. Once again, however, what were required were 
`hard' cases which provided the necessary evidence that real people were really being 
subjected to police mal or bad practice, or were victims of poor police investigations. 
Until which, such critical discourse was generally regarded as speculative, as 
fictitious. With the Confait Affair, however, the necessary evidence (knowledge) that 
the police were indeed routinely in breach of the informal Judges' Rules was 
presented in an indisputable way with the necessary force (power) to effect the 
changes that so many had campaigned for and for so long. 
This indicates, as well as emphasises, the moral dimension of legislative reform of the 
CJS, as the injustice or wrong must be proven. At the same time, it also calls into 
question the morality of the CJS. For, despite knowing that the system can sometimes 
get it wrong, and that as a consequence innocent people will inevitably be wrongly 
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convicted and/or harmed, it allows such a system to continue. The fundamental 
difference between the morality of CJS discourse and that of campaign discourse is 
evident in the following quotations, the first is representative of the System's stance, 
the second illustrative of the campaign stance: 
`It is better to keep innocent men (sic) in prison, than to let them go free and bring the 
system into disrepute' (Lord Denning, Former Master of the Rolls cited Miscarriages of 
Justice UK, 2002c). 
`We campaign.. . on. . . cases that we believe to be miscarriages of justice' (South Wales 
Liberty, 2002 my emphasis). 
In assessing the above quotations it is acknowledged that the CJS operates on the 
assumption that without the formalised rule of law itself there is no such thing as 
`justice'. However, the above quotations emphasise that CJS morality can be 
conceived as the adherence to the rules of law without question, whether or not those 
rules are just or fair, and without regard to the harmful consequences that law might 
engender. In such a context, miscarriages of justice and the harmful consequences that 
derive from previous mistakes or which emerge from hindsight cause little concern to 
the System, nor those wedded to it. A pertinent example is the Birmingham Six's 
attempt to sue the West Midlands Serious Crime Squad for the beatings that they had 
suffered before five of them `confessed' (see, for example, Sedley, 1999). In hindsight 
it has since transpired that the West Midlands Serious Crime Squad were responsible 
for dozens of exceptional wrongful convictions (see, for example, Burrell and 
Bennetto, 1999). In his judgement, however, in which he refused their application, 
Lord Denning ('the people's judge') appeared to be more concerned with the 
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consequences for the government and the police than with the due process of law and 
the possible validity of the allegations: 
`Just consider the course of events if this action is allowed to proceed to trial.. . If the six men 
win, it will mean that the police were guilty of perjury, that they were guilty of violence and 
threats, that the confessions were involuntary and were improperly admitted in evidence and 
that the convictions were erroneous. That would mean that the Home Secretary would either 
have to recommend they be pardoned or he would have to remit the case to the Court of 
Appeal. This is such an appalling vista that every sensible person in the land would say: It 
cannot be right that these actions should go any further' (Denning cited Mullin, 1986, p. 
216). 
To give Denning the benefit of the doubt, the above, now notorious judicial assertion, 
may, perhaps, be read as meaning that a criminal case could not be settled in a civil 
court. However, there can be no such confusion with a later remark by Denning about 
the Birmingham Six, who by this time were looking increasingly likely to overturn 
their previous wrongful convictions: `We shouldn't have all these campaigns to get 
the Birmingham Six released if they'd been hanged. They'd have been forgotten and 
the whole community would have been satisfied' (Denning cited Dyer, 1999g). 
Whether or not the `whole community would have been satisfied' the hanging of the 
Birmingham Six would have been a judicial error. An error that, apparently, would not 
have `troubled' Lord Denning as `donning his black cap to pass a death sentence had 
never troubled him' (Denning cited Dyer, 1999g), for such a judicial error would have 
been entirely legal. 
Against this, the morality of campaigns against miscarriages of justice is expressed on 
a number of different levels and in a number of different ways. At a semantic level the 
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names of the campaign organisations can be said to be moral signifiers. For example, 
the word `injustice' in `United Against Injustice', the overarching federal system of 
organisations, is by definition synonymous with `unfair' or `wrong'. So, the explicit 
message is that those affiliated to UAI are `United Against Unfairness', or, `United 
Against Wrong'. Similarly, the campaign organisation `Conviction', which helped to 
establish `Innocent' and UAI, can be read as synonymous with the act of being 
`convinced' or holding a firmly held 'belief. Being `convinced' and having a `belief 
in this context meaning, being convinced and/or believing in the innocence of the 
alleged victims of wrongful conviction that are the focus of the campaigns. Likewise, 
the campaign organisation `INNOCENT', one of the longest standing and most 
influential organisations affiliated to UAI, can be read as synonymous with the 
absence of `evil', `sinless', `blameless' and/or `pure'. This again emphasises the 
moral foundations of campaign organisations against miscarriages, as well as further 
emphasising their approach and attitude to the people that they represent. 
Another aspect of the moral nature the organisations that campaign against 
miscarriages emerges in an analysis of the initial processes involved in the production 
of exceptional successful appeals when organisations agree to support single case 
groups. One of the primary steps before the larger geographically located umbrella 
organisations affiliated to UAI, for example, agree to support single cases where there 
is an allegation of wrongful imprisonment is for one of the representatives of the 
organisations to visit the alleged victim in prison to hear their story. At this point, the 
representative from the campaign organisation is dealing with a person who has 
already been found guilty in a criminal trial and may also have failed in an appeal. 
Accordingly, attempts to overturn exceptional wrongful convictions can be conceived 
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as working under an inversion of the normal principles of criminal justice. Under 
normal conditions the law states that suspects and/or defendants are considered to be 
innocent of the charges against them until they are proven to be guilty. However, 
because victims of exceptional wrongful convictions have previously been convicted 
of a criminal offence they are presumed to be guilty until they are proven to be 
innocent. To be sure, in a recent statement the Home Secretary (Blunkett) argued that 
a miscarriage of justice denoted only cases where the accused had proved he (sic) had 
not committed the crime (cited Hopkins, 2002a). 
This raises added difficulties for the wrongly convicted that continue to protest their 
innocence following an unsuccessful appeal. At the trial stage the decision by the 
courts was whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty according to a legal criteria 
that the judge determined to have been satisfied. At the appeal and post-appeal 
stage(s), however, the alleged innocent victim must prove their innocence through the 
criteria of fresh factual evidence. In such a context, a crucial first step in overturning 
exceptional wrongful convictions is for the representatives of the larger campaign 
organisations to identify a person who is innocent of the criminal offences for which 
they have been convicted. This is often easier said than done and, depending on the 
particular case worker, can involve, to a greater or lesser degree, a leap of moral faith 
on the part of the campaign organisations. For in essence they are making a decision 
to believe those persons who allege that they have been the innocent victims of a 
wrongful conviction that has also failed in appeal before such a fact has been 
proven. 26 
26 As a strategy to reduce the degree to which campaign support 
is a `leap of faith' some case workers 
have adopted a formalistic and/or contractual approach to their preliminary 
investigation as a precursor 
to a face to face meeting with an alleged miscarriage of 
justice victim in prison. For example, in an 
attempt to systematise the process Andrew 
Green requests the case papers from the alleged victims' 
. ý2 
Along with the morality of campaign organisations is a form of integrity that also 
differs from the form of integrity evident in CJS discourse. Integrity within CJS 
discourse can be conceived as the attainment of the operational goals of the agencies 
of the CJS (police, CPS) in the context of the logic of an adversarial system. Often 
this can mean an attempt to prove the guilt and/or obtain the conviction of criminal 
defendants, whether or not they are actually guilty of the offences with which they 
have been charged or tried (JUSTICE, 1989, pp. 23-41). This is evident in the degree 
to which the police or CPS can break the stated rules of the CJS without a detrimental 
effect on the `truth' produced by the agents of the CJS and the ability of such `truth' 
to secure the conviction of the innocent. For example, the rules that govern how to 
obtain confession evidence are routinely transgressed, but this does not generally 
disqualify what are essentially illegitimately obtained `confessions'. On the contrary, 
Green's (1997, pp. 8-12) researches would indicate that the working premise of those 
charged with the job of obtaining confession evidence is that criminal suspects are 
inevitably not telling the truth; that when they deny their alleged part in the criminal 
offences for which they are being questioned they (suspects) are, in fact, employing 
strategies of resistance to conceal the truth, i. e. their guilt. In such a context, counter- 
strategies are employed to overcome the suspects' resistance and reveal the concealed 
solicitors and sends a fact-finding questionnaire to the alleged victim prior to any meeting. Following 
which he often sends a letter of `contract' to the prisoner confirming the prisoner's stated position in 
writing for the prisoner to sign and spelling out the assistance and/or support that he (the organisations 
that he represents) is able to offer. This being stated, there is no `industry standard' or recommended 
working method for the investigation of alleged or suspected miscarriages for the organisations that 
campaign against them in England and Wales. Accordingly, there is an inevitable element of chance, 
both in terms of the possibility of organisations campaigning for guilty offenders (which is apparent in 
the disclaimers that appear on miscarriage of justice campaign literature below), and for desperate 
victims of miscarriages to be poorly served by campaign organisations. At the time of writing, in 
acknowledgement of these issues, one of the principle aims of UAI is to hold a series of seminars and 
workshops on good practice and the methodology of miscarriage of justice investigation (Green, 
2002a). 
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truth of their guilt. This often results in the transgression of the safeguards that were 
designed to protect innocent suspects from inappropriate pressure or inducement (e. g. 
beaten confessions, charge, plea and sentence bargains), but the evidence so obtained 
is often regarded by the courts as the most truthful. The reasoning is: Why would 
someone admit to something that they didn't do, whatever their treatment or 
inducement? 
Against this, campaign integrity dictates that campaigns are not just about `winning' a 
quashed criminal conviction for the alleged innocent victims that they represent. On 
the contrary, integrity in campaign discourse is about ensuring that only truly innocent 
people are successful as a consequence of the support provided by the campaign 
organisations. This is most evident in the following quotation that can be read as a 
disclaimer to the continued support of those who might allege to be innocent victims 
of wrongful conviction, but who might in reality be guilty, or at the least, highly 
suspect: 
T. A. C. T. is against ALL forms of child abuse, however, in the interests of justice and truth, 
we must ensure that our legal system protects both the falsely accused and innocent, as well 
as punishing the guilty' (Falsely Accused Carers and Teachers, 2002a my emphasis). 
The integrity displayed in the above quotation is also displayed by all of the various 
campaign organisations (see, for example, False Allegations Support Organisation, 
2002; False Allegations Support Organisation, 2002b; Green, 2000b, p. 1; The Five 
Percenters, 2002b; United Campaign Against False Allegations of Abuse, 2000; 
Justice for Sion Jenkins, 2002). This is highly understandable, perhaps even morally 
pragmatic. For when a campaign organisation or a campaigning individual, especially 
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an organisation or an individual that has previously been successful in overturning an 
exceptional miscarriage, agrees to support an alleged or suspected miscarriage of 
justice case, that case is immediately afforded a kind of moral endorsement. For 
example, following his expositions of the Evans-Christie Affair and the eventual 
posthumous pardon of Timothy Evans, Ludovic Kennedy established a reputation for 
correcting miscarriages of justice that adds weight to any cause to which he becomes 
involved with (see, for example, Kennedy, 2002; Berlins, 2002a; Ingrams, 2001; 
Greenslade, 1998; Hardy, 1999). Similarly, the Rough Justice team (see Hill, Young 
and Sargant, 1985) and David Jessel's Trial and Error series (see Jessel, 1994) were 
widely regarded as emblematic of the innocence of the alleged miscarriage of justice 
victims in the cases that they chose to investigate27 (see also Gibson, 1999). More 
recently, following his success in the case of Stephen Downing (Hale, 2002), Don 
Hale's recent pledge of support for the Graham Huckerby campaign not only gives 
the campaign a moral boost, it is also regarded as an indicator he is, indeed, likely to 
be innocent (see Editorial, 2002b). 
As this relates to the important issue of legal representation, campaign organisations 
are keen to use previously successful solicitors and barristers that have confirmed 
their moral stance and integrity in overturning exceptional miscarriages of justice. In 
terms of solicitors, Gareth Pierce (Judith Ward; Guildford Four; Birmingham Six; 
Cardiff Newsagent Three; Frank Johnson; Satpal Ram), Campbell Malone (Stefan 
Kiszco, Kevin Callan; John Brannan) and Jim Nichol (Bridgewater Four, Colin 
Wallace, Peter Fell) stand out. In terms of Barristers, Michael Mansfield QC (Judith 
27 Of the 24 cases taken up by Rough Justice between 1982 and 1997 13 were referred back to the 
CACD with 8 of those being quashed after appeal (see Rough Justice, 1997). Between 1993 and 1999 4 
of the 15 cases in the Trial and Error series resulted in successful appeals and the others were in the 
appeals process (see Gibson, 1999). 
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Ward, Birmingham Six; Tottenham Three; Bridgewater Four; Gurnos Three) would 
be right at the top of most campaign organisations' wish list. As Matheisen (1974) 
noted, `grass roots' campaigns can be effective for direct victims of injustice when 
they establish what he termed `horizontal contacts' among like-minded individuals in 
a variety of key positions in the power nexus. 
In such a context, the moral stakes of campaigns against miscarriages of justice can be 
conceived of as extremely high. For if a campaign organisation or campaign 
individual with a reputation for overturning miscarriages were to continue to support 
an alleged victim no longer believed to be innocent, or perhaps discovered to be 
actually guilty, then the integrity of the organisation would be immediately called into 
question. As a consequence, other cases supported by the campaign 
organisation/campaigning individual would be brought into disrepute. 
This emphasises another crucial difference between CJS discourse and campaign 
discourse. As indicated, CJS discourse is adversarial, within which miscarriages of 
justice, mundane, routine and exceptional, are inevitable as defenders `succeed' in the 
acquittal of the factually guilty and prosecutors `succeed' in convicting the innocent. 
Against this, campaign organisations can be conceived as not adversarial at all; as 
entirely about truth, about social justice, fairness and harm avoidance, including an 
attempt to avoid even the most apparently speculative or fictitious harm. From such a 
standpoint, whether or not the analysis of future harm is highly speculative, campaign 
organisations regard it as yet to be proven fact, their task then being to set about 
proving it through real cases. Once proved, the aim then is to campaign to effect 
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reform of the CJS to ensure that such causes of injustice are not future causes of 
miscarriages of justice. 
Achievements and limitations 
On a qualitative and fairly straightforward level, successful campaigns achieve 
successful appeals for individuals in cases that had previously been unsuccessful in 
their mundane or routine appeals. In so doing, campaign organisations secure the 
release from prison of victims of wrongful conviction for serious criminal offences 
that might otherwise not be acknowledged nor remedied; they reunite families and 
friends; they contribute to the restoration of damaged reputations; and, they achieve 
financial compensation for exceptional victims of wrongful imprisonment. In 
addition, if the particular exceptional miscarriage of justice case is one that identifies 
a previously unacknowledged `error' with the CJS, then campaign organisations also 
contribute to the achievement of procedural reforms of the CJS. For example, the 
exceptional case of Adolf Beck provided the exemplary counter-discourse of the errors 
or failings of a criminal justice system without a court of criminal appeal and effected 
the establishment of the Court of Criminal Appeal. Similarly, the cases of Evans, 
Bentley and Ellis exemplified the errors of capital punishment and effected its 
abolition. The cases of Lattimore, Leighton and Salih in the Confait Affair (see Price 
and Caplan, 1976; Fisher, 1977; Price, 1985) provided the exemplary counter- 
discourse of false confessions that was able to effect the replacement of the Judges' 
Rules with the formalised codes of police conduct under PACE (1984). And, the 
exceptional cases of the Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six provided the 
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exemplary counter-discourse of the inherent problems of the existing post-appeal 
system, which effected the establishment of the CCRC. 
When campaigns are successful in producing exceptional miscarriages of justice that 
would otherwise have gone unacknowledged and/or unremedied they can be 
conceived from a certain perspective as contributing to the legitimacy of the very 
system that they are in programmatic opposition to (see, for example, Hillyard and 
Tombs, 1999, p. 21). Moreover, on an intellectual, anthropological level, it is widely 
accepted within Western societies that no human system can ever be perfect (Evans- 
Pritchard, 1963). Accordingly, and implicitly, then, it is also widely accepted that it is 
inevitable that some miscarriages will occur, and that some innocent people will 
inevitably suffer the consequences of justice in `error'. As this translates to the issue 
of the legitimacy of the CJS, it could be argued that if there were no exceptional 
miscarriages of justice, no formal or official admissions that the system does indeed 
sometimes get it wrong, then the legitimacy of the CJS could, possibly, called into 
doubt. To be sure, if the System never appeared to get it wrong, then it would, 
arguably, be viewed with the greatest of suspicion. It is in such a context that, perhaps 
paradoxically, the time that the system can be conceived to be most just and/or 
truthful is when it admits that it previously got it wrong. By the same token, the 
campaign focus on exceptional cases can be said to feed into and reinforce the 
intellectual requirement that underscores the notion that `justice must be seen to be 
done'. On the contrary, it would seem that an official admission to a certain amount of 
injustice must be seen to be able to state that justice has been done. 
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Another possible argument that campaign voices actually legitimise the system that 
they purport to stand against relates to the extent to which they work within the given 
legal agenda. Miscarriages of justice, exceptional or otherwise, are entirely 
legalistically defined. For an alleged or suspected miscarriage is always provisional 
unless and/or until the appeal courts quash a criminal conviction that was previously 
obtained. Accordingly, campaigns inherently work within the agenda of law, and they 
produce the vital knowledge of the most significant systemic errors and/or failings in 
the CJS's procedural framework in need of corrective reform, which from a certain 
perspective inevitably strengthens the system (see, for example, George, 1991). 
A problem with the possible perception that campaign organisations actually or 
inadvertently contribute to the legitimacy of the CJS is that it is based on the number 
of exceptional miscarriages of justice that are successfully achieved through a referral 
back to the CACD by the CCRC - an annual average of about 7 cases (see Table 3 
Chapter 2 above). In the context of all the criminal convictions this could, possibly, be 
perceived and/or conceived as fulfilling the legitimatory requirement that the judiciary 
only sometimes gets it wrong. At the very least, this could be seen as presenting little 
real concern to the continued legitimacy of the system. But, if all successful appeals 
are included in critical analyses, then, a fundamentally and profoundly different 
scenario is presented that indeed calls into question the continued legitimacy of the 
entire judiciary. To be sure, the official statistics of over 4,500 successful appeals 
each and every year from the Crown Court and CACD puts a completely different 
complexion on any notion that the system only sometimes gets it wrong. On the 
contrary, the official statistics on successful appeals are an official acknowledgement 
that the judiciary routinely and mundanely gets it wrong. They are an official 
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indicator or admission that, consequently, thousands of victims of wrongful 
conviction experience an extensive range of harmful consequences that is contrary to 
the stated aims of the CJS. In addition to this official acknowledgement of wrongful 
convictions, there are a whole range of other procedural causes and deterrents to a 
successful appeal (plea-bargaining, time loss rule, parole deal) that will never feature 
in the official statistics. In such a context, and in the context that exceptional 
miscarriages are not discrete from mundane and/or routine miscarriages because they 
determine the procedures through which they are successfully overturned, the neglect 
of mundane and routine successful appeals serves to underestimate the true scale of 
miscarriages of justice. It also renders the counter-discourse of campaign 
organisations in a profoundly and unnecessarily weak position. For if campaign 
organisations did not simply focus on individual cases but also made the connection 
that mundane and routine successful appeals are a procedural consequence of 
exceptional successful appeals there would be no mistake as to the effect of 
miscarriages of justice and the legitimacy of the CJS. 
A further reason why campaign organisations do not legitimate the CJS is that 
campaigns that are successful in overturning previously unsuccessful cases through 
the identification of previously unrecognised faults in the system (or, more likely 
proving previously unacknowledged faults) in effect contribute to changing the 
system that they are against. In so doing, campaign organisations do not work inside 
the legal agenda, but on the outside. For when they take up cases that have previously 
been unsuccessful in their mundane and/or routine appeals, the legal agenda has been 
exhausted. For example, prior to the introduction of the Court of Criminal Appeal off 
the back of the Beck case, officially acknowledged miscarriages of justice simply did 
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not exist. Without an appeals system there were no successful appeals. With the 
establishment of a court capable of hearing appeals in criminal cases, then, a 
fundamentally different system of criminal justice was created that introduced 
miscarriages of justice into socio-legal reality as an official phenomenon. In the same 
way, the successful campaign to abolish capital punishment through the exemplary 
counter-discourse of the exceptional cases of Evans, Bentley and Ellis created a 
fundamentally different system of criminal justice than a system that contained capital 
punishment. In this sense, despite the fact that the system seems not only to survive 
exceptional miscarriages of justice, but the relations of power also appear to remain 
unchanged by the reform of the CJS, a new legislative regime of truth has been 
established (cf. Foucault, 1980, pp. 122-123). 
Hence, campaigns that produce exceptional miscarriages of justice can also be 
conceived to be successful on a quantitative level. For campaigns that successfully 
overturn previously unsuccessful cases and then effect reforms to the CJS can also be 
conceived as providing the very procedures through which mundane and/or routine 
miscarriages of justice are determined in the future. Consequently, all appeals against 
criminal conviction that are successful, mundane, routine and exceptional, are rooted 
in the Beck case that provided the exemplary counter-discourse of the failings of a 
CJS without an appeal facility. Similarly, all of the mundane and/or routine successful 
appeals against police contraventions of codes of good conduct contained in PACE 
(1984) can be conceived to have their origins in the exceptional case of the Confait 
lffair and the interrogated false confessions of Lattimore, Leighton and Salih which 
effected PACE (1984). Therefore, exceptional miscarriages of justice should not be 
conceived as distinct or discrete from mundane and/or routine ones. Mundane, routine 
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and exceptional successful appeals against criminal conviction are inextricably linked 
- today's exceptional miscarriage of justice case becomes the mundane and/or routine 
case of tomorrow. 
Thus, any measurement of the reduction of miscarriages of justice and their harmful 
consequences must be attributed, at least in part, to the campaign organisations that 
achieve exceptional successful appeals and contribute to the corrective reform of the 
CJS. This, however, has not been recognised by campaign organisations who have, 
rather, continued in their counter-discursive struggle in the context of alleged cases of 
wrongful conviction that have already been through the appeals process and/or 
exceptional cases of successful appeal that were products of the post-appeal 
procedures of the CCRC. Both of these strategies are inevitably weak. For alleged 
cases of wrongful conviction that have failed in their existing appeal rights carry 
hardly any discursive force at all unless and until they achieve a successful appeal. 
Furthermore, exceptional successful appeals that are achieved through the post-appeal 
procedures of the CCRC are such a tiny aspect of all successful appeals that they, too, 
do not carry the discursive weight that they might if coupled with forms of counter- 
discourse of all successful appeals, which have their roots in the achievements of 
campaigns. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis has attempted to show that campaign voices against 
miscarriages of justice can be conceived as intrinsically engaged in the production of 
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exceptional successful appeals as part of a broader struggle to reform the criminal 
justice system to reduce the future occurrence of miscarriages of justice. For 
campaigns that produce successful appeals that emphasise new or previously 
unacknowledged errors or failings in the CJS's procedural framework provide the raw 
material that is required to effect corrective reform of the CJS and provide the 
procedural infrastructure through which all wrongful convictions are successfully 
appealed and remedied. 
Despite this, in their critiques of the CJS, campaign voices have, hitherto, not been 
very forceful, as they have primarily concentrated upon exceptional cases of wrongful 
imprisonment. Accordingly, they have not been able to comment more broadly on the 
procedures of the CJS that produce wrongful convictions so mundanely and/or 
routinely (plea bargaining, parole deal, time loss rule) which might not feature in the 
official statistics of successful appeals. Nor has previous campaign counter-discourse 
commented upon the forms of harm that accompanies mundane and/or routine 
wrongful conviction. Hence, whilst the exceptional case of the Confait Affair induced 
a public crisis of confidence on the methods by which the police produced confession 
evidence and effected PACE (1984), for example, the thousands of mundane and 
routine cases that are successful in appeal against PACE each year are neglected by 
the critical campaign gaze. As are the routine successful appeals that occur in the 
CACD which owes its existence to the exceptional case of Adolf Beck. This renders 
critical voices against miscarriages of justice unnecessarily weak. 
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6 
The critical academic voice 
Introduction 
This chapter turns the analysis of critical voices against miscarriages of justice to the 
academic sphere. It conducts a general assessment of the forms of academic discourse 
that were produced about the RCCJ, showing that academic voices are generally 
activated following successful appeals in exceptional cases. At such times, however, 
academic discourse is expressed in one of two general voices. For example, on the 
one hand there were academic voices that responded to the RCCJ by fully 
participating in the attempted reform of the system by recommending legislative 
solutions for the governmental correction of erroneous procedures of the CJS that 
were of public concern. These academic voices against miscarriages of justice can be 
conceived as taking up the baton from campaign voices that produce the discourse of 
exceptional successful appeals and closing the circle of the tradition of criminal 
justice system reform. On the other hand, more critical academic voices on the RCCJ 
generally conceived it as a `failed' `damage limitation exercise'. It is argued that this 
indicates a serious theoretical misconception of the intrinsic interrelations of power 
and knowledge and the governmental process. Furthermore, this chapter maintains 
that corrective legislative reform of the CJS need not be conceived in entirely 
`negative' terms. On the contrary, the more counter-discourse that is produced about 
exceptional successful appeals then, potentially, the more `crises' of public 
confidence in the CJS will be induced. And, the more problematic aspects of the 
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procedures of the CJS will have to be subjected to the tradition of criminal justice 
system reform to improve the CJS through corrective legislative reform. 
The chapter proceeds in three parts. Firstly, the general academic response to 
miscarriages of justice is explicated. Second, a closer analysis of the forms of critical 
academic discourse that collectively responded to the RCCJ is conducted, and a 
shared conception of power discerned. In particular, this part seeks to demonstrate the 
misconception at the heart of the forms of critical academic discourse that responded 
to the RCCJ, both in terms of the role and rationality of the Government in the 
interplay of CJS discursive forces and the disposal of public crises of confidence in 
the CJS. Finally, a reflexive analysis of the forms of critical academic counter- 
discourse that responded to the RCCJ (1993) is undertaken to locate such forms of 
counter-discourse themselves within the processes of CJS governmental reform. 
The academic response 
Academic discourse on the subject of miscarriages of justice is not generally produced 
in any sustained or systematic way. Rather, academic discourse on miscarriages is 
very much a by-product of researches in particular areas of the CJS or the process of 
criminal justice. For instance, academic analyses of the limits or the weaknesses of 
criminal defence provision (for example Cape, 1994) are inherently and intrinsically 
dealing with the potential miscarriages that occur when defence provision is 
inadequate. Similarly, analyses of PACE (1984) (for example, Coleman et al, 1993) 
are inherently concerned with the injustices (miscarriages) that occur when PACE's 
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(1984) codes of conduct are contravened. As for specific academic discourse on 
miscarriages of justice, however, this has tended to be almost entirely bound up in the 
exceptionality approach. It has been intermittently produced in response to the public 
crises of confidence that were induced by particular cases of successful appeal that 
exemplified unaccounted for `errors' in the legislative framework of the CJS. Hence, 
whilst the RCCP was sitting a number of academic responses were presented (see, for 
example, Baldwin and McConville, 1980; Irving and Hilgendorf, 1980). However, 
specific academic discourse on miscarriages of justice did not appear again until the 
establishment and Report of the RCCJ over a decade later. As Hillyard (1994a, p. 69) 
in his response to the RCCJ commented, `it is some thirteen years since many of us 
were burning the midnight oil expressing our profound dissatisfaction with the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure (1981). ' Since the academic discourse that was 
produced in response to the RCCJ, academic voices on miscarriages of justice have 
generally been hushed (the notable exception to this general rule being a series of 
researches presented by Nobles and Schiff, for example, 1995; 1997; 2000). 
A particular problem with this is that miscarriages of justice are not only an 
intermittent phenomenon that presents a problem every decade or so. On the contrary, 
as persistently underlined in this thesis so far, if miscarriages are defined in terms of 
successful appeals - the number of times that the system itself indicates a wrongful 
conviction - they can be conceived as a routine, even mundane 
features of criminal 
justice in England and Wales. As shown in Chapter 2 above, the LCD's statistics on 
successful appeals show that in the decade 1988-1998 the CACD abated over 2,670 
criminal convictions -a yearly average of 267. In addition, there are around 
3,500 
quashed criminal convictions a year at the Crown Court for convictions obtained at 
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the magistrates' courts. Contrary to this, when academic voices (discourses) on 
miscarriages of justice intermittently speak (are produced), they can be said to fall 
into one of two distinct categories: the `justice in error' voice or the `justice in crisis' 
voice. These phrases were the titles of the two main academic collections that 
contributed to the debate about the last major review of the CJS in response to 
perceptions of miscarriages of justice - the RCCJ. Justice in Error, edited by Walker 
and Starmer (1993), contained eleven contributions which included analyses of police 
investigative procedures (Coleman et al, 1993); the right to legal advice (Sanders and 
Bridges, 1993); the right to silence (McElree and Starmer, 1993); prosecution 
disclosure (O'Connor, 1993); and post-conviction procedures (Mansfield and Taylor, 
1993). All of which can be conceived as primarily concerned with procedural reform 
of the criminal process in the interest of reducing inadvertent or unintended `errors' 
that might cause miscarriages of justice and helping to resolve the identified public 
crisis of confidence in the CJS at the time. On the other hand, Criminal Justice in 
Crisis, edited by McConville and Bridges (1994), contained 28 contributions from 
prominent critical academic intellectuals that presented a more sustained collective 
assault upon the RCCJ in the interests of social justice. Most significantly, despite the 
ostensible differences in the contributions to Criminal Justice in Crisis in terms of 
subject area, all of the contributors shared a common voice that the RCCJ was a 
`damage limitation exercise' that functioned in the interests of the Government of the 
day, thus reinforcing its `control' of the CJS. Indeed, the Foreword to Criminal 
Justice in Crisis asserted: `All the papers in this volume... reflect a common sense 
of.. . 
betrayal' (McConville and Bridges, 1994a, p. xv). Despite this, the RCCJ duly 
disposed of the public crisis of confidence in the CJS to which it was established. This 
raises key questions about: 
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" the evaluative stance and function of critical academic discourse on miscarriages 
of justice; 
9 the part of public crises of confidence in the reform of the CJS; and, 
9 the position of the Government in response to public crises of confidence. 
Without wishing to exaggerate the uniformity of the exponents of academic discourse 
generally, and the complex and contrasting political positioning of the specific 
intellectuals who contributed to Criminal Justice in Crisis, this chapter focuses on the 
more overtly critical collection of counter-discourses against miscarriages that were 
collectively presented in Criminal Justice in Crisis. For they did not merely call for 
procedural reform of the CJS to reduce `error', but made a collective call for 
fundamental political change in the operations of criminal justice. The aim being to 
analyse the intentions and effects of the counter-discourses that were presented in 
Criminal Justice in Crisis and to assess the likely success of such forms of critical 
counter-voices. 
Criminal Justice in Crisis and the RCCJ 
In Criminal Justice in Crisis, miscarriages of justice were generally conceptualised as 
intrinsically linked to notions of the abuse of the Government's power (see, for 
example, Lacey, 1994, p. 40). In a similar vein, extra judicial inquiries such as the 
RCCJ (1993) were commonly conceptualised as devices that specifically function in 
the interests of whichever Government happens to be in office at the time of their 
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Report (see, Bridges and McConville, 1994, pp. 3-5). This view was also exemplified 
by Lacey (1994, p. 40) in the assertion that: 
`... the very logic of such bod[ies as the RCCJ] is that [they] hope to be judged a success - 
and success, most obviously, is judged in terms of the acceptance and implementation of its 
reform proposals. Thus such bodies always have a clear incentive to "second-guess" what 
will find favour with the Government of the day (my emphasis). 
Likewise, the legislative corrections to the CJS that flowed from the RCCJ, even if 
they were viewed `positively' by Criminal Justice in Crisis, were conceived as 
`damage limitation exercises', in the interests of reinforcing the Government's 
`control' of the CJS (see, for example, Bridges and McConville, 1994, pp. 22-23; 
Hillyard, 1994a, p. 74). Criminal Justice in Crisis's conception of extra judicial 
inquiries is succinctly summarised in the following quotation from Celia Wells' 
(1994, pp. 53-54) contribution: `It is unarguable that the criminal justice system is a 
taken for granted part of the apparatus of the state, however defined... [it is] subject to 
government manipulation in support of its claim to authority' (my emphases). 
Against this, Foucault's (1979, p. 85) research certainly provided an `argument' 
against such a conception of the importance and centrality of the Government in the 
operations of CJS power which can be conceived as entirely `sovereign' in form. To 
be sure, as was explicated in Chapter 4, Foucault (1979) offered a qualitatively 
different conception of the forms and operation of present forms of power to that 
expressed in Criminal Justice in Crisis. In fact, a polar distinction can be made 
between `sovereign' forms of rule as contained within the critical academic discourse 
in Criminal Justice in Crisis and the governmental rationality that underpins present 
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exercises of power from a Foucauldian perspective. For, unlike `sovereign' forms of 
authority wherein the `sovereign' exercises absolute power over `subjects', the 
defining feature of the mentalities of `government' and the exercise of present forms 
of power need to be understood in terms of the interrelationships between ruler and 
ruled (Foucault, 1991, p. 100; Gordon, 1991, p. 3). This `government', however, is 
not a conspiratorial, negative or coercive form of control or domination over a 
population or domain of government as expressed in Criminal Justice in Crisis. On 
the contrary, legitimate or `good' government takes as its object the enhancement of 
the population or domain to which it is mandated to be responsible. As Foucault (cited 
Rose, 1996, p. 44) pointed out, `legitimate government will not be arbitrary 
government, but will be based upon intelligence concerning those whose wellbeing it 
is mandated to enhance' (also Foucault, 1991, p. 100). This is achieved by new forms 
of statistical rationality that also emerged alongside the replacement of `sovereignty' 
by `government' that are intrinsically connected to the production and deployment of 
forms of knowledge, calculation, categorisation and expertise (see, for example, Hunt 
& Wickham, 1994, p. 27; Foucault, 1991, p. 96). 
In such a context, governmental forms of power are exercised via the surveillance of 
aspects of the societal domains for which governmentality assumes responsibility. 
This is precisely not about domination but, rather, about the negotiated outcome of the 
interplay of dominant forms of discourse and their counter-discursive opposition. 
From such an approach, forms of power and resistance are conceived as inter- 
relational force relations that exist within the social body (cf. Foucault, 1979, pp. 93- 
94). Power's conditions of possibility actually consist of this moving substrate of 
force relations: the struggles, confrontations, contradictions, inequalities, 
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transformations and integrations of these force relations. Thus, individuals are 
`positioned' within any struggle only as a consequence of the existence of a struggle 
for power (Foucault, 1979, p. 94). Accordingly, dominant forms of power and 
resistance to them involve the invention of `tactics' and the co-ordination of these 
various tactics into coherent strategies. A strategic manoeuvre must be countered by 
an opposing manoeuvre. A set of tactics must be consciously invented in opposition to 
the setting in place of another. A different `art' of criminal justice, for example, will 
oppose an historically given one (cf. Smart, 1988, p. 122). Moreover, whilst it is true 
to say that exercises of power are intentional, it is, simultaneously, nonsubjective 
(Foucault, 1979, p. 95). If power relations are intelligible, it is not necessarily due to 
the State's conspiratorial attempt to control the population but, rather, because they 
are imbued, through and through, with `calculation'. For whilst there is no power that 
is exercised without a series of aims and objectives, this does not mean that it results 
from the choice or conspiratorial decision of an individual subject or group of 
individuals. As Foucault (1979, p. 95) famously remarked: 
`... let us not look for the headquarters that presides over (power's) 
rationality... [For] ... neither ... the groups which control 
the state apparatus, [nor] those who 
make the most important economic decisions direct the entire network of power that 
functions in a society (and makes it function) ... [Rather]... the rationality of power 
is 
characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are 
inscribed... tactics which, becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating 
one another, but finding their base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming 
comprehensive systems: the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often 
the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have 
formulated them: an implicit characteristic of the great anonymous, almost unspoken 
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strategies which coordinate the loquacious tactics whose "inventors" or decisionmakers are 
often without hypocrisy. ' 
From such a perspective on power, the conception of the Government as the central 
object or target of critical counter-discourse because it is an apparatus of State is 
displaced. For government (or even Government for that matter) is, precisely, not 
synonymous with the State `whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us 
think' (Foucault, 1991, p. 103). However, this does not mean that the State is of no 
significance whatsoever in the discursive interplay of present forms of power. Rather, 
relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily 
extend beyond the limits of the State. This is because not only is it impossible for the 
State to occupy the whole field of power relations, the state can also only operate on 
the basis of other, already existing power relations. As Foucault asserted, it is better to 
view the state as `superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that 
invest... knowledge, technology and so forth' (cited Smart, 1988, pp. 123-124 my 
emphasis). 
If this Foucauldian approach is applied to Criminal Justice in Crisis, it is not that 
Government discourse is not a powerful force in the processes of the operations of 
CJS power. Nor is it that critical forms of academic discourse (in a generic sense) 
should cease in its critique of Government discourse or in its considerations of the 
Government in its analyses of CJS power. Rather, it is to acknowledge that the 
Government is neither critical academic discourse's only competing discursive force, 
or necessarily, its most powerful adversary. To be sure, in the interplay of competing 
CJS discourses, the Government has a stake and a discursive agenda. But, so, too, do 
other groups institutions and individuals. All of these various and competing 
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discourses need to be taken into account in analyses of the operations of CJS power - 
discourse must take account of other, competing, discourses. For example, in the 
Parliamentary campaign for the establishment of the Court of Criminal Appeal, it was 
not `The Government' that presented neither the only, nor the greatest discursive 
barrier or obstacle to its introduction. On the contrary, the century-long struggle for a 
court capable of reviewing criminal convictions was attributable to the force (power) 
of competing anti-Court of Criminal Appeal discourse in the government of the CJS 
(see Pattenden, 1996, pp. 5-33). 
Similarly, it was not `The Government' that stood in the way of the campaign for the 
abolition of capital punishment. In fact, the abolition of capital punishment was 
largely achieved through the support of the Government of the day's discourse that 
supported the campaign for abolition (see Callaghan, 1997). Indeed, it was not 
Government discourse, but, rather, the power of pro-capital punishment discourse that 
kept capital punishment firmly in place until the effective counter-discourse of the 
cases of Bentley, Evans and Ellis exemplified the inherent problematic nature of 
capital punishment (i. e. that certain hangings were mistaken and/or certainly 
inappropriate), was able to induce public support and eventually result in abolition. 
The same is the case for the introduction of PACE (1984) and the establishment of the 
CCRC. Government discourse did not object to the recommendation of the RCCP for 
the introduction for formalised codes of conduct on police conduct but duly translated 
it into PACE (1984). Nor did Government discourse resist the RCCJ's 
recommendation to establish an extension to the appeals system. On the contrary, it 
was promptly translated by the Government into the CCRC. 
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It seems that the forms of critical academic discourse against miscarriages of justice 
that were collectively presented in Criminal Justice in Crisis misconceived the 
(admittedly) somewhat paradoxical superstructural role or position of the 
Government. For whilst the Government is the object of counter-discourse, because of 
its position as facilitator or arbiter in the disposal of public crises of confidence in the 
government of the CJS, it simultaneously contains its own discursive agenda and is, 
thus, a potential (often real) discursive opponent. Criminal Justice in Crisis conflates 
the two and conceptualises the Government, because it is an apparatus of the State, as 
its only and most powerful competing discursive opponent. If the outcomes of extra- 
judicial governmental devices such as the RCCJ (1993) are not of the form desired by 
the critical scholars that collectively produced Criminal Justice in Crisis this does not 
necessarily mean that they are `damage limitation exercises' that merely function in 
the interests of the Government of the day (aka Lacey, 1994). It could, at least in part, 
be as much to do with the success of other competing discourses, including that of the 
Government, in the negotiated struggle to reform the CJS. For example, in the case of 
capital punishment, there still exists a campaign for its re-introduction (see Capital 
Punishment UK, 2001) to which the present New Labour Government discourse 
seems adamantly opposed, but which future Conservative Government discourse 
might not be opposed (see, for example, Editorial, 2001). Similarly, in the case of 
PACE (1984), it was police and pro-police discourse that was opposed to, and critical 
of its introduction, which it regarded as hampering police inquiries, providing too 
many rights to criminal suspects and was too expensive (see, for example, The 
Clerk's Notes, 1984; Osoba, 1988). Furthermore, in the case of the CCRC, just 
because there was (to a greater or lesser degree) universal approval to its 
establishment, that does not imply that it can be simply read-off as a `successful' 
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`damage limitation exercise'. As the tradition of criminal justice system reform 
previously explicated demonstrates, legislative reforms to the CJS are not at all 
`damage limitation exercises'. On the contrary, they are the product of historical 
struggle and the ability of critical counter-discourse that exemplifies particular and 
specific problematics in existing CJS procedural arrangements to induce public crises 
that ultimately yield legislative reforms of the CJS. Accordingly, the forms of 
counter-discourse that are able to induce public crises of confidence in the CJS should 
not be viewed as entirely `negative', but should also be viewed `positively' for the 
opportunities to reform the CJS that they provide. For, to paraphrase Foucault (1980, 
p. 52), it is not possible for CJS power to be exercised without knowledge; it is 
impossible for knowledge not to engender CJS power. 
Reflexivity 
The RCCJ can be conceived as a governmental device that produced the proper norms 
for the disposal of the public crisis of confidence in the CJS. This public crisis had 
been induced by the counter-discourse that exemplified the need for further criminal 
appellate opportunities once existing criminal appeal processes had been exhausted 
(Colvin, 1994). To demonstrate a collective misconception of extra judicial 
governmental devices such as the RCCJ, and a lack of reflexivity in the interplay of 
CJS power, this section considers a number of disparate demands and criticisms of the 
Report of the RCCJ that were expressed in Criminal Justice in Crisis. Without 
wishing to present a `straw' conception of the forms of counter-discourse that 
appeared in Criminal Justice in Crisis, the examples to be considered were fairly 
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arbitrarily selected and are representative of the general and collective approach to the 
relations of power to which all of the authors subscribed. To be sure, my intention is 
not to damn the intellectuals who contributed to Criminal Justice in Crisis on the 
basis of a number of stand-alone quotations or de-contextualised soundbites. On the 
contrary, the intention is not to damn anyone at all but, rather, to provide a more 
appropriate and reflexive understanding of the relations of power and resistance, of 
discourse and its counter-discursive opposition. The hope being that this can 
contribute to the future production and deployment of counter-tactics and strategies 
that might more effectively engage with predominant CJS discourse and bring about 
more satisfactory reforms of the CJS. 
For Bridges and McConville (1994, p. 50), for example, the major problem of the 
Report of the RCCJ was that it 'failed': `to provide a clear statement of the basic 
values which the criminal justice system should seek to uphold and a consistent, 
comprehensive account of the workings of that system. ' Similarly, for Lacey (1994, p. 
30), the RCCJ was a `missed opportunity' to look critically at the: `structural factors 
which gave rise to many of the particular problems in the administration of criminal 
justice.. 
. and the 
basic assumptions, values and goals which ought to inform criminal 
justice practices. ' For Maher (1994, p. 59), the main problem with the RCCJ was that 
it did not consider: `concepts such as individual rights of suspects and other persons in 
the criminal process; or ideas such as process or intrinsic values. ' For Brogden (1994, 
p. 152), the major `failing' of the RCCJ was it: `was not required to investigate what 
has been a major area of contention for two decades, police powers of stop-and- 
search. ' For Singh (1994, p. 172): `the RCCJ should have used the opportunity 
presented to it to reconsider the purpose of arrest and detention. . . 
by failing to 
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consider the variety of reasons which may underlie the police decision to arrest and 
detain, the Commissioners have implicitly endorsed the police practice of using these 
powers for the purpose of inflicting summary punishment. ' For Cape (1994, pp. 186- 
187): `The failure [of the RCCJ] to take account of the structural imbalance between 
the two parties [defence and prosecution] leads to a complete failure to deal with an 
issue that is fundamental both to police detention and to the provision of defence 
services at the police station; that is, what is the true purpose of police interrogation of 
suspects. ' In addition, Hillyard (1994a; also 1994b) criticised the `failure' of the 
RCCJ to improve the treatment of the Irish community. Boothman (1994, p. 96) 
argued that the Commission's recommendations would actually serve to further 
discrimination and more deeply institutionalise racism within the CJS. And, Hodgson 
(1994, p. 200) was critical of the RCCJ's `failure' to thoroughly evaluate the function 
of the criminal defence lawyer. 
Such demands, despite the validity of their divergent critiques, misconceive the 
conditions of governmental intervention into the CJS and the relations of power and 
resistance within the governmental reform processes of the CJS. In particular, the 
evaluative stance of such analyses is couched too much in terms of `success' or 
`failure', which produces a totalizing all or nothing feel. Governmentality, on the 
other hand, is precisely not about `success' or `failure'. On the contrary, government, 
as a process of reform is always ongoing, `unfinished' (cf. Mathiesen, 1974); in a 
state of continual contestation, negotiation and re-negotiation in its management or 
arbitration of competing discourses (cf. Foucault, 1980). 
Moreover, the forms of critical counter-discourse against miscarriages of justice that 
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were produced in response to the RCCJ in Criminal Justice in Crisis tended to 
overlook and misconceive the historical struggle within which extra judicial bodies 
are established. They served to trivialise the legislative achievements that such 
struggles obtain. They, generally, demanded far more in terms of corrective legislative 
recommendations than the RCCJ specifically, and extra judicial inquiries generally, 
are able to deliver. As such, they can be conceived as an attempt to piggyback specific 
campaigns to push through disparate legislative reform agendas. Extra judicial 
inquiries into the CJS have traditionally been established to address specific criminal 
justice problematics exemplified by forms of critical counter-discourse that were able 
to induce public crises of confidence in the CJS. The RCCJ was established primarily 
to address a failing in the appeal process. It was not a royal commission on the `basic 
values which the criminal justice system should seek to uphold' aka Bridges and 
McConville; it was not a royal commission on the `basic assumptions, values and 
goals which ought to inform criminal justice practices' aka Lacey; it was not a royal 
commission on `the individual rights of suspects and other persons in the criminal 
process' aka Maher; it was not a royal commission on `police powers of stop-and- 
search' aka Brogden; it was not a royal commission on `the purpose of arrest and 
detention' aka Singh; it was not a royal commission on `the provision of defence 
services at the police station' aka Cape; it was not about the treatment of Irish 
criminal suspects aka Hillyard; it was not about the treatment of suspects from ethnic 
minorities aka Boothman; and, it was not about the `function of the defence lawyer' 
aka Hodgson. Accordingly, the demands of the RCCJ expressed in Criminal Justice in 
Crisis were not only inappropriate and, largely, irrelevant, they inevitably floundered. 
The RCCJ was specifically established in governmental response to the cases of the 
Guildford Four, Birmingham Six, et al. The discursive agenda on the need for a royal 
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commission to investigate these cases was framed in the context that these cases 
exemplified the need for further appellate procedures once existing appeal processes 
had been exhausted. The `terms of reference' of the RCCJ was not framed in terms of 
the need to improve the underlying values which the CJS should seek to uphold, or 
the goals of CJS practices. Nor any the other aforementioned conceptualised `failings' 
of the RCCJ that were called for by Criminal Justice in Crisis. The RCCJ's 
recommendation to establish the CCRC was successful in disposing of the public 
crisis of confidence in CJS appeal procedures precisely because it was addressed to 
the reason for its establishment. 
From this it follows that if the object is the improvement of Irish criminal suspects, 
for example, critical counter-discourse needs to be produced that specifically 
exemplifies the mistreatment of Irish suspects and is able to induce a public crisis of 
confidence in this aspect of the CJS. Once this crisis has been induced the remit or 
`terms' of the extra judicial inquiry that will be established in governmental response 
need to be framed to address this particular and specific CJS problematic. In this 
process of agenda setting, other discursive forces will come into play with their own 
competing, and, in many instances, conflicting discursive agendas. This stage in the 
disposal of public crises is crucially important, as the public perception of the problem 
to be addressed and, hence, in need of legislative correction will determine the 
possible success of the governmental process. As George (1991, p. 76) has argued, a 
way to `guarantee a debate': 
`... is to shift the framework of debate in such a way that any conclusion reached within 
it is 
in accord with one's views. Whether one wins or 
loses particular debates conducted within 
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such a shrewdly chosen framework is then largely irrelevant, since the very act of debating 
will strengthen those presuppositions that are ultimately of greatest concern. ' 
If an extra judicial inquiry were to be established in response to a public crisis in the 
appeals procedure and it, instead, focused upon the treatment of Irish suspects, to 
follow the same example, it would not be able to dispose of that crisis. Accordingly, 
the RCCJ did not address the issue of the treatment of Irish suspects in the criminal 
process. Such governmental devices as the RCCJ are not about the resolution of all 
problematic aspects of the CJS. If critical counter-discourse is to be successful in 
terms of its programmatic aims, it needs to more appropriately understand the 
rationale of such extra judicial inquiries as the RCCJ and the conditions of the 
establishment of such governmental devices. Such an understanding can assist in the 
invention of more effective counter-discursive-strategies in attempts to produce the 
prerequisite public crises of confidence in specific aspects of the CJS and effect 
governmental corrective legislative reform. 
An example of this thesis can be derived from an analysis of Winter's (1994) 
contribution to Criminal Justice in Crisis's critique of the RCCJ. In particular, Winter 
(1994, p. 80) stated that when the RCCJ was announced `we' (the Britain and Ireland 
Human Rights Project (BIHRP)): 
`... wrote to the then Home Secretary asking him to extend the Commission's terms of 
reference to include Northern Ireland.. . 
The terms of reference would not be expanded, we 
were informed... We went ahead and submitted evidence to the Commission anyway, 
convinced that the fact that so many miscarriages of justice involved cases concerned with 
the conflict in Northern Ireland. ' 
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Winter (1994) is almost certainly correct on the significance of the high profile Irish 
cases and the establishment of the RCCJ. At the same time, she demonstrates well the 
importance of the terms of reference of such governmental devices for the subsequent 
disposal of public crises of confidence. This raises the question of the strategy of the 
BIHRP to submit their evidence `anyway', despite being informed that the `terms' 
would not be expanded. At this stage, once the terms had been established, it might 
have been more tactical for such researchers to shift their focus to research that 
exemplified the failings in the criminal appeals procedure in the interests of more 
fruitful corrective recommendations on the criminal appellate framework. As it was, 
researchers continued with their own disparate research and legislative reform 
agendas, which inevitably failed, and which, ultimately, served to weaken critical 
academia's counter-discourse's overall position. It is within this context that the forms 
of critical academic discourse that responded to the establishment of the CCRC 
should be assessed. Criticisms that the recommendation to establish the CCRC was 
met with `virtually universal approval' but that `the proposal is not entirely 
unproblematic' (Bridges and McConville, 1994, p. 22) say as much about the 
misunderstandings of the forms of critical counter-discourse that were collectively 
presented in Criminal Justice in Crisis in terms of the processes of governmental 
legislative reform of the CJS as they do about the success of other competing 
discourses - discourse not only has to take account of other 
discourse, it must also 
take account of itself. 
A final example of this thesis can be derived from Boothman's (1994) contribution. 
Boothman (1994, p. 91) noted that the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) was 
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`disturbed' that: 
`... race did not gain a mention in the Royal Commission's terms of reference... Yet... there 
was a considerable body of research on race and criminal justice which at the very least 
suggested a serious problem... and a number of the most serious miscarriages of justice that 
had lead to the Commission being established had in fact involved black defendants. ' 
As with Winter (1994), Boothman (1994) is undoubtedly correct on the significance 
of `race' and discrimination in the criminal justice process. So much has been more 
recently acknowledged as a consequence of the Stephen Lawrence Affair. 28 But, how 
was such acknowledgement achieved? It was certainly not achieved by submitting 
critical counter-discourse on racial discrimination to an extra judicial governmental 
inquiry with a remit of a review of the law on criminal appeals. On the contrary, it 
was achieved through a specific case that exemplified structural racism within the CJS 
that was able to induce a public crisis of confidence in the government of the CJS in 
its treatment of suspects, defendants and victims in the context or `terms' of `race'. In 
keeping with the discursive rules of the tradition of criminal justice system reform the 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry was established in response, and the legislative 
recommendations of the Macpherson Report are currently being debated (see, The 
Law Commission, 2001). 
28 For an archive of all The Guardian's reportage of the Lawrence case see The Guardian Unlimited 




This chapter considered the academic response to the most recent governmental 
overhaul of the CJS - the RCCJ. In so doing, it discerned two types of academic voice 
in response to miscarriages of justice: a reform orientated voice that closes the circle 
on the tradition of criminal justice system reform by fully participating in the 
recommendation of corrective procedural reforms and a voice that is essentially 
critical of reforms. In focusing on this latter more overtly critical expression of the 
academic voice, it was demonstrated that the critical academic counter-discourses that 
were presented in Criminal Justice in Crisis, the primary critical academic text on 
miscarriages of justice in collective response to the RCCJ, generally misconceived the 
relations of power and resistance in the governmental processes of the disposal of 
public crises of confidence in the CJS. The reflexive part that such critical counter- 
discourse itself fulfils in those processes was also shown, highlighting not only the 
inherent problems of exceptionality but also the specificity of CJS reform. Phenomena 
such as exceptional successful appeals are discursive productions that are intrinsically 
connected to specific forms of critical knowledge that exemplify problematic aspects 
in the legislative framework of the CJS. If such counter-discourse is able to induce a 
public crisis of confidence in the CJS then it signifies a problematic moment in the 
government of the CJS. In this process, the utility of the public crisis of confidence is 
to identify and to prioritise the most problematic aspects of the existing CJS 
legislative framework as part of the broader governmental surveillance or 
visualisation of the CJS. This provides the necessary force to counter-discourse 
required to operationalise governmental intervention. In response, `governmentality' 
domesticates the crisis and transforms a `negative' public crisis of confidence in the 
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governmental authority of the management or rule of the CJS into a `positive' 
reaffirmation of such governmental rationality. This governmental management, 
however, is not a conspiratorial, abusive, control of the CJS for its own ends, as 
conceived by the forms of critical academic discourse in Criminal Justice in Crisis, 
but a rationality that seeks to improve the CJS when the appropriate conditions for 
governmental intervention are present. Accordingly, public crises of confidence in 
particular aspects of the CJS need not be seen as entirely negative events, nor, 
necessarily, as a sign of a Government in terminal `crisis'. On the contrary, they can 
be conceived as necessary prerequisite conditions for the reform of the CJS that 
provide opportunities to force through fundamental changes to problematic aspects of 
the CJS that should not be squandered but exploited. This, to be sure, seems an 
entirely functionalist analysis of legislative reform of the CJS. Such a form of 
analysis, however, not only seems wholly appropriate, it is necessary to capture what 
Nobles and Schiff's researches have shown to be the `autopietic' internal logic and 
`self-referential communications' of the CJS (see, Nobles and Schiff, 1995, p. 300; 
1997; 2001). This form of systems analysis, however, is not the conservative analysis 
normally attributed to such analyses. On the contrary, it is founded in the critical and 
material realities of the governmental disposal of continual conflict or struggle. 
Moreover, it is a form of critical analysis that attempts to understand such processes 
in the interests of the production and deployment of more effective counter-discursive 
tactics and strategies. For if relations of power and resistance are misconceived then 




The human rights voice 
Introduction 
In addition to the voices caught up in the tradition of criminal justice system reform, 
with the primary focus of the reform of the procedural framework of the CJS, a 
further discernible voice has spoken about miscarriages of justice and the harm that 
they engender from the human rights approach. In Chapter 1, the human rights 
approach was cited as a possible way out of the limitations of prevalent definitions of 
miscarriages of justice. In particular, the human rights voice is not confined to a 
pursuit of factual innocence of victims of wrongful convictions but, rather, is 
grounded in a notion that any breach of rights causes harm to individuals and is 
unlawful. This can contribute to the re-orientation of miscarriages of justice away 
from exceptionalist understandings to include all successful appeals whatever their 
cause. Furthermore, when the estimated and/or claimed number of prisoners who 
should not be in prison is also taken into critical consideration a fundamentally 
different set of implications for critical analyses of human rights and victims of 
wrongful conviction is presented. For example, it is widely estimated that as many as 
3000 people are currently imprisoned in England and Wales with a legitimate 
grievance about their conviction. This estimate was reported in a HO bulletin, 
appeared in Prison News, was confirmed by a prison governor and 
broadcast as 
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accurate on several occasions by the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) (The 
Portia Campaign, 2001; Watkins, 2001). 
Clearly these are matters that are appropriate for human rights discourse. To be sure, 
in February 2001, the then chief inspector of prisons, Sir David Ramsbotham, claimed 
that there were as many as 20,000 people in UK prisons that he believed should not be 
there. These included children, the mentally ill, asylum seekers and those in prison for 
trivial shoplifting or drug offences (see Hattenstone, 2001). Nevertheless, at this stage 
in its articulations, the existing human rights voice has not capitalised on the promise 
of the HRA and problematised routine and/or mundane successful appeals as 
wrongful convictions. On the contrary, successful appeals have tended to be seen as 
an indication that legal rights and freedoms are being upheld, and that the system is 
actually fulfilling its human rights obligations against miscarriages of justice by 
providing mechanisms for overturning wrongful convictions as and when they occur. 
Nor has the existing rights voice more systematically questioned the general 
appropriateness of imprisonment. Accordingly, the existing human rights voice can be 
conceived to suffer the same definitional limitations as the voices bound up with the 
reform of problematic procedures of the CJS. It is also primarily directed towards 
victims in exceptional cases of successful appeal that were not successful in their 
routine and/or mundane appeal attempts. Hence, the number of victims of wrongful 
convictions and the harm that they experience that can be calculated from the existing 
human rights voice is also extremely limited. 
This chapter acknowledges that no system of criminal justice can work from an 
assumption that it mundanely and/or routinely gets it wrong, and that the system (any 
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system) must operate on the basis that its verdicts are for the most part sound. 
Moreover, it is accepted that otherwise there would be a bizarre situation in which all 
prisoners would have to be treated as if they were or, at least, potentially innocent. 
Despite this, the sheer number of successful appeals that are currently occurring 
indicates a scale of wrongful convictions that is at odds with the general spirit of the 
HRA and the Articles therein, which limit the lawful restrictions and/or abuses from 
the Act. From such a qualified frame of reference, this analysis proceeds by firstly 
drawing out from the recent literature on the HRA an image of the limited scope of 
the current human rights voice. Secondly, extending previous arguments, a more 
adequate application of the HRA is envisaged to show, in a provocative and 
illustrative fashion, how the current scale of victims of wrongful convictions that can 
be inferred from the official statistics on successful appeals could be said to 
contravene almost every Article. This exposes the limits of existing forms of human 
rights counter-discourse and calls for the system to be more reflexive in respect of 
wrongful convictions. In this sense, there is a requirement to at least consider the 
conditions for performing the unperformable. 
Existing invocations of the HRA 
As the HRA was passed by Parliament in 1998, and came into force in October 2000, 
during the five-year period of this research the notion of the human rights of 
individuals caught-up in the criminal justice system and the HRA 
have been 
increasingly invoked in one of two distinct ways. On the one hand the human rights 
voice has referred to the HRA and spoken in the 
interests of overturning potential 
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exceptional miscarriages of justice in the narrow confines of already convicted 
prisoners. Alternatively, the human rights voice has used the HRA in the general 
interests of the welfare of the prison population. 
In terms of the human rights voice's invocation of the HRA in attempts to overturn 
possible exceptional miscarriages of justices, in July 1999, for example, five law lords 
were called upon to decide whether prison inmates had the right to talk to the media. 
Under Article 10 of the ECHR, Freedom of Expression, 29 Ian Simms and Michael 0' 
Brien (who would later achieve a successful appeal as one of the Cardiff Newsagent 
Three) challenged The Prison Rules' stipulation that journalists should be allowed to 
visit prisoners only on condition that they sign an undertaking not to disclose or 
publish any information obtained during the visit. Finding in favour of Simms and 
O'Brien the judges invoked the human rights voice and said that prisoners who 
protested their innocence often had no other means of searching out the fresh 
evidence needed to have their cases reconsidered by the CACD. As such the Home 
Secretary's ban on journalists was determined to be `an unlawful interference with 
free speech' (see Dyer, 1999f; Editorial, 1999d). This would seem to indicate that the 
treatment of prisoners within England and Wales, whether legitimately imprisoned or 
victims of wrongful convictions, currently complies with Article 10 of the 
ECHR/HRA. In March 2002, however, John Hirst had to win a further legal challenge 
under Article 10 for the right to speak to journalists on the telephone (see Cozens, 
2002). In a similar vein to the earlier ruling, Mr Justice Elias invoked the human 
rights voice and gave the reason for the judgement on the following grounds: 
29 This challenge predates the introduction of the HRA 
in October 2000 and, hence, was made under 
Article 10 of the ECHR, which provided exactly the same rights and 
freedoms that are currently 
provided by Article 10 of the HRA. 
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`News is perishable and news stories have to be put together within a very short space of 
time ... [in such a context]... concern over certain aspects of prison conditions, for example, 
will often arise from some specific event. The journalist must catch the tide or the impact of 
the story will be lost. It will frequently be too late for information to be obtained by written 
communications' (cited Dodd, 2002). 
It would seem, then, that the matter of a prisoners' right to freedom of expression is a 
multifaceted one, where each of those facets must be obtained individually through 
successful legal challenge. Moreover, it would seem that the right of prisoners to 
express themselves to the media, either by written communication or by telephone is 
deemed to be lawful if it serves the general interests of overturning wrongful criminal 
convictions. In this context, it is interesting that convicted prisoners are not allowed to 
vote. This was reported in April 2001 when the high court upheld a ban on convicted 
prisoners having the right to vote which had been also challenged under Article 10 of 
the HRA, and had the support of Martin Narey, the director general of the prison 
service (see Dodd and Milne, 2001). In the judgement, Lord Justice Kennedy 
reiterated the Government's policy as follows: `As the home secretary said, 
parliament has taken the view that for the period during which they are in custody 
convicted prisoners have forfeited their right to have a say in the way the country is 
governed' (cited Dodd and Milne, 2001). This indicates that the wrongly imprisoned 
are indeed denied a crucial aspect of the freedom of expression, which can be 
conceived as an intrinsic element of Article 10 in a liberal democratic society. It also 
goes against the judgements in the two successful challenges brought under Article 10 
which emphasised the importance of the rights of communication and 
democratic 
participation of prisoners who might be innocent for the contribution that they might 
189 
make in the interests of justice. In another case in which the human rights voice was 
called upon to speak, John Hirst, cited above for his successful challenge under 
Article 10 of the HRA for the right to communicate with the media by telephone, was 
punished following telephone interviews with BBC Radio about the setting up of an 
Association of Prisoners, a `trade union' for inmates (Dodd, 2002). At the time of 
writing, Hirst 's challenge for an Association continues under Article 11 of the HRA, 
Freedom of Assembly and Association, the argument being that he is not asking for 
prisoners to have the right to comment on the single currency, but about prisons and 
prisoners rights (Ofer cited Dodd, 2002). Thus, unless Hirst's challenge is successful, 
wrongfully convicted prisoners will continue to be denied the full rights and freedoms 
contained in Article 11. Most recently, in November 2002, Richard Roy Allan was 
successful in a challenge against the United Kingdom in the European Court of 
Human Rights at Strasbourg under Articles 8 (Privacy), and 6 (Fair Trial) of the HRA. 
It was ruled that the police had acted unlawfully in recording his conversations by 
audiotape and on video and in using a police informant as a means of conducting 
`surreptitious interrogation, circumventing the protections for a suspect who has 
availed himself (sic) of legal advice and exercised the right to silence' (see European 
Court of Human Rights, 2002; also Miscarriages of Justice UK, 2002f). On this issue, 
there has been widespread condemnation that the police practice of `bugging' 
conversations between suspects and their solicitors is a breach of Article 8 of the 
HRA, which provides for the right to consult a lawyer in private, and could be a cause 
of miscarriages (see Gibb, 2002). 
In terms of attempts to ensure the welfare of convicted prisoners, in July 2002 the 
European Court of Human Rights ruled that the human rights of Lawrence Conners 
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and Okechukwiw Ezeh, for example, had been breached in contravention of Article 6 
of the HRA (Fair Trial) after both had extra days added to their sentences in 
disciplinary hearings. The effect of the ruling is that prison governors are likely to 
lose the authority to act as `judge and jury' in internal hearings relating to alleged 
breaches of prison disciplinary regimes and prisoners will be allowed the right of 
legal representation (see Ford, 2002a; Ford, 2002b). In addition, it has been widely 
speculated that overcrowded prisons due to record numbers of inmates in prisons in 
England and Wales along with reported squalid conditions of many institutions (see, 
for example, Ford, 2002) may be a breach of prisoners' human rights (see, for 
example, Morris, 2002). The HRA was also invoked in the setting-up of the first 
independent inquiry into the `death in custody' of Paul Wright who suffered a fatal 
asthma attack whilst in prison (see Miscarriages of Justice UK, 2002e). The HRA was 
invoked in an application for a judicial review following claims that the 2,900 
teenagers aged between 15 and 17 in prison in England and Wales is `brutal, inhuman 
and illegal' (see Leppard, 2002). And, the HRA was invoked by Roger Zoppola in 
August 2002 in a claim against the Home Secretary for the lack of disabled facilities 
in Pentonville prison where he is serving an eight-year sentence for possession and 
supply of drugs (see Prasad, 2002). 
What the above examples indicate is that the human rights voice has liberally invoked 
the HRA, but only in one of two limited contexts. On the one hand, the HRA has been 
invoked in the name of allowing convicted prisoners the rights and freedoms to 
overturn possible injustices/miscarriages. Alternatively, the HRA has been invoked in 
the context of ensuring the legal welfare of prisoners who may be denied the rights 
and or freedoms that are available to the citizenry as a whole. 
The above examples 
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also illustrate the force of the human rights voice when it speaks. For when successful 
rulings are achieved under the HRA individual victims of wrongful convictions or 
injustice generally in the treatment of convicted prisoners it is officially 
acknowledged that they have been illegally harmed in some way. The effect also 
induces reform of the problematic aspect of the system to reduce the possibility of 
others being harmed in the same way. 
However, the human rights voice has not been invoked to speak about the current 
scale of successful appeals in England and Wales, nor the extent of harm to victims of 
wrongful criminal convictions that such a scale of successful appeals implies. Indeed, 
from a conventional human rights perspective successful appeals are not wrongful 
convictions at all. On the contrary, as Pattenden (1996, p. 57) in the most extensive 
existing research on appeals against conviction and sentence in England and Wales 
(see Nobles and Schiff, 1997, p. 293) asserted, the foremost function of an appeal 
against criminal conviction is to satisfy the guaranteed right in signed-up-for national 
and international human rights legislation open to everyone convicted of a criminal 
offence the right to appeal against that conviction to provide redress to the victims of 
miscarriages of justice. From such a perspective, successful appeals are not viewed 
negatively as indicators of a systemic failure, but positively as a sign that the appeals 
system is fulfilling its `function'. The problem with this is not that successful appeals 
per se indicate judicial `failure'. On the contrary, to repeat, it is inevitable that there 
will be judicial mistakes and/or errors and that there will be some wrongful 
convictions. The problem is that the current scale of wrongful convictions that the 
official statistics on successful appeals infers can be conceived as in contravention, 
not only with the spirit of the HRA, but also with almost every Article of the Act. 
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The unlawfulness of the current scale of successful appeals 
In addition to stating the rights and freedoms provided to individuals in England and 
Wales, the Articles of the HRA also provide for occasions of lawful contravention. 
Essentially, these lawful contraventions relate to the lawful arrest and/or detention of 
persons guilty or suspected of criminal offences, to the maintenance of order, and the 
general promotion of the rule of law. At the same time, however, the HRA determines 
the limits upon what might constitute a possible lawful contravention of the Act. 
These limits are spelt out in Articles 17 Prohibition of Abuse of Rights, and 18 
Limitation on use of Restrictions on Rights, which state that: 
`Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 
rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided 
for in the Convention' (HRA, 1998, Article 17). 
And, that: 
`The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be 
applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed' (HRA, 1998, 
Article 18). 
From such a frame of reference, the current scale of victims of wrongful conviction 
that can be inferred from the official statistics on successful appeals can be conceived 
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as excessive and, therefore, in direct contravention of Article 17 and Article 18 of the 
HRA. In direct contravention of Article 17, the scale of successful appeals indicates 
that those engaged in the conviction of wrongful conviction victims and their 
treatment thereafter, whether intentionally or unintentionally, are engaged in activities 
that might act to `destruct' the rights and freedoms set forth in the HRA. They also 
limit the rights and freedoms of victims of wrongful convictions to a greater extent 
than is provided for in the HRA. In direct contravention of Article 18, the official 
statistics on successful appeals indicates a scale of victims of wrongful convictions 
that can be conceived as violations to the rights and freedoms of the HRA that are not 
permitted. Furthermore, such violations are currently being applied for purposes other 
than those for which they have been prescribed. To illustrate this, I draw from the 
recent literature on successful appeals and consider the lawful restrictions to the 
various remaining Articles of the HRA in chronological order. 
The rights and freedoms provided by the HRA commence with Article 2, The Right to 
Life, with the following statement: 
`Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. `No one shall be deprived of his (sic) life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a 
crime for which this penalty is provided by law' (s(1) my emphases). 
In terms of lawful restriction or contravention of the right to life, Article 2 s(2) states 
that: 
`Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it 
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary' 
(my emphasis) 
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There are a number of issues here that need to be unpacked. Firstly, the HRA would 
seem to intrinsically assume that law in England and Wales serves only, and always, 
in the interests of the protection of life. This assumption entirely attunes with, and 
might seem completely credible from, the standpoint of popular perceptions of 
wrongful convictions in England and Wales, i. e. that they are exceptional and small in 
number and that safeguards exist to remedy them should they occur. But, as the 
foregoing analyses have sought to show, the various laws in England and Wales that 
govern the treatment and resolution of miscarriages of justice do not take appropriate 
or adequate account of the extensive scale of wrongful convictions that can be 
inferred from the official statistics on successful appeals and their harmful 
consequences. Nor, therefore, the possible harm to the life of victims of wrongful 
convictions that law can, itself, pose. 
This leads into a second and related point pertaining to the precise meaning of 
`deprivation of life'. Conventional readings of Article 2 s(l) and s(2) of the HRA 
would, probably, assume that `deprivation of life' refers to execution and, hence, to 
acknowledged historical miscarriage of justice victims such as Timothy Evans and 
Derek Bentley who were deprived of any further life when they were hanged either in 
error or inappropriate circumstances. Indeed, the notion in s(2) that deprivation of life 
is not unlawful `when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely 
necessary' would support such an interpretation of the termination of life. In this 
context, the case could be made that since the abolition of capital punishment 
in the 
1960s such deprivation is no longer a consequence of 
England and Wales' CJS. But, 
by definition, `deprivation' of life can also refer more generally to any action that 
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might `prevent', `hinder' or interfere with the fulfilment or `enjoyment' of an 
individual's life (Collins, 2000, p. 300). As such, any wrongful conviction that might 
serve to dispossess or detrimentally impact upon an individual's life can be conceived 
as being in contravention of Article 2. It is in this context that victims of wrongful 
convictions bear testimony that law can be conceived as a threat to their lives. In the 
context of exceptional miscarriage of justice cases, this can be illustrated in the high 
profile wrongful imprisonment cases of the Birmingham Six, Guildford Four, 
Maguire Seven and Bridgewater Four, who together spent over 100 years of wrongful 
imprisonment. 30 A more mundane example is the case of David Jones who was 
wrongly accused and charged, but not convicted of, a paedophile offence. What these 
examples show is that a range of harm is caused to victims of wrongful convictions 
from whichever appeal court they derive that has a detrimental effect upon the 
enjoyment and/or fulfilment of their lives, however defined. 
In the recent literature on successful appeals there are various examples in which 
there were judicial declarations, and, therefore, official acknowledgement, that the 
convicting evidence in certain cases of wrongful conviction was unlawfully obtained 
through treatment that amounted to torture, thus, in direct contravention of Article 3 of 
the HRA, Freedom from Torture, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment. For example, 
quashing Keith Twitchell 's conviction in the CACD Lord Justice Rose said that the 
case was: 
30 This combined total for these four high profile cases of wrongful imprisonment would have been 
substantially greater had Patrick Molloj' of the Bridgewater Four and Guiseppe Conlon of the Maguire 
Seven had served their full sentences and not died in prison in 1981 and 1980 respectively. 
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`... yet another appeal arising from the lamentable history of the.. . West Midlands serious crime squad 
(within which) a significant number of police officers... some of whom rose to very senior rank, 
behaved outrageously, and in particular extracted confessions by grossly improper means, amounting 
in some cases to torture' (Lord Justice Rose cited Pallister, 1999b). 
Other examples of recent successful appeals that all aptly demonstrate the 
contravention of Article 3 in the conviction of exceptional victims of wrongful 
convictions within England and Wales include those of Patrick Molloy (see Regan, 
1997b), Derek Treadaway (see Johnston, 1997) and George Lewis (see Weaver, 
1998). 
But, this too, is not only an exceptional matter. For, in addition to these exceptional 
examples of successful appeals, there is evidence to suggest that Article 3 of the HRA 
is also routinely and/or mundanely contravened within the jurisdiction of England and 
Wales' CJS. This most recently emerged following an inspection of a range of places 
of detention in England and Wales in April 2002 by the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). 31 
The CPT's delegation, which was the first to visit Wales and to examine the treatment 
of persons held in a military establishment in the United Kingdom, inspected 12 
places of detention in England and Wales (European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2002). 
Following its inspections, the CPT reported that whilst the establishments that were 
visited in London were found to be `satisfactory', all of those visited in Wales were 
31 For a critical analysis of the CPT see Evans, 
M. D. & Morgan, R. (1999) Preventing Torture: A 
Study of the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
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found to be in contravention of Article 3. It transpired that a number of those 
interviewed separately at both Parc Prison (in Bridgend) and Hillside Secure Centre 
(at Neath) informed the CPT that they had been ill-treated by police officers. 
Allegations included abuse at the time of arrest and in police cells, including being 
punched and kicked. Moreover, the CPT's inspection of Cardiff Central Police Station 
found its cells were "dirty and poorly ventilated", with the effect that the people held 
there were also being treated in contravention of Article 3 (see Eden, 2002). 
In a consideration of the CPT's visit to England and Wales, however, it must also be 
noted that the CPT only inspected a very small sample of all the places of detention 
within England and Wales. Taking prison establishments as an example they 
inspected only 4 prisons (3 in England and 1 in Wales) out of a total of 13832 prison 
establishments in England and Wales (HM Prison Service, 2002). As such, even the 
CPT's finding of `satisfactory' treatment in establishments in London must be treated 
with extreme caution, as not all London establishments were visited. There is also the 
possibility that the establishments that were visited in London by the CPT could have 
been `staged' to present a `satisfactory' image to the visitors. Such a phenomenon is 
widely acknowledged to occur in other areas of social life which encounter periodic 
public scrutiny or review, such as the field of education with its Ofsted inspections 
and reports on school performance (see, for example, Carvel, 1999; Younge, 2000). In 
such a context, it is possible to argue that as it was the CPT's first visit to Wales, the 
establishments that were visited might have been unprepared or not known what to 
expect, and hence failed to present the required image. In saying this, however, it 
must be emphasised that there is no real value in separating England and Wales 
in 
32 This figure also includes privately operated prison establishments 
in England and Wales. 
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terms of the treatment of those held in places of detention, as all of the establishments, 
whether in England or Wales come under, and are covered by and subject to the same 
penal and governmental guidelines, Standards and Performance Indicators (see, for 
example, Prison Service Standards Manual, 2000). Accordingly, whether a particular 
establishment that is identified to be in contravention of Article 3 of the HRA is 
geographically located in England or in Wales it represents an unlawful violation of 
the Act by the CJS that collectively governs England and Wales. In such a context the 
CPT's finding that Article 3 of the HRA was being contravened in terms of the 
general treatment of prisoners within the jurisdiction of England and Wales is highly 
relevant to the specific issue of the treatment of victims of wrongful convictions who 
are wrongly imprisoned. For, it indicates that victims of wrongful conviction who are 
wrongly imprisoned within England and Wales are also likely to be specifically 
denied Article 3 of the HRA during their wrongful imprisonment. 
The rights and freedoms provided by Article 4 of the HRA, Freedom from Forced 
Labour, are also particularly relevant to an analysis of the 3000 victims who are 
currently estimated to be wrongly imprisoned in England and Wales. As the law 
currently stands, Rule 31(1) of The Prison Rules (1999) requires that convicted 
prisoners, male and female, do `useful' work for up to 10 hours a day. This work can 
take a variety of forms in industrial workshops and/or agricultural units, and includes 
the production of goods and services needed by prisons, as well as for sale in the local 
community. Alternatively, prisoners can work within the prison in cleaning, catering, 
and general building and maintenance work. In return prisoners receive around £7 per 
week, depending upon resources, the amount and type of work available and the level 
that the prisoner has reached on the `Incentives and Earned Privileges Scheme' (IEPS) 
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(for how this applies to male and young male convicted prisoners see Prisoners 
Information Book, 1999a, pp. 100-102; for women and young females see Prisoners' 
Information Book, 1999b, pp. 100-102). 
Significantly, any non-compliance by a convicted prisoner with the requirement to 
work invokes disciplinary procedures under Rule 51 (21-23) against the offending 
prisoner (The Prison Rules, 1999, Rule 51(21-23)). If found to be guilty of an offence 
against discipline the governor may impose a range of punishments including: a 
caution; loss of facilities (privileges) for up to 42 days (21 for prisoners under 21); 
stoppage of up to 42 days earnings (21 for prisoners under 21); cellular confinement 
for up to 14 days (7 days for prisoners under 21); and, up to an additional 42 days in 
custody The Prison Rules, 1999, Rule 55). 33 
Crucially, if a prisoner is found guilty of more than one disciplinary offence they can 
be punished for each one with punishments running consecutively (except that the 
total number of additional days added to a prisoners sentence must not exceed 28 for 
any one incident) (for male prisoners and young male offenders see Prisoners' 
Information Book, 1999a, p. 59; for female prisoners and young female offenders see 
Prisoners' Information Book, 1999b, p. 60). 
As the law stands for unconvicted prisoners awaiting trail, The Prison Rules provides 
the following `Statement of Principle': `Unconvicted prisoners are presumed to be 
innocent. Subject to the duty to hold them and deliver them to court securely and to 
33 For details of punishments see also Prisoners' Information Book, 1999a, pp. 59-60; Prisoners' 
Information Book, 1999b, pp. 60-61. 
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the need to maintain order in establishments, they will be treated accordingly' (for 
how this applies to male prisoners and young male offenders see Prisoners' 
Information Book, 1999a, p. 17; for how this applies to female prisoners and young 
female offenders see Prisoners' Information Book, 1999b, p. 17). In other words, it is 
not compulsory for unconvicted prisoners to labour. Nonetheless, the unconvicted are 
still subject to the discourse to labour through the following incentive: 
`As an unconvicted prisoner you do not have to work in prison. If you are willing to work 
but there is no work available, you will be given a small amount of money each week to 
cover basic things you may need to buy from the prison shop. If you are offered work and 
you refuse it, you may not get any money from the prison, and the prison does not have to 
offer you any more work' (for how this applies to male prisoners and young male offenders 
see Prisoners' Information Book, 1999a, p. 27; for how this applies to female prisoners and 
young female offenders see Prisoners' Information Book, 1999b, p. 27). 
In such context, it is not difficult to argue that prisoners, whether male or female, 
young or `old', whether convicted or unconvicted, and/or whether actually guilty of 
the criminal offences for which they were convicted are, in effect, forced to labour. 
For, a failure to comply with the compulsory requirement to labour does not only 
engender extra punishment, it prevents prisoners the ability to purchase the necessary 
items that might provide some basic quality of life. The question is, does this forced 
labour of convicted prisoners constitute the contravention of Article 4 of the HRA? 
On this matter, s3(a) of Article 4 states that: 
For the purpose of this Article the term "forced or compulsory 
labour" shall not include: (a) 
any work required to be done in the ordinary course of 
detention imposed according to the 
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provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional release from such 
detention. ' 
This lawful restriction to Article 4 seems entirely reasonable from the common-sense 
perspective of popular perceptions of the scale of the miscarriage of justice 
phenomenon. From such a perspective there is a certain accepted inevitability that any 
human system will produce some wrongful convictions. Accordingly, there is a 
corresponding accepted inevitability that some wrongful conviction victims will 
consequentially suffer a denial of their rights and freedoms. The legitimacy of such a 
perspective is grounded in the belief that only very few people will inevitably be 
denied the rights and freedoms that are provided for the citizenry of England and 
Wales. It is also grounded in a belief that when such a denial is known about the 
situation will be speedily rectified and the miscarriage of justice victim will be 
appropriately and adequately compensated for the harm caused. So much is also an 
explicit requirement of the HRA, manifest in the mechanisms for the fast-track 
remedy of miscarriages of justice (s4 and s5) and their compensation (s8) should they 
occur. However, the denial of rights and freedoms on the current scale within England 
and Wales as indicated by the estimated 3000 victims of wrongful imprisonment can 
be conceived to present new dilemmas to the continued legitimacy of current criminal 
conviction practices. It can also, therefore, be conceived as an indicator that Article 4 
is also contravened by England and Wales' CJS. Because, if the present legislative 
provision is incompatible with the stated aims of the CJS, it can, therefore, be said to 
be `unlawful' on its own terms, and, therefore, incompatible with the HRA (1998, s4) 
(cf. Green, 2002b, p. 76). 
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Under Article 5 of the HRA, Right to Liberty and Security, s(1) it is stated that: 
`Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of 
his (sic) liberty. ' The HRA, however, does provide a number of possible lawful 
restrictions to Article 5 including: `(a) the lawful detention of a person after 
conviction by a competent court ... 
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person 
effected for the purpose of bringing him (sic) before the competent legal authority on 
reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably 
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having 
done so' (HRA, 1998, s(1) my emphases). A dominant theme of England and Wales' 
lawful non-compliance with Article 5, then, relates to the twin notions of the 
`reasonable' suspicion of a suspect's criminality and, then, the `competence' of the 
judicial proceedings against the suspect. As this relates to miscarriages of justice, the 
notion of reasonable suspicion is immediately called into doubt. For if the suspicion 
and subsequent conviction of a suspect of a criminal offence was entirely `reasonable' 
then wrongful convictions would, indeed, be in line with popular perceptions, i. e. 
exceptional and small in number. 
As for the `competence' of England and Wales' legal authority, this too has, arguably, 
been undermined by exceptional wrongful conviction cases that highlight the very 
incompetence of many criminal trials to decipher and decide upon, for example, 
competing and opposing expert scientific evidence. The cases of the Birmingham Six, 
the Guildford Four, the Maguire Seven, the Bridgewater Four are relevant to this 
discussion, as are the cases of Judith Ward and Stefan Kiszko. All of which not only 
called into question the reliability of scientific evidence in criminal trials, but also the 
competence of criminal trials by jury in determining cases which hinge upon expert 
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scientific evidence. In addition, the mundane successful appeal case that was cited in 
which 48 motorists were successful in their joint-appeal against Greater Manchester 
Police also cast doubt upon the reliability of the scientific evidence that was 
influential in obtaining their convictions. In response to the challenge such 
exceptional and/or non-exceptional cases presented to the forensic science 
community, two inquiries into the state of forensic science in England and Wales that 
have reported in the last decade - the RCCJ (1993) and the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology (1993) (CST). The general conclusion of both 
the RCCJ and the CST was that, although forensic science had experienced a bad 
press following the success of the aforementioned exceptional cases, these were 
exceptions to the general rule of reliable (truthful) forensic practice. 
Against this, Erzinclioglu's (1998; 2001) researches drew from over 20 years as a 
practising forensic scientist. In them he argued that the debate about forensic science 
has been concerned mainly with individual cases of miscarriages of justice, when the 
real problem lies with a system that allows such injustice to occur in the first place 
and with such frequency. For Erzinclioglu (1998), there are several interrelated 
problems, which, in combination, produce a system that invites malpractice, with the 
inevitable consequence that miscarriages of justice will occur. In addition to 
Erzinclioglu's (1998; 2001) critique of expert forensic science evidence, the recent 
literature on successful appeals also contains a range of critical researchers on other 
aspects of expert scientific evidence and their potential to cause wrongful convictions. 
For example, Norman's (2001; 2001a) and Norman and Fryer's (2002) researches cast 
doubt upon the scientific evidence upon which dozens of criminal convictions were 
obtained against women for the murder of their children, when the most 
likely cause, 
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and which counter-scientific evidence suggests, seems to be `cot death' or Sudden 
Infant Death Syndrome' (SIDS) (see also Sweeney and Law, 2001; Arthur, 2002; 
Morgan, 1992). In a similar vein, Robins (2000), Burrell (2000), Mega and Syal 
(2001) and Panorama (2001) all reported a series of cases that revealed serious flaws 
in the fingerprint system which have led to unsafe criminal convictions. In addition, 
Ingrams (2002) was critical of the supposed `incontrovertible' proof of DNA evidence 
when presented in court, despite the lack of public and judicial understanding of what 
he termed the `mysteries of DNA'. Thus, despite the fact that expert scientific 
evidence is intended to resolve adversarial disputes in the interests of justice (a 
truthful judicial outcome), miscarriages of justice that are caused by expert scientific 
evidence are not only commonplace they are currently inevitable. 
In addition to the notions of reasonable suspicion and judicial competence, Article 5 
s(4) of the HRA further contains the following important right of appeal for those who 
might be wrongly imprisoned of criminal offences: `Everyone who is deprived of his 
liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the 
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release 
ordered if the detention is not lawful' (my emphases). At first sight, s(4) of Article 5 
seems acutely circular in that the lawfulness of a criminal conviction will be 
determined by the same law that delivered the previous prison sentence and if that 
previous prison sentence is determined to be unlawful then the person who was 
unlawfully imprisoned will be released according to law. Despite this, s(4) of Article 
5 presents a number of possible challenges to existing appeal practices and 
procedures. For example, a recent precedent that was established by a challenge under 
s(4) of Article 5 of the HRA by patients compulsorily 
detained in psychiatric hospitals 
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under the Mental Health Act (1983) (MHA) might also be highly relevant to the 
current post-appeal procedures of the CCRC, and the continued legislative viability of 
the CAA (1995) which established the CCRC. In one of the most significant rulings to 
emerge under the HRA, it was declared that patients had the right to speedy appeal 
hearings against their detention under the MHA (1983) to protect their liberty in case 
they were being unfairly detained. Moreover, that the government had, indeed, 
breached the human rights of thousands of people by not providing prompt reviews of 
their detention by independent tribunals (see Wilson, 2002; Editorial, 2002). In such a 
context, there is the potential that a corresponding challenge could also be made 
Under Article 5 s(4) of the HRA against the delays in the procedures of the CCRC in 
referring cases back to the CACD. For, as James (2002a, p. 5) noted, when assessing 
an appellate procedure, it is essential to do so in the context of its ability to grant fast 
and fair resolutions to those cases where justice `failed' the first time around. In 
attempting such a challenge, however, an immediate problem that emerges in that 
neither the LCD, nor the Court's Service collect or publish information for the 
average time taken from an application to the CCRC to a hearing of the appeal in the 
CACD. 34 Accordingly, in an attempt to arrive at an estimate of the average time taken 
for miscarriages to be quashed at the post-appeal stage of the process, Table 6 draws 
from the CCRC's published results of cases referred back to the CACD and their 
outcomes. It provides an analysis of a sample of 10 cases which were randomly 
considered out of the 36 cases that were successfully quashed following a referral 
back to the CACD by the CCRC between April 1997, when the CCRC started 
handling case work, and October 2001 (see Table 1). And, it determines an average 
34 This was confirmed in a series of telephone conversations that took place on the 
2 May 2002 with 
staff at the LCD and the Court's Service. 
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time of almost 4 years (3 years and 9 months) for meritorious cases to be quashed 
through the post-appeal procedures of the CCRC. 
Table 6: Average time taken from application to Home Office or Criminal Cases Review Commission to 
quash criminal conviction in meritorious eases 
Time from Average time 
Date applied Date referred Date application to from 
Name Date Appeal to Home by CCRC conviction Home Office application to 
Convicted History Office or quashed by or CCRC to Home Office 
CCRC* CACD quashed or CCRC to 
conviction quashed 
conviction 
Leave to Home Office 3 December 
James Hester 20 July 1995 appeal April 1996 7 April 1998 1998 24 Months 
refused 28 
March 1996 
27 October Appeal Home Office 
Danny 1987 dismissed 18 September 7 July 1997 17 51 Months 
McNamee January 1994 December 
1991 1998 
Leave to Home Office 28 January 16 July 1999 72 Months 
Mary 12 June appeal 17 June 1999 
Durham 1989 refused 24 1996 
Jul 1990 
Refused by Home Office 21 January 14 October 40 Months 
12 March single judge 17 June 1999 1999 
Trevor 1985 27 February 1996 
Campbell 1986 and by 
full court 27 
June 1986 
26 February Not provided Home Office 7 January 26 October 105 Months 
Keith 1982 January 1998 1999 
Twitchell 1991 
20 July 1998 Dismissed Transferred 20 October 7 December 32 Months 
Michael 0' 16 March from home 1998 1999 
Brien 1990 Office to 
CCRC April 
1997 
Ellis 20 July 1998 Dismissed June 1997 20 October 7 December 30 Months 
Sherwood 16 March 1998 1999 
1990 
Darren Hall 20 July 1998 Dismissed June 1997 20 October 7 December 30 Months 
16 March 1998 1999 
1990 
December Leave to Transferred 26 April 31 March 35 months** 
John Kamara 1981 appeal from Home 1999 2000 
refused in Office to 
1983 CCRC in 
A ril 1997 
4 December Not provided Home Office 30 July 1998 7 October 34 Months 




Source: Criminal Cases review Commission (2002b) `Results of Cases referred to the Court of Appeal' 
website: http: //www. ccrc. gov. uk v. uk retrieved 3 May 2002. 
* Prior to the establishment of the CCRC under the Criminal Appeal Act (1995) the decision of whether to refer a 
case that had exhausted its appeal rights back to the CACD lay with the Home Secretary, and C3 Division, the 
Criminal Cases Unit in the Home Office. Following a recommendation by the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice (1993) the CCRC was established on 1 January 1997 and started handling casework on 31 March 1997. In 
April 1997, all the cases under review by C3 were transferred from the Home Office to the CCRC. 
** The calculation for the case of John Kamara is a minimum calculation from April 1997 when transferred to the 
CCRC from the Home Office to 31 March 2000 when his conviction was quashed, as the date of his application to 
the Home Office was not provided. 
207 
The delays represented in Table 6 can be conceived to serve to compound the 
subjective harmful consequences of victims of exceptional wrongful convictions. 
They also compound the more objective harmful consequences of miscarriages of 
justice to society as a whole by, for example, increasing the financial burden of justice 
in `error' (explicated in the next chapter). Moreover, as James et al's (2000, pp. 143- 
146) research showed, as the CCRC deal with a daily intake of around four 
applications against a best disposal rate of two this has resulted in delays and backlogs 
in the post-appeal processes of the CCRC which can be conceived to be in 
contravention of Article 5 s(4) of the HRA, and also, possibly, Article 6, as the CCRC 
is failing in its task of providing fast and fair resolution to victims of exceptional 
wrongful convictions. 
Under Article 6 of the HRA, Right to a Fair Trial: `Everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal' 
(s(1)). The conventional trend to focus on exceptional cases of wrongful convictions 
serves to support the notion that, on the whole, England and Wales' criminal process 
is fair in that it supports the impression (perception) that miscarriages are uncommon. 
But, if the critical gaze also considers routine and/or mundane successful appeals, as 
well as exceptional ones, any notion of `fairness' quickly evaporates, in a system 
where there are thousands of successful appeals which are overwhelmingly 
determined on points of law (see, RCCJ, 1993; Brandon and Davies, 1973). In this 
context, James's (2002) research into the possible implications of the HRA for 
potential applicants at the post-appeal stage of the CCRC is highly significant. In 
particular, James (2002, pp. 7-8) distinguished two roles for the CCRC. On the one 
hand, the CCRC can be regarded as a preliminary or advisory stage of the CACD, a 
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gateway to the CACD which can be conceived to make no legally binding decisions 
as it is the CACD that is the ultimate arbiter of rights under Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
On the other hand, however, when the CCRC makes the decision to reject 
applications, it is, in fact, determinative of the applicants' rights, and should thus be 
considered in the role of tribunal. At such times, a range of current practices of the 
CCRC can be conceived to undermine the `fairness' of the criminal process, and, 
therefore, as a contravention of Article 6 of the HRA. For example, the CCRC's lack 
of effective mechanisms for the reception and reconsideration of fresh evidence could 
be conceived as a breach of Article 6 on the grounds that it does not provide a suitable 
forum for the hearing of fresh evidence. Further, the CCRC's act of appointing the 
same police force to reinvestigate complaints against it could be said to conflict with 
the notions of independence and impartiality under Article 6. Moreover, the current 
availability and limits of post-appeal funding present a situation within which 
applicants cannot prepare a proper post-appeal defence case to the CCRC or put their 
case forward in person, which can also be conceived as contrary to Article 6 (for 
details of these examples see James, 2002, pp. 6-7). 
A further important feature of Article 6 of the HRA to this analysis is stated at s(2): 
`Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty. ' Against this, there is widespread evidence within the recent critical literature 
that many victims of miscarriages within England and Wales were the victims of a 
criminal process that can be conceived as one which very much reverses s(2) of 
Article 6 by regarding them as guilty until proven innocent (see, for example, Norton- 
Taylor, 2001; Woffinden, 2000a; Hinsliff and Bright, 2000; Wadham, 2001; Hopkins, 
2001). Indeed, from the critical literature on miscarriages of justice the very raison 
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d'etre of many criminal prosecution cases within England and Wales' adversarial 
system of criminal justice can be conceived as the construction of cases upon a 
working assumption of guilt (see, for example, Hopkins, 2001; Green, 1997; 
McConville et al, 1991; Woffinden, 1987). 
Under Article 7 of the HRA, No Retrospective Penalties s(1) states: 
`No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it 
was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at 
the time the criminal offence was committed. ' 
On the face of it, a right or freedom that revolves around the relative justness of law 
and the limitation of retrospective criminal punishment seems entirely reasonable and 
consistent with the judicial rationale and existing practices of England and Wales' 
criminal process. Once again, however, in the context of the official statistics on 
successful appeals this right, arguably, calls into question the continued legitimacy of 
a range of legislation that underpins existing criminal conviction practices. For the 
legitimacy of such legislation is, arguably, grounded in an assumption and perception 
that the CJS is a human system that can sometimes get it wrong. It is not grounded in 
an assumption that the system routinely and mundanely gets it wrong, with the 
consequences that thousands (possibly tens of thousands) of people directly suffer, 
and many millions more (the rest of the population) suffer indirectly in numerous 
ways (discussed in detail in the next chapter). As stated, it is acknowledged that the 
CJS and penal system's have to work under a presumption that court verdicts are on 
the whole correct. The current scale of wrongful convictions 
does, however, at the 
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very least, raise the question: Is it legitimate to continue with a criminal process and a 
form of punishment that routinely and mundanely gets it wrong every day, month and 
year? 
An analysis of victims of wrongful convictions whether wrongly imprisoned or not, 
also verifies that Article 8, Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, is not only 
contravened in exceptional circumstances, but, on the contrary, it is also routinely and 
mundanely contravened within England and Wales' CJS. For it is stated that 
`everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence' (HRA, 1998, Article 8 s(1) and s(2)). Against this, every person who 
is successful in their appeal against their criminal conviction is testimony to the fact 
that, to a greater or lesser degree, the `privacy' of his/her family life, however defined, 
was, in effect, disrespected. In the case of the wrongly imprisoned, this can take the 
form of many years of wrongful imprisonment with the consequence of absence from 
a partner and/or during a child's upbringing can damage family and friendship 
relations. An example is the exemplary case of Frank Johnson (Bird, 2002; Hopkins, 
2002; 1999), who was wrongly imprisoned for 26 years, during which his life was 
`ruined', his wife left him, he did not see his children and he lost all contact with his 
past life (see Hill, 2002c). 
In the case of victims of wrongful conviction who are not imprisoned this can take the 
form of harming the wrongly convicted person's family relations, reputation and/or 
standing within his/her community. In addition, a case reported in April 2001 
highlighted an issue relating to the right provided by Article 8 that is generally denied 
to prisoners within England and Wales, which 
by association is also specifically 
211 
denied to thousands of victims currently estimated to be wrongly imprisoned. The 
case concerned Gavin Mellor who lost a challenge under Article 8 of the HRA to 
donate his sperm for the artificial insemination of his wife in the hope she might 
become pregnant and they could start a family (see Dodd and Milne, 2001). This 
relates to the specific issue of the estimated thousands of victims of wrongful 
imprisonment because they, too, will be denied the right to start a family during their 
wrongful imprisonment, further compounding the potential harmful consequences. 
Article 12 of the HRA, Freedom to Marry and Found a Family, would seem to be 
closely related to those provided under Article 8- respect for private and family life. 
To show that Article 8 was denied to convicted prisoners, including those wrongly 
convicted, the case of Gavin Mellor who was not allowed to donate the necessary 
sperm for his wife" IVF treatment was cited. Mellor's case is also evidence of the 
contravention of Article 12 for all prisoners including wrongly convicted prisoners `to 
found a family'. 
As for the right to marry, a feature of many exceptional wrongful imprisonment cases 
is that the victims who were married at the time of their wrongful imprisonment 
experienced a detrimental impact upon their marriages. For example, it is widely 
reported that the marriages of Paddy Hill (see Hattenstone, 2002) and Gerry Hunter 
(see Geffen, 1999) (both Birmingham Six), Michael O'Brien (Cardiff Newsagent 
Three) (see Hill, 2001 a) and Eddie Browning (see Linder, 1997) all broke-down either 
during or as a direct consequence of their wrongful imprisonment. An additional 
consequence of wrongful imprisonment is that during their time spent in prison many 
victims are denied the opportunity to meet a prospective partner whom they may wish 
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to marry and found a family. Indeed, an analysis of exceptional victims of successful 
appeal shows that victims of wrongful conviction who were not married at the time of 
their wrongful imprisonment do not, as a rule, marry during their wrongful 
imprisonment. For example, Andrew Evans did not marry during his 25 years of 
wrongful imprisonment; nor did Michael Hickey marry during his 17 years of 
wrongful imprisonment; nor did Vincent Hickey during his 17 years of wrongful 
imprisonment; nor did Stephen Downing during his 27 years of wrongful 
imprisonment; nor did John Kamara during his 20 years of wrongful imprisonment. 
Accordingly, the contravention of Article 12 can be conceived as a profound feature 
of wrongful imprisonment, as it either detrimentally impacts upon the victims who are 
married or denies many the opportunity to meet a potential spouse to marry and found 
a family whilst wrongly imprisoned. 
According to Article 14 of the HRA, Prohibition of Discrimination: 
`The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status. ' 
In assessing Article 14, Box's (1983) classic analysis of the composition of England 
and Wales' prison population is highly insightful. Of particular relevance Box (1983, 
p. 2) revealed that: 
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`For every 100 persons convicted of... serious crimes, 85 are male. Amongst this convicted 
male population, those aged less than 30 years, and particularly those aged between 15 and 
21 years are over-represented. Similarly, the educational non-achievers are over-represented 
- at the other end of the educational achievement ladder there appears to be hardly any 
criminals, since only 0.05 per cent of people received into prison have obtained a university 
degree. The unemployed are currently only (sic) 14 per cent of the available labour force, 
but they constitute approximately 40 per cent of those convicted. Only 4 per cent of the 
population are black, but nearly one-third of the convicted and imprisoned population are 
black. Urban dwellers, particularly inner-city residents, are over-represented. ' 
More recently, Pantazis (1998) drew from a national survey of prisons conducted by 
the Home Office in 1991 and confirmed Box's (1983) findings on the inequality of 
the prison population as it consists mainly of young poorly educated males, within 
which those from ethnic minority backgrounds were over-represented. In particular, 
the main findings of the national survey were that: 
9 96% of the prison population were men, whereas within the general population the 
number of men and women are roughly equal; 
" approximately 40% of the prison population were under 25, compared to 16% of 
the general population; 
" 41 % of male prisoners were from partly or unskilled occupations, against 18% of 
the general male population; 
" 15% of male prisoners identified themselves as either black or Asian, when less 
than 5% of the total general population come from those ethnic groups; and, 
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" 40% of male prisoners under the age of 25 left school before the age of 16, 
compared with 11% of the general male population (see Walmsley et al, 1992). 
From such research findings, it would be possible to conceive that Article 14 of the 
HRA is routinely contravened within England and Wales' CJS, as the prison 
population is not comprised of a representative cross-section of the population as a 
whole. On the contrary, people from a certain `sex' - male - with a certain `property 
status' or `social origin' - working class - within which people - men - and from 
`national minority' groups of `race', `colour', `language' and/or `religion' are all 
over-represented. In an attempt to determine the extent to which the inherent 
discrimination that is evident in the general prison population is applicable to victims 
of wrongful imprisonment, Table 7 presents details of 20 of the most prominent 
wrongful imprisonment cases between 1997-2002. 
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Table 7: Composition of wrongful imprisonment victims by Sex, Age, Occupation and 
Ethnic Status/Appearance* in 20 of the most prominent cases between 1997-2002 
Name Sex Age when Occupational Ethnic Years spent 
wrongly Status/ wrongly 
convicted Appearance* imprisoned 
1. Alex Allan Male 29 Welder 7 
2. James Reith Male 27 Unemployed 2 
3. Andrew Male 17 Unemployed 25 
Evans 
4. Peter Fell Male 21 Hospital 17 
Porter 
5. John Robert Male 19 15 
6. Jeremy Male 23 P/T Farm 
Barober Worker 
7. John Kamara Male 24 Described as 20 
`Black' 
8. Michael 0' Male 22 10 
Brien (Cardiff 
three) 
9. Ellis Male 20 10 
Sherwood 
(Cardiff three) 
10. Darren Hall Male 20 10 
(Cardiff three) 
1 l. Raphael Male 19 Described as 10 
Rowe (M25 `Black' 
three) 
12. Randolph Male Described as 10 
Johnson (M25 `Black' 
three) 
13. Michael Male Described as 10 
Davis `Black' 












17. George Male 21 Described as 5 
Lewis `Black' 
18. Sheila Female 62 Piano Teacher 4 
Bowler 
19. Stephen Male 17 Cemetery 27 
Downing Worker 
20. Mohammed Male 31 Accountant Indian 2 Years 4 
Patel Months 
Source: Compiled from the archives of the miscarriage oi justice canydigii g1uup 1111ºucc1«. vvcusIte. 
http: //www. innocent. org. uk 
* The analysis of `Ethnic Status/Appearance' 
is a crude one based on the description of `colour' or 
ethnicity of the wrongly imprisoned victims as reported 
in the case study literature. Hence, it takes no 
account of the possible ethnic minority groups that might 
feature who might be white, e. g. Irish. This 
serves the illustrative purposes here, however, as 
6 out of 20 (30%) were described other than `white'. 
Thus, indicating the overrepresentation of those from ethnic minority groups. 
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Table 7, then, demonstrates that victims of wrongful imprisonment are generally men 
who were under 30 at the time of their wrongful conviction, were either unemployed 
or in manual or low skill occupations, within which men from ethnic minority groups 
are vastly over-represented. Thus, Article 14 of the HRA would seem to be also 
routinely contravened by England and Wales' CJS in terms of the specific context of 
wrongful imprisonment. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis has attempted to illustrate in a provocative mode that the 
current scale of wrongful convictions, as inferred from the number of successful 
appeals, can re-orientate the existing human rights voice to cover a scale of denial of 
legal rights and freedoms that has not previously been acknowledged and/or 
articulated. For, from the perspective of the limitations of the restriction of rights and 
the prohibition of abuse of rights contained in the HRA, the current scale of wrongful 
convictions is incompatible with almost every Article of the HRA. 35 This presents not 
only a challenge to existing perceptions of the scale of the harm to victims of 
wrongful convictions, it also presents a different set of moral and ethical implications 
for analyses of human rights and victims of injustice. To be sure, the sheer number of 
victims of wrongful conviction, whether imprisoned or not, would seem to indicate 
35 The only Article of the HRA that this chapter did not assess was 
Article 16: Restriction on Political 
Activity of Aliens. This being stated a case that was reported 
in July 2002 would indicate that even this 
was being routinely contravened in England and Wales when the special 
immigration appeals 
commission ruled that the government had acted unlawfully 
by discriminating against foreign nationals 
when it arrested 11 terrorist suspects and 
imprisoned them in high security jails without charge (for 
details see Gillan, 2002). 
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that a judiciary that produces so many wrongful convictions as indicated by the 
number of successful appeals and the estimated number of cases of wrongful 
imprisonment is incompatible with, even in unlawful violation of, the HRA. For 
although the HRA recognises that miscarriages can occur and provides for their 
speedy remedy and compensation, it also limits and prohibits the abuse of the lawful 
transgressions or contraventions from the Act. In such a context, the number of 
victims in cases of successful appeals can be conceived as excessive excursions from, 
and, hence, contrary to the HRA, and an indication of an excessive amount of harm to 
victims of wrongful convictions. The forcefulness of this critique is further 
strengthened in the context of the estimated 3000 victims of wrongful imprisonment 
in England and Wales. 
The object of this analysis is not to require or demand that the CJS proceed on the 
basis that its findings are unsound and that convicted criminals and/or prisoners are 
innocent. For sure, that would indeed be an absurd logic. However, the current scale 
of wrongful convictions does raise human rights issues for the judiciary and the penal 
system, which despite the difficult nature of the analysis cannot be ignored. For these 
matters not only need to be considered in depictions of the scale and consequences of 
wrongful convictions they also need to be addressed by a system that so mundanely 
produces wrongful convictions. 
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8 
The zemiological voice 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, the human rights voice was re-orientated to include all successful 
appeals and to more fully capitalise upon the promise of the limitations of the lawful 
restriction of rights and the prohibition of the lawful abuse of rights as proscribed by 
the HRA. In so doing, a qualified construction of the human rights voice was shown 
to extend existing voices on the harmful consequences of victims of wrongful 
convictions to cover a scale of denial of individual rights and freedoms not previously 
conceived. However, even such an enhanced human rights voice would still entail 
significant limitations. For even if the human rights voice did capitalise on the full 
potential of the HRA it would still only construct the harmful consequences of 
wrongful convictions at the level of the individual and in terms of the denial of legally 
defined rights and freedoms. From such a frame of reference, even if an individual 
suffered loss of life, which would appear to be in moral contravention of Article 2 of 
the HRA, if that loss of life were legally proscribed then the human rights voice 
would not conceptualise harm. Another major limitation with any voice constructed 
from the perspective of the HRA would be that it would be silent about many other 
forms of harm that are engendered by wrongful convictions that 
impact upon the 
citizenry as a whole. For example, the human rights voice cannot 
include broader 
forms of social and/or psychological harm to 
husbands/wives and/or partners of the 
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victims of miscarriages of justice. Nor can any constituted or qualified human rights 
voice speak of the forms of harm experienced by the children and/or parents of 
victims of miscarriages of justice. In addition, the inherent economic consequences of 
excessive public expenditure on wrongful convictions, that take away from other 
areas of need (NHS, education, housing, and so on), that also need to be included for 
an adequate depiction of the consequences of wrongful convictions, would also be 
omitted by a conventional human rights voice. 
To extend the depictions of the harmful consequences of wrongful convictions still 
further, this chapter attempts to provide an even more adequate depiction of the trails 
of harm that wrongful convictions leave behind, not only to the direct victims but also 
forms of harm more holistically conceived. In so doing, this chapter considers the 
potential of the emerging zemiological perspective on questions of crime and 
punishment. Whilst welcoming this voice, and indeed seeking to contribute to it, I 
also want to flag up the deficits in the zemiological account, in particular, its tendency 
to shift notions of `crime' and `harm' entirely outside legal parameters. It is argued 
that such a move would only deprive the zemiological voice of the discursive force to 
impact upon effective reforms of the systems with which it finds fault. 
Conceptual and methodological issues 
Zemiology (from the Greek, zemia, harm or damage) is an emerging academic 
perspective within critical criminology and socio-legal studies that was born out of a 
frustration with criminology's failure to challenge state definitions of `crime' and 
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`victim' (Sanders, 1999, p. 5). In essence, zemiology is an outgrowth of the research 
program outlined by Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1975, pp. 132-138) which 
argued that criminologists should concern themselves with `social injury' and/or 
`public wrong', and that definitions of `crime' should revolve around violations of 
human rights; indeed, that critical criminologists should be `defenders of human 
rights' (see also Green and Ward, 2000, p. 104). The zemiological approach attempts 
to attain a more holistic understanding than is available in conventional 
criminological discourses of the range of serious harms (social, psychological, 
physical and/or financial), that are engendered by social and political decisions and/or 
structures in the interests of social justice (Gordon et al, 1999). In particular, 
zemiology argues that undue attention is given to many events and incidents that are 
defined as `crime', which serves to distract attention from other events and incidents 
which often involve a comparable and even increased amount of serious harm to 
victims. For example, whilst there is an annual average of over one million recorded 
workplace injuries in Britain, a restriction to the term `crime' means that only one 
thousand or so that are successfully prosecuted each year are available to critical 
analysis. These are enormous differences that minimise and marginalise the extent of 
the harm caused by injuries at work, and reveal profound implications in terms of 
what can be done with such data conceptually, theoretically and politically (Tombs 
cited Hillyard and Tombs, 2001, p. 5; see also Pearce and Tombs, 1992). 
Accordingly, there is a utility in the zemiological approach in this attempt to re- 
orientate definitions of miscarriages of justice to include all successful appeals and 
provide a more adequate depiction of wrongful convictions and the 
harm that they 
engender. For in a similar way to the zemiological analysis of workplace 
injuries, this 
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thesis is specifically concerned to demonstrate that existing conceptions of 
miscarriages as exceptional occurrences that amount to a handful of cases each year 
are similarly inadequate. To be sure, existing analyses of the harmful consequences of 
miscarriages have largely derived from autobiographical and/or biographical accounts 
of single cases of high profile exceptional successful appeals that were the products of 
post-appeal procedures (for example, Kee, 1986; Mullin, 1986; Callaghan and 
Mulready, (1995); Hill and Hunt, 1995; Hale, 2002). From such sources the harmful 
experiences and/or consequences are constructed as highly individualised accounts, 
which can be conceived to be not sufficiently zemiological. For they do not include 
the recorded statistics of successful appeals in England and Wales that amount to 
many thousands of cases each year. They, therefore, also omit the harmful 
consequences that occur in the most apparently mundane of successful appeals at the 
Crown Court from magistrates' courts and the routine appeals that are successful at 
the CACD that often entail a comparative amount of harm with exceptional cases. 
Moreover, where existing analyses have considered the harmful consequences of 
miscarriages of justice they have generally done so in the very narrow confines of the 
individual victims. This, in turn, illustrates the need for a re-orientation of how 
miscarriages and the victims of miscarriages are conceptualised and defined, and how 
the harm of miscarriages is quantified: `what one measures, and how one measures it, 
makes an awful lot of difference to what one finds and the range of. .. responses that 
then appear to be "feasible"' (Hillyard and Tombs, 2001, p. 13). In such a context, a 
zemiological approach can be applied to the terrain of miscarriages of justice to 
produce a more comprehensive voice and/or set of analyses of the 
harm that 
accompanies the possible scale of miscarriages that can 
be inferred from the official 
statistics of successful appeals. This will provide a more accurate picture of the 
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vicissitudes of wrongful convictions and, hence, represent the constitution of a more 
forceful counter-discourse. 
Before proceeding with the application of a qualified zemiological voice to the terrain 
of successful appeals, however, it is important to consider the unique methodological 
issues that the zemiological approach raises. This is because the fundamental notion 
behind zemiology, namely `harm', inevitably carries a certain degree of vagueness, 
subjectiveness, and/or a possible multiplicity of reference. For instance, in the most 
obvious reference, the `physical harm' of wrongful conviction can be fairly 
straightforwardly defined, demonstrated and quantified. A black eye (without 
complications) can be conceived as qualitatively and quantitatively less harmful than 
the loss of an eye, a bruised arm (to a person who is not haemophilic) is less harmful 
than a fractured one, and so on. Similarly, the financial harm of wrongful convictions 
can be relatively unproblematically analysed in the cost/benefit mode, presenting 
methodological issues that are fairly well recognised and able to be accounted for. 
However, the forms of social and psychological harm that are engendered by 
wrongful convictions present an entirely different set of methodological concerns. For 
whilst an extensive range of social and psychological harms can be conceptualised in 
the abstract, few harms apply equally to all wrongful conviction victims. Wrongful 
convictions are qualitatively and quantitatively different, as are the social 
circumstances and psychological dispositions of wrongful conviction victims. Single 
men who are wrongful conviction victims, for example, are likely to experience harm 
in very different ways, and possibly to a lesser extent than, say, a married father of 
two children, whose wife and children will also experience a whole range of social, 
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psychological and/or financial harms. Similarly, a wrongful conviction for drink 
driving which incurs a penalty of 12 month's loss of driving licence can be conceived 
as qualitatively and quantitatively less harmful than a wrongful conviction for a 
paedophile offence which incurs a custodial sentence and potentially permanent 
damage to reputation. For even if such an offence is successfully appealed there is the 
potential that the appellant will always be perceived as a paedophile - for some `there 
is no smoke without fire'. 
This indicates the need for a zemiological continuum of harm, whereby it needs to be 
acknowledged that the associated social and/or psychological harm(s) experienced by 
victims of wrongful convictions, for example, may differ from person to person, i. e. 
different people may experience the psychological harm of 10 years wrongful 
imprisonment differently. To follow the same example, the psychological harm of a 
wrongful conviction for drink driving can, probably, (but not necessarily), be 
conceived as qualitatively and quantitatively less harmful than a wrongful conviction 
for paedophilia. Accordingly, what follows does not claim that the social and 
psychological harmful consequences unearthed by this chapter are universally valid 
and/or representative for all victims of wrongful conviction. Rather, examples of 
social and/or psychological harm are provided to give some indication (insights) of 
likely forms of harm that might be experienced as a consequence of wrongful 
conviction in the interests of extending existing understandings. 
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The wider harms of miscarriages of justice 
The newness of the zemiological approach means that the most significant attempt to 
date to provide a definitional framework for zemiology was presented in two 
conference papers by Hillyard and Tombs (1999; 200 1). 36 For them, a developed 
understanding of social harm `would encompass notions of autonomy, development 
and growth' (Hillyard and Tombs, 1999, p. 9). In terms of psychological harm, it 
`would cover any psychological or emotional distress arising from events and 
behaviours outside of an individual's ... control' (Hillyard and Tombs, 2001, p. 11). 
With regard to physical harm, a zemiological perspective `would include... torture and 
brutality by state officials' (Hillyard and Tombs, 1999, p. 9). And, financial harm, 
from a zemiological voice, would incorporate `mis-appropriation of funds by 
government' (Hillyard and Tombs, 1999, p. 9). In the specific context of successful 
appeals, each of the types of harm conceptualised by Hillyard and Tombs (1999; 
2001) have a resonance. To illustrate some of the various forms that each of the types 
of harm can take, the remainder of this section draws from the recent literature on 
successful appeals. This analysis, however, will not be exhaustive. Rather, the 
theoretical and methodological strategy is to provide insights of some of the more 
prominent forms of harm that victims of wrongful conviction might experience to 
further the conceptions available in existing voices. 
36 Pluto Press will publish an edited book on the possibilities and limits of zemiology in 2003. 
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Social harm 
A range of forms of social harm to the direct victims of wrongful convictions was 
accounted for in the previous chapter that re-orientated the human rights voice to 
speak of the widespread contraventions of the HRA. In addition to the forms of socio- 
legal harm, a zemiological voice would emphasise additional forms of social harm felt 
by the individual victims of wrongful convictions as it can also relate to being 
deprived of a partner's support. Social harm from such a perspective can relate to a 
parent's absence during a child's upbringing, which can have associated impacts upon 
both the absent parent and the child's health and life-chances. Symmetrically, it can 
also have profound impacts upon the families and friends of the wrongfully convicted. 
Furthermore, it can also relate to the victims of the criminal offences for which the 
wrongfully convicted were wrongfully convicted, and to their families and friends 
too. 
Examples of all of these various aspects of these additional forms of social harm that 
wrongful convictions engender can be found throughout the counter-discourse against 
miscarriages of justice, but has, hitherto, not been emphasised and, hence, has had 
little impact. For instance, many of the exceptional cases of successful appeal often 
entailed victims of serious criminal offences such as murder, rape or serious assault, 
the social harm to whom can be said to be the greatest of all. For example, as 
Broughton (cited Campbell, 1998) said as Derek Bentley's conviction was quashed by 
the CACD in July 1998: `Our thoughts are with the family of PC Sidney Miles, who 
gave his life in the line of duty and whose death is often 
forgotten. ' 
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In addition to the possible social harm to the actual victims of the criminal offences in 
cases of wrongful conviction, there are also significant forms of social harm to the 
families and friends of those victims when wrongful convictions are overturned and 
justice is revealed to have miscarried. For example, with the release of the three 
surviving members of the Bridgewater Four37 an issue that had long since been 
regarded as domesticated within the public consciousness re-emerged, with the 
pertinent question being re-stated: Who, then, did murder Carl Bridgewater? (Graves, 
1997). Prior to the release of cousins Michael Hickey and Vincent Hickey and James 
Robinson there had been a general belief and conviction, particularly among Carl 
Bridgewater's former community, that justice had been done. Even after a Rough 
Justice television programme, that was helpful in the final referral of the case back to 
the CACD, Carl Bridgewater 's father had asserted: `I am firmly convinced that those 
men killed our son and are serving just sentences' (Brian Bridgewater cited Editorial, 
1996). With the quashing of the Bridgewater Four's convictions, however, this 
position was called into question and it now seemed that someone else might have 
been responsible for Carl 's murder. 
Almost inevitably attention was returned to Hubert Spencer, a man linked with the 
Bridgewater case since he shot and murdered Hubert Wilkes, an elderly farmer, in 
December 1979,14 months after Carl was killed less than half a mile away on the 
same farm. Spencer was jailed for life for the shooting of Wilkes, which was described 
during the trial as a drunken, motiveless murder. Since that time campaigners for the 
Bridgewater Four have persistently pointed the finger of blame at Spencer, publicly 
describing him as the real killer. Spencer, who was released from prison in 1994, has 
37 Pat Molloy the `fourth' member died in prison in 1981. 
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always denied any involvement in Carl Bridgewater's murder. As yet, the case of 
who killed Carl Bridgewater remains officially unsolved. As Paul Tongue said: 
`memories of the killing will fester like an open wound unless the case of who killed 
Carl is solved (Canon Paul Tongue, the Rural Dean of Stourbridge cited Weaver, 
1997). 
Such examples are commonplace in the literature on successful appeals. They 
emphasise both the general fear of crime and the re-emergence of forms of social 
harm to the families and friends of the victims of criminal offences in consequence to 
the public knowledge of exceptional wrongful convictions (see, for example, Leonard, 
1997; Editorial, 2000b; Buncombe, 1999; Steele, 1995; Shaw, 1998; Roberts, 1999; 
Hale, 2002; Graves, 1997). 
This indicates an important consequence of the zemiological approach. For the failure 
to convict those persons guilty of serious offences can be conceived as of as much 
concern from the perspective of harm reduction as the conviction of the innocent. For 
just as when an innocent person is wrongly convicted, if a perpetrator of a serious 
crime is not convicted and they remain at liberty, then there is the potential for them 
to commit more serious crime, and, hence, cause more harm. 
As indicated, a zemiological voice of the forms of social harm to the direct victims of 
wrongful convictions would extend existing notions of the denial of legally provided 
human rights and freedoms. For such legally grounded analyses do not provide an 
appropriate or adequate depiction of the range of the social harmful consequences that 
victims of wrongful conviction experience. For married victims with children the 
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social harm of wrongful imprisonment can be conceived as the most socially harmful 
in the sense that the impacts are more widely felt. For example, almost a decade after 
his successful appeal Paddy Hill (Birmingham Six) declared: `Me, I died in prison, 
inside' (cited Hattenstone, 2002), thus indicating that he will probably never get over 
the social harmful effects of his 16 years of wrongful imprisonment, during which his 
wife divorced him and his children grew up in children's homes without him. 
Similarly, during Gerry Hunter's (Birmingham Six) arrest he was violently and 
brutally assaulted and his home was vandalised. And, during his 16 years of wrongful 
imprisonment he also had no chance to take part in the care of his children, the 
youngest of whom was four years old when he was arrested, and his wife and children 
had to live at subsistence level supported by state benefits because he was unable to 
provide for them (see Geffen, 1999). When Michael 0' Brien (Cardiff Newsagent 
Three) was wrongly imprisoned his son was three years old and his wife was 8- 
months pregnant with their second child and he had recently renewed a relationship 
with his alcoholic father after years of conflict. In terms of social harm, during his 10- 
years of wrongful imprisonment, he was also absent from his son's life, his second 
child, a daughter suffered a `cot-death' when she was two months old, his wife left 
him and his father, reported to have been broken by his son's wrongful imprisonment, 
drank himself to death (see Hill, 2001 a). 
In addition to forms of social harm in terms of what might be termed immediate social 
familial loss, another form of social harm experienced by many victims of wrongful 
conviction is the stain on their reputations despite a successful appeal. As Annette 
Hetivins, who was successful in a routine appeal in the CACD in February 1999 for an 
arson attack that killed three people, asserted: `I was exonerated by the courts but not 
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in the community in which I live. That won't happen until the investigation is 
officially reopened and the killer is caught ... until ... 
[the] murderer is found ... I will 
carry the stigma. Injustice doesn't cease just because you walk free from the court of 
appeal' (cited Roberts, 1999). To be sure, a feature of many wrongful convictions are 
the `whispering campaigns' about the guilt of the victims that continue long after the 
victims have achieved a successful appeal (for further examples see Dyer, 1997; 
White, 1997; Editorial, 1998d; Editorial, 1998e). These brief examples give an insight 
into the likely forms of social harm to victims of wrongful convictions. One form of 
social harm that almost all victims of wrongful imprisonment are likely to share was 
summed up by Peirce (cited Gillan 2001) in the following terms: `They [victims of 
wrongful imprisonment] come out with no money and no counselling. They have no 
references, it is difficult to open a bank account, and you can't get a mortgage. They 
have no GP. You don't belong' (see also, for example, Dudley, 2002). 
In addition to the social harms to the individual victims of wrongful convictions, a 
zemiological voice would also speak of the profound social effects upon the families 
and friends of the victims. In some cases the harm caused in terms of the anger, 
anguish, pain, suffering and sheer frustration of the family and friends of the wrongly 
convicted can be just as severe as the people they support, also having profound and 
long-lasting effects upon their own lives. For example, Ann Whelan, the mother of the 
Bridgewater Four's Michael Hickey, was singled out following the successful appeal 
in the Bridgewater case for the 19 years that she had campaigned tirelessly and 
relentlessly for their release. Prior to the wrongful conviction of 
her son, for his 
alleged part in the murder of Carl Bridgewater, Ann 
Whelan had no interest in the 
matters of the CJS. But, her son's wrongful conviction will probably 
define the 
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remainder of her life, as well as the life of her son. Taking about Ann Whelan's 
efforts James Robinson said: `The problem for the West Midlands police force was 
that they happened to fit-up Ann Whelan's son. They got a tiger by the tail' (cited 
Leonard, 1997). 
A letter to The Times that appeared in July 1998 would indicate that the `tiger's' (Ann 
Whelan's) campaign is far from completed. In it she attacked the CJS on the grounds 
that in the 12 months since the quashing of the Bridgewater convictions nothing had 
been done to bring to account those responsible for the unjust convictions of the men. 
In particular, she pointed out that there had been no inquiry into how such a 
`horrendous' miscarriage of justice could have been perpetrated and no effort made to 
find the real killer. She regarded this state of affairs as a terrible indictment of the law, 
the judicial system and the HO. She further asserted that the men and the public 
deserve to see immediate action by the HO, CPS and the police. She concluded that 
no doubt the authorities hoped that, following the successful appeals, the problem 
would go away. This, she said, will not happen. `In acquitting these innocent men 
they have completed only half the task and must be reminded of this in no uncertain 
terms' (Whelan, 1998). 
In October 2002, Whelan (2002) reported the on-going social harm that she 
experiences as a consequence of her son's wrongful conviction. This relates to 
Michael Hickey's continuing mental health problems and the financial burden that he 
still represents to her, as he has not as yet received compensation for his 17 years of 
wrongful imprisonment and survives on her 
financial support and £61 a week 
incapacity benefit. This story of the social consequences of wrongful convictions to 
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the lives of families and/or friends of victims is also a common theme of campaigns 
against miscarriages of justice (see also, for example, Hale, 2002 for an account of the 
social costs to Stephen Downing's family; Birnberg, 1998 for an account of the 
campaigning efforts of Derek Bentley's sister Iris Bentley). 
In addition to these possible social harms of wrongful convictions there are also wider 
ranging or broader social harms that are felt by the society as a whole. For public 
perceptions of the legitimate operation of the CJS in accordance with its expressed 
aims (`justly', `fairly' and `efficiently') affect and have effects upon the citizenry as a 
whole. Simon Regan (1997a) articulated this position as follows: `If a person is 
wrongly convicted it not only strikes at his or her personal liberty - serious enough by 
any standards - but at every last one of us. For, ultimately, it is we who have created 
the system and we who must live or die by it. ' From such a perspective, the broader 
social harm of the scale of wrongful convictions that can be inferred from the 
statistics on successful appeals have profound and troubling effects upon each and 
every member of society, signalling a failure of CJS legitimacy that must urgently be 
addressed. 38 As JUSTICE (1989, p. 6)) asserted: 
`No criminal justice system is, or can be, perfect. Nevertheless, the manner in which a 
society concerns itself with persons who may have been wrongly convicted and imprisoned 
must be one of the yardsticks by which civilisation is measured. Quite apart from the 
damage to one's good standing in the community, wrongful conviction and imprisonment 
can (and frequently do) lead to the break-up of family, loss of reputation, 
home and job, as 
well as psychological harm. So seriously is the 
deprivation of liberty taken.. . that violation 
38 See also, for example, Joseph, J. (1998) `Sometimes 
justice may be seen to be undone' The Times 
June 3 p. 51 where he states possible miscarriages of 
justice are `deeply troubling, not only for those 
wrongly imprisoned, but for democratic society as a whole. 
' 
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of the right to liberty is the only violation of human rights which must be 
compensated... Moreover, the imprisonment of an innocent person means that the real 
culprit is still at liberty [to offend] and this can [cause more damage and] undermine public 
confidence in the criminal justice system' (original emphasis). 
Psychological harm 
Perhaps the most serious and profound of the associated consequences to the direct 
victims of wrongful convictions is the psychological harm that they experience. This 
was highlighted, for example, in 1996 when Adrian Grounds', a psychiatrist at the 
Institute of Criminology at Cambridge, examined Gerry Conlon of the Guildford Four 
and four of the Birmingham Six. In so doing, he found that they were all suffering 
from irreversible, persistent and disabling post-traumatic stress syndrome. He 
compared their mental state with that of brain damaged accident victims or people 
who had suffered war crimes. He concluded that it often made them impossible to live 
with (cited Pallister, 1999). 
Four years after Grounds' examinations there is evidence that the traumas continue 
for at least some of the members of the Guildford Four. In a newspaper article that 
appeared in June 2000,11 years after his release, Gerry Conlon (one of the Guildford 
Four) claimed that he was `still going through a terrible time, getting dreadful 
flashbacks' (cited Pallister, 2000). Adding support to Grounds's earlier findings he 
asserted that his `psychiatrist (had told him) that he has never experienced a worse 
case of post-traumatic stress syndrome, worse even than the soldiers in the Falklands 
war' (cited Pallister, 2000). 
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As for Paul Hill (another member of the Guildford Four), he stated in a BBC 
television programme, also aired in June 2000, that he did not think there was 
`anybody alive who (could) come out of that experience and not be scarred' (cited 
Pallister, 2000). He continued that the most poignant thing about his case for him was 
that the judge had `expressed regret that the death penalty was not an option' (cited 
Pallister, 2000). 
This pattern is repeated for the surviving members of the Bridgewater Four. For 
example, Michael Hickey suffered three nervous breakdowns (see Campbell, 1997) 
during his 19 years of wrongful imprisonment and has continued mental health 
problems since his release (see Ann Whelan talking about her son's continued mental 
health problems cited Carter, 1998). As for the costs to Vincent Hickey, five of his 
close family died during his wrongful imprisonment and his psychological despair 
resulted in a failed suicide attempt (see Campbell, 1997). As for the label `child 
killers' attached to the Bridgewater case, the following quotation from the remaining 
surviving member, James Robinson, sums up well its agonising socio-psychological 
cost: `For long, lonely years we have cried and been racked with despair. People have 
looked at us with hate in their eyes and called us child killers. We are not child killers' 
(James Robinson cited Graves, 1997b). 
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Physical harm 
The recent literature on successful appeals also contains many examples that relate to 
Hillyard and Tombs' (1999, p. 9) definition of physical harm from a zemiological 
perspective as including `torture and brutality by state officials'. In the previous 
chapter, Article 3 of the HRA, (Freedom from Torture), was shown to be contravened 
in exceptional cases of successful appeal in terms of the police torture and brutality in 
obtaining wrongful convictions. Article 3 was also shown to be routinely contravened 
in the general treatment of the prison population. 
A limitation with the preceding discussion of the physical harm caused to victims of 
wrongful convictions is that in confining the analysis to the legal sphere the details of 
that physical harm and broader questions of social justice are either marginalised, or 
entirely lost altogether in the legal jargon. A zemiological voice, however, would 
provide a more morally orientated detailed account of the precise forms and extent of 
the physical harms experienced. In so doing, a more adequate account of the physical 
harm of wrongful convictions is provided, and the ways in which such injustices and 
apparent contraventions from the HRA are dealt with. 
For example, George Lewis was head-butted, punched in the head and threatened with 
a syringe as police officers from the now disbanded West Midland Serious Crime 
Squad questioned him after his wrongful arrest in 1987 for two armed robberies and a 
burglary that he did not commit. The officer who assaulted George Lewis was the late 
John Perkins, a detective constable with the West Midlands Serious Crime Squad. 
39 
39 There is evidence that the West Midlands serious crime squad secured at 
least 49 prosecutions on the 
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He is also alleged to have fabricated evidence in 23 other cases. When Lewis later 
consulted with his solicitor he was informed that there were no grounds to appeal 
against his convictions. The case was only referred to the CACD after West Yorkshire 
Police began an investigation into the Serious Crime Squad's activities. A retrial was 
set to take place but Lewis was released from custody in 1992 when the prosecution 
decided to offer no evidence against him. 40 Reacting to the news of Lewis's 
compensation award a spokesperson for the West Midlands Police said it regretted 
`the miscarriage of justice which occurred in this case'. He said that the four officers 
who fabricated the evidence against Lewis were no longer serving with the force. DC 
Perkins had died in 1992. DC Reynolds who arrested Lewis with DC Perkins and 
another officer, not named in court, had recently retired. The remaining officer, also 
not named, had retired the day before the CACD decision. As such none of the police 
officers involved in the George Lewis miscarriage of justice case will be held to 
account. On this matter, it was stated by the spokesperson that the retirement of this 
officer the previous day was a `coincidence an nothing more' (see Ford, 1998a). 
The case of Keith Twitchell is also connected to the former activities of the West 
Midlands Serious Crime Squad. In this case, Twitchell was tortured into signing a 
confession for his alleged part in an armed raid on a local factory in 1980 in which a 
security guard was killed and £11,500 stolen. When he was arrested, eight or nine 
police officers handcuffed Twitchell 's wrists to the back legs of the chair upon which 
basis of false confessions or fabricated evidence. 30 have been overturned by the CACD and in another 
19 cases the charges were dropped, the defendants acquitted or the judge directed not guilty verdicts 
see Pallister, D. (1999) "'Confession" to disgraced crime squad led to 20-year jail term' The Guardian 
October 27. 
40 It is quite common in many CACD appeals that result in CJS miscarriages that the prosecution offers 
no evidence. This has been described in terms of damage 
limitation whereby as little of the full story as 
possible is revealed in open court. For an example of this point see 
George Irving cited Graves, D. 
(1997d) `Bridgewater three set to be released' Electronic Telegraph Issue 637: 
http: //www. telegraph. co. uk retrieved 2 February 2000. 
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he was sitting. Next a plastic bag was placed over his head and pressed against his 
nose and mouth. This suffocation procedure was repeated until finally his resolve was 
totally dissolved and he agreed to sign the statement put in front of him. For his 
`confession', Twitchell served 13 years of his 20-year conviction, being released in 
1993. At the time of writing, Twitchell had received no compensation and none of the 
police officers involved had faced any charges, which also has implications for any 
notions or `aims' of CJS fairness. 
Another example is the case of the Bridgewater Four in which four wrongful 
convictions were obtained through physical harm to suspects. Throughout the 
Bridgewater case, no forensic evidence of any kind against the four was ever 
submitted to any court. No fingerprints of the men were found. No murder weapon 
ever turned up. And there were no witnesses. On the contrary, as stated above, the 
only forensic evidence and witnesses known to the police clearly indicated that it was 
someone else who might be guilty. The police suppressed this and the entire 
prosecution case was based solely on the confessions of Vincent Hickey and Patrick 
Molloy. 
As for Vincent Hickey's `confession', only after the quashing of the convictions of the 
Bridgewater Four in 1997 was it was revealed that successive Home Secretaries had 
had `irrefutable' evidence since 1990 that a serious malpractice had taken place but 
had refused to act. Electrostatic Definition Analysis (ESDA) had shown that the 
handwriting and signature on Vincent Hickey's confession could not have been his 
(see Graves, 1997c). 
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As for Patrick Molloy's `confession', it was revealed that it occurred after days of 
violent interrogation, during which his teeth were broken and he was consistently hit 
around the face and head. For the first ten days he was denied access to a solicitor. 
During this time his food was heavily salted and he was denied liquids. In desperation 
he drank from the toilet. His sleep was interrupted regularly during the night. And he 
was shown Vincent Hickey's forged `confession' accusing him of the murder of Carl 
Bridgewater. In the end, when he was traumatised and weakened by the experience, 
he was offered immediate bail if he signed a confession linking the other three to the 
murder. This he signed as DC John Perkins held him by the hair and read his 
`confession' in his ear whilst DC Graham Leeke wrote it down (see Regan, 1997b). 
When Patrick Molloy was allowed access to a solicitor he immediately retracted any 
statement that he had made, but to no avail. When the BridgewaterThree were freed 
on bail by the CACD in 1997 Lord Justice Roch made the assertion that: `It now 
seems that Mr Molloy was interviewed by officers who were prepared to deceive him 
into making confessions' (Lord Justice Roch cited Graves, 1997c). 
As a result of this, and other allegations that had arisen from the Bridgewater appeal, 
the CPS was asked to investigate three separate allegations against 10 Staffordshire 
police detectives for fabricating evidence. Merseyside police carried out the inquiry, 
after which the DPP announced that no charges would be brought against the accused 
detectives. The DPP `appreciated' that the decision would be `difficult to understand' 
but maintained that the CPS could only act if there was enough evidence to put before 
a court to make a conviction realistic (see Carter, 1998). 
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The above example emphasise an extreme asymmetry (one-sidedness) in the 
processes of criminal justice which has profound impacts for any notion of social 
justice and/or the fairness of the CJS, indicating that CJS is more about `realistic 
criminal conviction', whether `fair' or not. This might go some way in accounting for 
why routine allegations of police and/or prosecution misconduct in England and 
Wales are so rarely punished. Indeed, it is interesting to note that research undertaken 
into police complaint procedures shows that of the 35,820 complaints against the 
police to the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) in 1998, for example, only 847 were 
substantiated. And of those, only 113 resulted in any form of disciplinary action 
(Smith cited Mills, 1999). 
Financial harm 
Hillyard and Tombs' (1999, p. 9) notion of the `mis-appropriation of funds by 
government' as a key theme of a zemiological definition of financial harm would also 
figure prominently in any broader zemiological analysis of the financial consequences 
of wrongful convictions. For as the government assumes responsibility for the 
management of the CJS, any public money that can be conceived to be excessively 
spent as a consequence of wrongful conviction and/or wrongful criminal 
imprisonment, for example, can, in part, be conceived as `mis-appropriated' money. 
Whether measured directly or indirectly, the financial costs of the current scale of 
successful appeals are both significant and substantial. For my purposes here, `direct' 
costs relate to all those expenditures that are normally considered as such costs 
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including compensation paid out for wrongful convictions, judicial costs for court 
hearings and appeals and defence lawyers and barristers costs. But there are also a 
whole host of possible `indirect' economic costs of wrongful convictions, described as 
such only because they are not normally considered. For example, there are the expert 
psychological or social services' assessments, probation reports, and so on necessary 
in court hearings. There are the costs to the penal system of containing the wrongfully 
convicted in prison. There are also the potential costs to the benefit system in terms of 
support provided by the state that was previously provided by the wrongly convicted 
person. And, there are all manner of other `indirect' medical costs incurred, such as 
the socio-psychological counselling that was evident in many of the high profile 
exceptional miscarriage of justice cases in helping to reintroduce those wrongly 
imprisoned into society, sometimes after decades of incarceration. 
Other `indirect' financial costs of wrongful convictions (in the sense that they are not 
normally considered) can also, arguably, include the costs of establishing and 
maintaining such governmental institutions as the CACD, the roots of which were a 
direct response to public pressure that was asserted by the case of Adolf Beck (see 
Editorial, 1904a - Editorial, 1904f; Editorial, 1907). They can include the costs of 
such governmental bodies as the- CCRC, which, like the CACD was also created as a 
direct consequence of public knowledge of exceptional successful appeal cases. They 
can include the costs of establishing and maintaining extra judicial governmental 
inquiries such as royal commissions into problematic aspects of the CJS. They can 
include the costs of the Police Complaints Authority (PCA). Moreover, they can, 
conceivably, include the costs of government policies designed at managing 
miscarriages of justice and all of their strategic 
implementations. 
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Additional financial costs of wrongful convictions spoken about from a zemiological 
voice would also include the costs in overturning the criminal convictions in 
exceptional cases of successful appeal. For example, there were six separate police 
inquires into the Bridgewater Four case, three CACD appeals, one of which, an eight- 
week appeal that was dismissed in 1989, was the longest in British legal history (see 
Graves, 1997d; North, & Wilson, 1996; Wilson, 1996). Similarly, the case of the 
Birmingham Six was referred back to the CACD three times. Furthermore, before the 
appeal judges were prepared to agree that a miscarriage of justice had occurred the 
chief prosecutor had to publicly admit that the forensic evidence, that was so 
influential in the original convictions, was `worthless' (see Laframboise, 1993). More 
recently there was the case of the M25 Three. Previous CACD appeals also figured in 
this case that were dismissed in July 1993, with Lord Watkins stating that there was 
not `even a lurking doubt' about the safety of their convictions (Lord Watkins cited 
Editorial, 2000a). Accordingly, Michael Davis, Randolph Johnson and Raphael Rowe 
- the M25 Three - spent a further seven years wrongfully convicted of a murder that 
they could not have committed. Witnesses had claimed that two of the gang were 
white - but the above named are all black - and forensic evidence and 
fingerprints 
found at the murder scene did not match any of the convicted men. This not only 
emphasises a profound judicial reluctance or inability to overturn meritorious 
wrongful convictions, it also demonstrates a profound financial inefficiency in the 
ability of the CJS to overturn meritorious post-appeal cases. 
But, the question of the financial efficiency of justice does not only relate to 
exceptional cases of successful appeal that retrospectively show a 
failure to overturn 
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wrongful convictions. The sheer number of successful appeals each year, both in the 
CACD and the Crown Court, further undermines the notion of the efficiency of the 
present system. For if the system were efficient it would not make as many mundane 
and/or routine `mistakes' as it does. 
Any attempt to calculate such financial costs, however, can only be partial, as much 
of the information on such matters is not available. Indeed, the HO Statistical Bulletin 
collects statistical data only of `notifiable' criminal offences. As miscarriages of 
justice are not regarded as notifiable criminal offences (to do so would be to define 
them under a general rubric of `state crime') statistics on such matters are not 
collected. In addition, details of HO compensation in cases of miscarriages of justice 
is regarded as `confidential' (see Editorial, 1998a) information, which only further 
obscures and obstructs any attempt at economic cost calculation. Despite these 
methodological problems, rough estimations can be determined from a variety of 
sources. For example, HO Research Studies (HORS) reports on research undertaken 
by or on behalf of the HO and published by RDS can prove a very fruitful source. For 
example, HO sponsored research on the comparative merits of public versus private 
prisons divulges much statistical information on the relative costs of the prisons 
compared and assessed. Other useful sources published by RDS include Research 
Findings, the Research Bulletin, Statistical Bulletins and Statistical Papers. They can 
provide official statistics that are produced as by-products of other inquiries that are 
applicable here. Investigative newspaper journalism and biographical accounts of 
some of the high profile exceptional miscarriages are also a rich source of 
information. From these sources a trickle of information pieced together can present 
some indication of the `bigger picture'. In an attempt to 
demonstrate, at least in part, 
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the existence of the bigger picture of the financial costs of wrongful convictions that 
are not normally taken into account, the remainder of this section will consider some 
of these costs in relation to four areas - compensation, legal fees, penal costs and the 
CCRC. 
Popular perceptions of miscarriage of justice compensation, in line with popular 
perceptions of miscarriages generally, tend to think only about compensation paid out 
to exceptional high profile victims of wrongful imprisonment. In such a context, 
attention is focused upon individual cases such as the £1 million that was recently 
reported to have been offered to Paddy Hill of the Birmingham Six for his 17 years of 
wrongful imprisonment (see Bright and Hill, 2002). These cost seem significant 
enough, but they tend to give the impression that such compensation is uncommon. 
Indeed, Paddy Hill 's offer comes over a quarter of a century after his wrongful 
conviction, and 11 years after his conviction was quashed by the CACD in 1991. 
But, compensation to victims of miscarriages of justice is a routine feature of the CJS 
if the wrongful conviction derived from `judicial error'. Over the last decade, for 
example, there have been over 150 successful applications for compensation for 
wrongful conviction or charge under the statutory or ex-gratia schemes. As this 
translates into economic terms, the HO paid out a record £6.65 million in 
compensation in 1997-98, compared with £ 1.54 million in 1994-95 (see Ford, 1998b). 
In addition, according to a newspaper article published in December 1998, the 
Government faces the prospect of a future bill of up to £50 million in costs and 
compensation for miscarriages of justice uncovered 
by corruption investigators as part 
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of an anti-corruption drive in the Metropolitan Police. The Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner is said to have given the Home Secretary this figure after a confidential 
review of `Operation Stain' into the problems of tackling corruption among London's 
police force. The figures were said to be based on the possibility that 200 cases being 
investigated will all result in quashed convictions. The article concluded that whilst 
details of HO compensation in miscarriages of justice are `confidential', they are 
believed to include awards of up to £20,000 for each year wrongly spent in jail (see 
Editorial, 1998a). 
This figure for HO compensation awards of £20,000 for every year of wrongful 
imprisonment appears conservative in the context of a previous article that appeared 
in the same newspaper almost 12 months earlier. In that article it was revealed that in 
January 1998 George Lewis was awarded £40,000 compensation (E200,000 in total) 
for each of the five years that he had spent imprisoned for crimes that he did not 
commit (see Ford, 1998a). Further support for the current compensatory sum of 
£40,000 for each year spent wrongfully imprisoned stems from the Andrew Evans 
case. In June 2000, it was reported that Andrew Evans -a routine miscarriage of 
justice victim - received £ Im for the 25 years that he spent wrongfully convicted of a 
murder that he did not commit - which also averages out at around £40,000 for each 
year he spent wrongly imprisoned (see Weir, 2000). 
Most recently, it was estimated that Stephen Downing is expected to receive an £8 
million Government `apology' for his 27 years of wrongful imprisonment (see Hill, 
2001b). If this estimation is achieved it will significantly increase the current estimate 
of between £20-£40,000 compensation for every year of wrongful 
imprisonment to 
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almost £300,000 per year. Consequently, the estimated £50 million future bill for 
miscarriage of justice compensation would seem to be in need of a significant 
revision. 
To gain a purchase upon the likely financial costs of mundane and routine successful 
appeals, it is interesting to consider how legal fees for legally-aided defence work 
relates to Publicly Funded Legal Services. 41 In 2001, for example, over 103,000 
applications were made in magistrates' courts for publicly funded defence 
representation in the Crown Court, almost all of which were granted. This resulted in 
a total net expenditure on criminal legal aid in 2001 of £1,750 million (see Lord 
Chancellor's Department, 2001, pp. 101-104). If these costs are set against the 
average number of cases that were successful in appeal against criminal conviction 
each and every year over the last decade (represented in Table 2 and Table 5 above), 
we can reasonably assume that at least 5% of legal aid spending in 2001 was spent 
wrongly convicting and then successfully overturning those wrongful convictions. For 
the annual average of 267 cases that were successfully appealed in the CACD against 
criminal convictions given in the Crown Court (see Table 2 cited in chapter 3 above) 
and the annual average of 3,500 successful appeals in the Crown Court against 
criminal convictions given in the magistrates' court (see Table 5 cited in chapter 3 
above) would have been funded twice. This amounts to a sum in excess of £87 million 
in 2001 alone. 
In addition to the financial costs of wrongful convictions so far calculated, the total 
costs of miscarriages of justice are increased still further if the costs to the penal 
41 The Legal Services Commission replaced the Legal Aid Board in April 2001. 
245 
system of containing the wrongfully convicted in prison are also included. For 
example, the average cost per prisoner place in all prison establishments between 
1998 and 1999 was £22,649.42 If this figure is multiplied by the 3000 people who are 
currently estimated to be wrongly imprisoned in England and Wales with a legitimate 
grievance (Watkins, 2001), then a further £67.9 million can be added to the annual 
expenditure on miscarriages. This brings the likely annual running total of 
compensation, public legal assistance and prison costs to an amount of over £ 155 
million. 
Whether they are normally taken into account or normally omitted, the financial costs 
of establishing and running the Criminal Cases Review Commission are also directly 
attributable to exceptional successful appeals. For the CCRC was a legislative 
outgrowth of the RCCJ (1993) which was established in response to the public crisis 
of confidence that was induced by the repeated refusal of successive Home 
Secretaries to refer the cases of the Guildford Four, the Maguire Seven and the 
Birmingham Six back to the CACD. The CCRC, like the CACD and the royal 
commissions on miscarriages of justice exists only because miscarriages can and do 
occur. As the `Management Statement' of the CCRC states it `will come to play a key 
role in enhancing public confidence in the integrity and effectiveness of the criminal 
justice system as a whole, as Parliament intended' (Criminal Cases Review 
Commission, 2002c). Moreover, one of the CCRC's five primary objectives also 
states that it will `enhance public confidence in the criminal justice system' 
(Criminal 
Cases Review Commission, 2000). In this context, any notion of the theoretical 
`independence' of the CCRC is difficult to sustain. In such a context, the economic 
42 Prison Service Website: http: 'wWWI hmprisonserv ice. gov . ukfag retrieved 
24 July 2001. 
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costs of the CCRC can be conceived as political governmental expenditure to 
domesticate identified failings in the legislative framework of the CJS and, 
simultaneously, promote confidence in the rule of law. Accordingly the costs of the 
CCRC come into play. Table 8 shows a total of £9.7 million in terms of the 
employment costs of the CCRC between 1 January 1997 and 31 March 2000. 
Table 8: Annual employment costs of Criminal Cases Review Commission 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
£'s millions 2.2* 2.2 2.5 2.8 9.7 
Source: Source: Criminal Cases Review Commission, 1998; Criminal Cases Review Commission, 
1999; Criminal Cases Review Commission, 2000. * This figure represents the period 1 January 1997 to 
31 March 1998. 
Table 9 shows a total of £7.3 million in terms of the running costs of the CCRC 
between 1 January 1997 and 31 March 2000. 
Table 9: Annual running costs of Criminal Cases Review Commission 
Year 1997 4 1998 1999 2000 Total £'s millions 1.8* - 1.8 1.8 1.9 7.3 Source: Criminal Cases Review Commission, 1998; Criminal Cases Review Commission, 1999; 
Criminal Cases Review Commission, 2000. * This figure represents the period 1 January 1997 to 31 
March 1998. 
If the £5 million or so per annum that it costs to run the CCRC is added to the running 
annual total of £ 155 per annum for likely costs of compensation, legal assistance and 
penal costs, then the annual costs of wrongful convictions in just these four areas 
increases to around £ 160 million a year. When the costs of establishing and running 
such things as the CACD, the PCA, governmental inquiries and/or the royal 
commissions into problematic aspects of the CJS are also added, the economic costs 
of wrongful convictions over the last decade probably run into many billions of 
pounds. 
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This analysis could be accused of stretching the argument too far. As no human 
system can be perfect, it is inevitable that some wrongful convictions will occur. 
Accordingly, it is also inevitable that the provision of safeguards to attempt to prevent 
and remedy wrongful convictions when they occur is a necessary requirement in a 
liberal democratic society that will incur a financial cost. The problem with this is that 
the system does not just sometimes get it wrong. Contrary to public perceptions, there 
are over 4,000 successful appeals every year in England and Wales. The present 
system gets it wrong everyday of every week of every year, then, with the 
consequence that an excessive amount of public expenditure can be conceived to be 
currently spent on wrongful convictions. Accordingly, it is not that any expenditure 
on wrongful convictions is entirely wasteful, more that the current expenditure is so 
excessive that it can legitimately be conceived to detract from public spending in 
other areas of desperate need. 
So, from a zemiological voice, the excessive amount of money spent on wrongful 
imprisonment, for example, can be conceived to deprive innocent school children in 
terms of restricted educational resources. The excessive amount spent on 
compensation to victims of miscarriages of justice can be conceived as depriving 
countless scores of people from necessary hospital treatments. Moreover, the 
excessive amount spent on legal fees to wrongfully convict people and then support 
their successful appeals, for example, can be conceived to take away from the total 
governmental expenditure that could go to providing a decent minimum wage or more 
realistic pension. In this zemiological sense, wrongful convictions affect us all, which 
is why the reduction of the costs of injustice of the current system would 
be at the 
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forefront of the zemiological voice - justice might cost, but mis-justice, undoubtedly, 
costs more. 
Critical remarks 
The utility of the zemiological voice, then, is that it not only enhances the re- 
orientated human rights voice constructed in the previous chapter that invoked the 
limits and/or prohibitions of the lawful restriction and/or abuse of the HRA, it also 
further extends it. For the zemiological voices on forms of social and psychological 
harm further emphasise the effects of wrongful conviction on the enjoyment and/or 
fulfilment of the lives of victims, thus further illustrating the contravention of Article 
2 of the HRA (Right to Life). The zemiological voice on the physical harm of 
wrongful convictions further enhances the human rights critique of the contravention 
of Article 3 of the HRA (Freedom from Torture). The zemiological voice on the 
financial harm of the current public expenditure on wrongful convictions extends all 
existing voices into an important area of harm which contains significant human 
rights issues for all members of the population. In addition, the zemiological voice 
can serve to extend notions of miscarriages of justice still further by bringing to light 
an extra dimension of harm when successful appeals are achieved, i. e. the broader 
harm that accompanies the knowledge that justice `failed' and that the real perpetrator 
remains at liberty to cause more harm. In this sense, zemiology can, indeed, be 
constructed as a `defender of human rights' and can contribute to re-qualifying a 
variety of forms of anti-discourse about wrongful conviction that are currently an 
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extremely marginalised or even hidden aspect of the overall potential of counter- 
discourse against miscarriages of justice. 
There are, however, core questions and difficulties that need to be raised in appraising 
the promise of the zemiological project. Not least, there is a central vagueness or all- 
purposeness in the adoption of the `harm' perspective. For instance, it is not obvious 
whether the locus of harm lies at the level of the individual or more indirectly, in 
some aspect of the social collectivity. The clarification of this issue, however, is of 
major importance, in addressing, for example, issues around the ubiquitous, but 
contested, idea of `victimless crimes'. On the one hand, zemiology would seem to 
indicate that the only way to decide and assess the occurrence of injustice or `crime' 
is to demonstrate some definite form of `harm' or injury to an individual victim. On 
the other hand, and possibly with no reference to any particular complaints of 
individual harm, zemiology insists on highlighting indirect harms that may have an 
impact on other aspects of society more collectively conceived. To date, zemiological 
writings have not properly specified this kind of distinction. 
There are also a range of issues relating to the inherent subjectivity and relativism of 
zemiological analyses in the sense that `harm' is an irreducibly value-laden norm. 
Clearly, and most basically, some individuals will tend to get more easily upset 
(psychological harm), or more easily hurt (physical harm), than others in the event of 
experiencing very similar wrongdoings against them. This could play out to the effect 
that the treatment of individuals by state agencies such as the police and prison 
service, for example, that upset or hurt those 
individuals that are predisposed to 
psychological anxiety or more vulnerable to physical 
harm would be defined as 
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harmful and, hence, `criminal'. By the same token, however, similar, or even the same 
treatment during police interviews and/or imprisonment would not be defined as 
harmful and, hence, not `criminal', if they occurred to individuals not so predisposed. 
To give an almost caricatured sense of the problem, would the wrongful 
imprisonment of someone prone to claustrophobia represent a worse `crime' than the 
wrongful imprisonment of someone who did not have that condition? 
The serious point behind such a near-absurd scenario concerns the relationship 
between harm and injustice, a complex connection, which the logic of zemiology 
seems to oversimplify. This is an issue because the injustice of a wrongful conviction 
might have little to do with the exact amount of harm experienced. An individual 
would be no less unfairly treated because he/she did not complain about their 
psychological deterioration in prison whilst hoping for the repeal of their sentence. 
This emphasises an inevitable subjectivity/relativism in calculations of harm. For 
example, to take a case of economic harm, a £50 parking fine to a millionaire would 
cause little bother to that individual's daily life. However, the same penalty dealt out 
to a person on state benefits would probably account for a week's groceries, thus 
constituting a disproportionate amount of harm to the latter individual in relation to 
the same treatment. Whilst there would undoubtedly be some additional `justice' in a 
kind of sliding scale of penalties according to harm, the effectiveness of the resulting 
system and the intrusive contesability of case-by-case relativities would be unlikely to 
create consistency of expectation, a prerequisite of any system of law/justice. 
A further set of questions that could be levelled at zemiology relates to the conception 
of human nature that lies behind zemiological 
declarations of harm. What if it was 
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thought, for example, that international human rights were actually themselves 
harmful to either individual freedom or group subcultures? It could be argued that we 
cannot simply assume that the notions of `human rights' as they were constructed in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the aftermath of the Second World War 
(see United Nation, 2002; Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, 2002), and 
generally and unproblematically incorporated by the ECHR and the HRA, always 
serve in the best interests of all human beings, in all places, and for all time. It could 
even be argued that forms of human rights legislation, by advocating certain forms of 
human behaviour and conduct and restricting and actively sanctioning others, can be 
regarded as a form of social control and domination that limits the ability of 
individuals to act in self-determining ways. This is not necessarily to criticise or argue 
against signed-up-for human rights in England and Wales. Rather, it is to point up 
difficult matters such as the possible eurocentricity of their origins and question their 
applicability to states and societies that are not signatories to such legislation. A 
pertinent example of the difficulties faced by the universal and/or inalienable export 
of Western human rights ideals was the recent conflict in Afghanistan by the 
`international community' that was sanctioned by the United Nations (see, for 
example, Woollacott, 200 1). 43 In particular, that conflict was partly legitimated in the 
name of human rights and the liberation of Muslim women who, it was argued, were 
being oppressed, as they were not being afforded the rights and freedoms that are 
aspired to/signed-up-for in the West (see, for example, Viner, 2002). This took little, 
if any, account of the harm caused to the tens of thousands of human beings caught-up 
in the conflict that were defined as `against us', as they were not in compliance with 
43 For a detailed history and chronology of the 
United Nations see United Nations (1997) `Milestones 
in United Nations History' website: http: %i'ww'ww'ww'. un. org Overview 'milesto4. htm retrived 21 October 
2002. 
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Western notions of `proper' human conduct (see, for example, Scraton, 2002; 2002b; 
Chomsky, 2002; Green, 2002b; Mathiesen, 2002). A key conundrum for zemiology, 
then, is: Isn't one person's (group's) injury another person's justice? 
More generally, what is the basis of zemiology's implicitly assumed vantage point of 
moral superiority - something of which must be assumed if the adjudication of harm 
is to lead to real progressive change? A zemiological analysis of the psychological 
harm to a victim of a miscarriage of justice, for example, is not necessarily superior to 
a more legally grounded analysis of the harm caused by the denial of legal rights and 
freedoms. Following the same example, psychological harm can manifest itself 
precisely because legal rights and freedoms have been transgressed, and 
psychological equilibrium can possibly be restored once the denial of rights has been 
acknowledged by the state and remedied. As indicated, psychological harm can also 
be completely unrelated to external factors and could be a purely subjective mental 
state. Zemiological framing seems to take it for granted that there is an obvious and 
`progressive' way of accounting for and dealing with harms, and that somehow those 
subscribing to zemiology will, in fact, be singing from the same moral hymn sheet. 
Not only is this very questionable in itself, the zemiological literature fails entirely to 
openly discuss such obvious lacunae. 
Finally, there are a number of issues around the attitude of zemiology and the status of 
the existing CJS. If the primary object of zemiology is the reduction of 
harm, then, in 
the context of wrongful convictions, for example, zemiology could not reasonably 
be 
conceived as being entirely `against' the 
System as such. On the contrary, a strict 
zemiological approach would 
be just as concerned with the harm caused by 
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perpetrators of serious crimes as they are already conceived by the CJS, for example, 
murder, rape, serious physical assault, and theft, for the harm that such occurrences 
cause to victims. From such a standpoint, zemiology would, logically, seek to ensure 
that such `criminals' or `harm producers', or whatever form of semantics one would 
care to use, were not at liberty to continue to produce harm/commit `crime', and this, 
perhaps, could be thought to leave existing arguments for working in or against the 
CJS pretty much in the place they were prior to the zemiological `intervention'. 
And, yet, it is manifestly the case that one of the key self-images of zemiology is that 
it does, precisely, intervene in such a way as to promote the `longer-term' 
abandonment of conventional notions of `crime', `law' and `criminal justice' 
altogether in favour of analyses of `harm' (Hillyard and Tombs, 2001, p. 23). Where 
this is the implication, a critical counter can be made, for example, with the recent 
introduction of the HRA, that renders the actions of state agencies and the employees 
of state agencies `unlawful' if they are incompatible with the letter and/or the `spirit' 
of the Act. This, I believe, significantly improves the opportunities for successful 
legal challenge against the CJS for violations of the Act. Moreover, if zemiologists in 
the guise of `defenders of human rights' can persuasively demonstrate violations of 
the HRA, then, the cause of such violation can be labelled as crime within a general 
rubric of definitions of state crime and legal redress can be effectively obtained. As 
Penny Green's (2002b, p. 76) definition of state crime asserted: `If a state's own 
actions depart from that state's own rules or is unjustifiable in terms of the values the 
rules purport to serve, then those actions objectively are illegitimate. ' 
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Accordingly, I do not see zemiology as necessarily different or distinct from the `state 
crime' perspective that attempts to highlight the violation or contravention from 
signed-up-for human rights. On the contrary, the critical modes of thinking behind 
zemiology and the state crime approach `share a common appreciation of 
contradictory affairs in human affairs, a negative assessment of the status quo, and a 
belief in the need for fundamental change in productive and social relations' (Barak, 
1991, p. 11); they can both be conceived as logical extensions of the call by 
criminologists such as Sutherland (1940; 1983) in the 1930s to include the behaviours 
of `white-collar' and corporate offenders - behaviours which may or may not be 
legally defined as against the law, but which nevertheless, cause harm, injury and 
violence - into what was then emerging as the precursor to the study of `the crimes of 
the powerful'; and, they are both direct outgrowths of the program outlined by 
Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1975). As Barak, (1991b, p. 273) asserted in his 
call for an expanded definition of crime to incorporate state criminality: [My call is a 
response to] `the call in the 1970s by two radical criminologists [Schwendinger and 
Schwendinger 1975] for the study of systems of exploitation and state crimogenic 
institutions [that] has not been seriously pursued by criminology. ' In this sense, I 
believe that zemiology should continue to proceed within the `short' to `medium' 
term view presented by the main advocates of zemiology that: 
`... whether or not a new discipline of zemiology is to emerge, we must accept that raising 
issues of social harm does not [necessarily] entail making a simple, once-and-for-all choice 
between representing these as either crimes or harms; each may 
form part of an effective 
political strategy' (Hillyard and Tombs, 
2001 p. 22 original emphasis). 
For as Tombs (1999, p. 6) elsewhere noted: 
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`It is difficult to conceive of over-riding advantages to organising our work around `social 
harm' [i. e. zemiology]. A focus on law through the category crime may be more productive: 
law provides a site of struggle, and facilitates the development of focused political action in 
a way that it is not necessarily the case with reference to social harm. That we should restrict 
our work and political activity to law does not, of course, follow from this observation' 
(original emphasis). 
To be sure, this undoubtedly creates a paradox for the architects of the zemiological 
paradigm, for how can you have an alternative based in zemiology, and yet say, we 
can retain a notion of crime/law in the present term? Despite this, I see the utility of 
the short to medium zemiological lens to critical analyses of miscarriages of justice as 
having the potential to contribute to, not detract from, the forms of critical 
criminology from within which the `frustrated' notion of zemiology derives. It can 
contribute to the attempt to re-orientate definitions of miscarriages of justice to 
include all successful appeals precisely because it helps to illuminate, in a very 
persuasive way, the comparable forms of harm that occur in all successful appeals, 
whether they be exceptionally, routinely or mundanely determined. Hence, the human 
rights approach of zemiology can contribute to the incorporation of such events and 
behaviours that can be conceived to violate (contravene) domestic or international 
signed-up-for human rights legislation within the rubric of state crime in the struggle 
against forms of social injustice. Moreover, as Carlen, (1991, pp. 54-62) drawing 
from Bachelard (1940) and Derrida (1976) has noted: 
Radical theorists can diminish their perennial fear of the discursive power of the empirical 
referent by adopting `the methodological protocol... 
that systems of thought must say "No" 
to their own conventions and conditions of existence... there 
is no reason why they should 
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not both take seriously (that is, recognise) and deny the empirical referent's material and 
[discursive] effects... [for] the very task of theory is to engage in a struggle for power over 
the "meaning of things"... to produce new meanings which will empower' (original 
emphasis). 
For me, zemiology and the state crime perspectives are complementary expressions of 
the long tradition within critical criminology of saying `No' to power; to dominant 
definitions and categories of `crime' and `victim'; they are essentially a struggle for 
power over the `meanings' of `crime' and `victim'. In this sense, I do not think that 
one has to be an out-and-out zemiologist to find a utility with the approach. Nor does 
one have to be an out-and-out critic. In the same way that Foucault can be used as a 
resource to picture aspects of existing forms of social reality without the need to be a 
`Foucauldian' (see Gane, 1986, p. 111; Osborne, 1994, pp. 493-499), zemiology, too, 
notwithstanding its difficulties/limitations, can be used as a resource, as a tool of 
analysis, a platform that can aid in the re-orientation of popular perceptions of 
miscarriages of justice. As Hillyard and Tombs (2001, p. 10) stated: `defining what 
constitutes harm is a productive... process ... zemiology 
is partially to be defined in its 
very operationalisation, in its efforts to measure social harms. ' Defining what 
constitutes `crime' and `victim' is equally a productive process. Definitions of `crime' 
and `victim' change over time, in part, precisely because certain events and/or forms 
of behaviour that cause harm are promoted and demoted in the discursive struggle 
between the defenders of the existing CJS arrangements and critics who want to 
change/reform them. It is within such a context that this thesis sees the utility of a 
fusion of Foucauldian insights of the operations and exercise of prevailing forms of 
CJS knowledge-power with the perspectives of zemiology and state crime as tools to 
picture the real scale and the harmful effects of miscarriages of 
justice and to assess 
257 
the possibilities of resistance. The motivation being, that it will initiate a more fruitful 
debate about conventional `meanings' of miscarriages in such a way as to question the 
management of the CJS, change public perceptions and contribute to struggles for 
change. 
Conclusion 
In an attempt to extend still further the existing depictions of the harmful 
consequences of wrongful convictions, this chapter constructed a new voice from the 
emerging zemiological approach. In essence, zemiology works within the general 
agenda of human rights discourse but extends forms of human rights critique into a 
more morally grounded domain. In this context, a qualified zemiological voice was 
constructed that did not stray too far outside of a focus on the categories of 
`lawfulness' and `unlawfulness' as contained in the HRA. In so doing, the 
zemiological voice was indeed shown to both enhance the extended human rights 
voice on the harmful consequences of wrongful convictions that was re-orientated in 
the previous chapter, and take the analysis into even newer territory. This provided a 
more detailed depiction of a range of forms of harm that are likely to be experienced 
by the direct victims of wrongful convictions. It provided an insight into a more 
appropriate depiction of some of the wider harmful consequences to others caught-up 
in justice in `error' and the broader society. It built on, and enhanced, critiques about 
the contravention of Article 2 of the HRA, that were constructed 
in the previous 
chapter, by emphasising forms of social and psychological 
harm of wrongful 
convictions. It strengthened the notion of the contravention of 
Article 3 of the HRA, 
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also constructed in the previous chapter, through the provision of insights into the 
details of forms of physical harm experienced by victims in cases of successful 
appeal. Furthermore, the zemiological voice was applied to extend existing analyses 
still further by indicating the staggering costs to the public purse of wrongful 
convictions that have profound socio-economic and human rights impacts upon 
society as a whole. In addition, a further consequence of the zemiological voice on 
successful appeals from a symmetrical perspective is that the failure to convict those 
persons guilty of serious offences is of as much concern as the conviction of the 
innocent. For just as when an innocent person is wrongly convicted, if a perpetrator of 
a serious crime is not convicted and they remain at liberty, then there is the potential 
for them to commit more crime, and, hence, cause more harm. 
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Conclusion 
Overall, this thesis has been trying to shift analyses of miscarriages of justice to a 
more inclusive perspective of successful appeals against criminal conviction. The 
point of this is three-fold: to provide a more adequate depiction of both the scale of 
wrongful convictions that are currently occurring and the possible harmful 
consequences of those wrongful convictions; to map a new terrain for miscarriages of 
justice as afield of empirical enquiry; and, to critically review the activity of counter- 
discourse. The first three chapters called for a re-orientation of existing definitions of 
miscarriages of justice to include all successful appeals on the grounds that the focus 
upon exceptional cases of successful appeal is limited in its depiction of the scale of 
wrongful convictions. Moreover, it was shown that even if all of the cases that appear 
in the official statistics of successful appeals were defined as miscarriages they would 
still not capture the total wrongful conviction phenomenon in England and Wales. For 
they do not include a whole variety of causes of wrongful convictions that will never 
feature in the official statistics. Accordingly, the scale of the victims of wrongful 
convictions and the harmful consequences that they experience is also potentially in 
excess of that which can be inferred from the official statistics of successful appeals. 
Following this, the first three chapters of Part Two evoked the most significant 
existing voices on miscarriages of justice and pointed up both their strengths and their 
pitfalls. Whilst the existing voices against miscarriages of 
justice routinely assert that 
they are widespread, they are grounded 
in a definition from which wrongful 
convictions can only be conceived as rare occurrences and quantified as small 
in 
number. In consequence, attempted reforms of 
the system to remedy or avert 
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miscarriages of justice have attempted to impact only within the very limited scope of 
procedural problematics that are exemplified by specific post-appeal cases. As this 
relates to the harmful consequences of wrongful convictions, existing analyses have 
also been restricted to the denial of legal rights and freedoms and have only been 
conceived as rare occurrences involving a small number of individual victims. 
In response, I attempted to shift critical academic theory about the production and 
deployment of counter-discourse against miscarriages of justice and the governmental 
processes through which competing discourse is dealt with. In particular, the 
relevance of public crises of confidence that accompany successful appeals that 
exemplify previously unacknowledged `errors' in the legislative framework of the 
CJS was emphasised. Such events should not be viewed negatively. On the contrary, 
they represent moments when the conditions for reform of the CJS are right, and can 
be utilised to force through more effective changes. This has tended to be missed by 
critical academic analyses against miscarriages of justice, which have rather tended to 
gloat at the public crisis as if it were somehow evidence of a corresponding crisis in 
government. This indicates a deep theoretical misconception at the heart of the forms 
of critical academic counter-discourse that responded to the RCCJ. For `government', 
in the Foucauldian sense, is precisely about the management of opposing discourses at 
critical moments and in response to problematic events. In such a context, a primary 
task of critical counter-discourse to the way things are should be to attempt to invoke 
as many public crises of confidence as possible, which should then be viewed as 
opportunities to be exploited and to force more effective changes. 
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Historically, the changes that have followed public crises of confidence in specific 
aspects of the CJS, such as the establishment of the CCRC as recommended by the 
RCCJ, have not met the expectations of the critical academic community. This has 
served to further the general misconceived conspiratorial tendency that government is 
no more than an authoritarian abuse of power, which dominates a citizenry or a 
population. If viewed differently, however, at least part of the problem can be 
attributed to the kinds of misconceived notions of power, resistance and government 
that were collectively expressed in the counter-discourse contained in Criminal 
Justice in Crisis. The RCCJ did not fail in the public's eyes, for it resolved the public 
crisis of confidence that it was established to address. Rather, the critical academic 
discourse that responded to the RCCJ can be conceived to have failed to properly 
understand both the conditions for its establishment and to exploit the real 
opportunities that it provided. 
In essence, then, this thesis represents a concerted attempt to move away from 
exceptionalist understandings of wrongful convictions towards a much more inclusive 
depiction of the miscarriage of justice terrain. Extending existing analyses in this way, 
the domain of human rights and the moral promise of the HRA were explored. For 
although the HRA does allow for the lawful transgression from the rights and 
freedoms it provides, it does so only within the context of certain limits and 
prohibitions against the abuse of rights. From such a standpoint, a closer analysis of 
the various Articles of the HRA and the current scale of successful appeals revealed 
that almost all were conceivably being contravened 
by a judiciary that produces too 
many wrongful convictions. This re-orientated 
human rights voice, however, also 
displayed insurmountable limitations in terms of depictions of the harmful 
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consequences of wrongful convictions, because human rights discourses are entirely 
grounded in notions of legally constructed individual subjects. 
In an attempt to provide a voice that might better be able to depict the full range of 
harm, both to individuals other than the direct victims of wrongful convictions and the 
collectivity as a whole, the fledgling zemiological approach was considered. This took 
the human rights analysis further into the territory of moral critique. Even so, once 
again reservations were lodged. In its most extreme, but quite logical, guise the 
zemiological voice requires that critical discourse takes place completely outside of 
the legal agenda because `crime' must be substituted in toto by `harm'. This was 
argued to be a mistake as it would inevitably diminish the contribution of zemiology 
to struggles for change and more focussed forms of political action against existing 
legal regimes. There is also an almost constitutive risk of subjectivism and 
incommensurability at the heart of zemiology, because of the experiential relativity of 
`harm' across immeasurable social situations. Suitably qualified, the zemiological 
voice was put to work in the terrain of successful appeals whereupon it called up 
depictions and calculations of the consequences of miscarriage of justice that are not 
available from other perspectives. 
The thesis, then, has sought to contribute towards the articulation of a new critical 
`voice' in several ways and at different, but related, levels. The existing definitions, 
calculations, conceptions of causality and understandings of reform around 
miscarriages of justice have been persistently questioned and cumulatively, at least to 
an extent, replaced by more inclusive horizons. 
This involved a series of conceptual 
`interventions' derived from a particular reading of Foucault's insights, and it also 
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required considerable reworking of both empirical cases and evaluative standpoints. 
When first embarking on this thesis I was struck by the fact that the `terrain' or `field' 
of miscarriage of justice analysis appeared rather incoherent and even morally 
arbitrary. Whilst it is hardly likely that the much needed task of re-mapping the field 
could be accomplished by any one study or another, the different aspects of argument 
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